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This is a five-part study of leveraged management buyouts. It examines the nature of these 
transactions and evaluates the difference in the development of LMBO activity in the UK 
and Germany. This study (i) provides evidence on how the development of specific macro- 
and microeconomic factors as well as the legal and tax environment have influenced LMBO 
activity in the LTK and Germany; (ii) examines and compares the post-buyout performance 
of LMBO companies in the UK and Germany until 1991; and (iii) investigates the changes 
in operating performance for a sample of 30 companies which conducted LMBOs in 
Germany in times of recession. Evidence of this research suggests that significant 
differences in the micro- and macroeconomic conditions and in the legal and tax 
environment in the UK and Germany were responsible for the different level of LMBO 
activity in these countries. The results of the research indicate further that the leveraged 
management buyout structure improved post-buyout operating performance of the majority 
of UK and German LMBO companies until 1991. The results on the examination of 
companies which were the target of LMBOs during the difficult economic conditions from 
1991 to 1994 revealed that the sample companies were able to improve operating 
performance after the buyout. Statistical evidence however could not confirm the 
assumption that post-buyout performance exceeds pre-buyout performance of German 
LMBO companies in times of recession. 
Due to the fact that research on German LMBO companies is limited in scope and number, 
further research should focus on the following issues: (i) whether the LMBO structure can 
be sustained over the long term as a corporate form in Germany; (ii) why some LMBO 
companies fail in Germany; (iii) why, if the LNOO structure is the optimal organisational 
form, some German LMIBO companies go private after the buyout. 
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Summary: 
The 1980's witnessed a dramatic increase in the incidence of debt-laden corporate 
restructuring, so-called leveraged buyouts. One frequently employed form thereof is the 
leveraged management buyout (LMBO). After beginning in the US, these buyout 
transactions quickly traversed the Atlantic, spreading first to the UK and then throughout 
Europe. In times of recession leveraged management buyouts were seen as an important 
method of restructuring in order to improve the efficiency and performance of the corporate 
structure through the remarriage of ownership and control and through the influence of 
leverage in the funding of the transaction. 
This research is a five-part study of leveraged management buyouts. It starts with a 
description of the leveraged management buyout concept in general, providing information 
about the most important LMBO company characteristics, the role of debt in the 
transaction,, the structure of the transaction and the potential exit alternatives after the 
buyout. The following sections research the development of specific micro- and 
macroeconomic factors as well as the legal and tax environment. These external conditions 
have influenced the development of LMBO activity and are responsible for the current 
levels of LMBO activity in the UK and Germany. Finally, the study examines and compares 
the post-buyout performance of UK and German LMBO companies until 1991, concluding 
with evidence on changes in the operating results of 30 sample German LM1130 companies 
under the difficult economic conditions between 1991 and 1994. The research on post- 
buyout performance of German LMBO companies in recessionary times examines to what 
extent deteriorating macroeconomic conditions diminish the positive effects of leveraged 
management buyout transactions. In this context, company performance one year before the 
buyout was compared to company performance two years after the buyout and to the 
average industry performance. Three accounting variables were used to measure 
performance and the Mest and anova analysis was used to test the null hypothesis that pre- 
buyout performance equals post-buyout performance. 
1 
The comparison of micro- and macroeconomic factors in the UK and Germany reveal that 
significant differences in the external conditions of LMBO activity were responsible for the 
considerably less strong development in German LMBO activity compared to that of the 
UK. Furthermore, research on the legal and taxation requirements in both countries 
revealed that the regulations were much more complex and strict in Germany than in the 
UK. This may have contributed to the far less dynamic development of LMBO activity in 
Germany. 
The results on the comparison of post-buyout performance of German and UK LMBO 
companies revealed that LMBOs before 1991 led to improvements in the post-buyout 
operating performance for a majority of LMBO companies. The results obtained suggest 
that operating performance after the buyout is higher than before the buyout. The evidence 
found supports the assumption that changes in operational performance are due to the 
reunification of ownership and control giving management an incentive to increase 
efficiency and value and finding a way to pay off the LMBO debt while increasing the value 
of the firm. 
The examination of the post-buyout performance in 30 German LMBO companies which 
conducted an LMIBO in the recessionary period between 1991 and 1994 revealed that the 
post-buyout performance with respect to sales, operating income and operating cash-flow 
exceeded the pre-buyout performance. The statistical calculations on the variables sales, 
operating income and operating cash-flow of the 30 sample companies produced differing 
results. The results on pre- and post-buyout sales were statistically significant so that the 
null hypothesis that post-buyout sales volume equals pre-buyout sales volume could be 
rejected. The results for the difference in pre- and post-buyout operating income and cash- 
flow were statistically insignificant, so that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. As a 
consequence, it could not be statistically proven that LMBO structure has a positive 
impact 
on the post-buyout performance of companies which conducted LMBOs in times of 
economic recession. 
2 
Existing research about the development of German LMBO companies is still very IMlited 
in scope and number. In order to complete the existing evidence on post-buyout 
performance of German LMBO companies, further research is needed on the longevity of 
the LUBO structure as a corporate form in Germany. Second, future research should focus 
on the reasons for LMBO company failures in Germany, with a comprehensive study on the 
factors which led to bankruptcy. Third, if the LMBO structure is an optimal organisational 
form,, more research is needed on the question why some LMBO companies go public after 
the buyout and whether the increase in performance is sustainable after the company has 
gone public. 
3 
A. General description of the study focus 
1. Introduction 
1. Nature and intent of LMBOs 
The decade of the 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in the incidence of debt-laden 
corporate restructuring, so-called leveraged buyouts. One form of restructuring that has 
frequently been employed is the leveraged management buyout. In this transaction, stock 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of incumbent top level managers and a relatively 
small number of investors. Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and especially leveraged management 
buyouts (LMBOs) were important elements in the process of corporate restructuring which 
emerged in the US in the late 1970's. 
After its advance in the US, buyouts quickly traversed the Atlantic, spreading first to the UK 
and then throughout Europe. Here, in times of recession, buyouts have played an important 
role in the restructuring of firms. Efficiency and performance were improved by a shift in 
ownership and by the influence of the leverage that played a significant role in the funding of 
the transaction. 
The relatively short history of leveraged management buyouts in Continental Europe began 
in the late 1980's. In Germany, the idea took off when many large conglomerates were 
looking to sell off non-core subsidiaries in order to raise cash or when the succession 
problems of family-owned businesses became an issue to be resolved. According to a study 
of Chiplin and Wright (1989), the buyout market in Germany, compared to that in its 
European neighbour Great Britain, has been very slow to develop. 
In the UK and the US, where the buyout market can be traced back to the late 70s, 
researchers have exarnined the nature and the intent of leveraged finance transactions and 
the effects of debt on post-buyout performance. 
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Palepu (1990), who examined the influence of leveraged buyout transactions on the value of 
a company, writes that, although a significant increase in financial leverage is the most 
obvious characteristic in theses transactions, several other aspects must also be considered. 
According to Palepu (1990), buyouts are structured so that management receives equItN' 
holdings in the firm, bringing about significant changes in corporate governance. Managers 
and equity investors join the firm's board of directors and play an active role in the future 
strategy and performance of the firm. 
Due to the fact that leveraged finance transactions have increased in size and frequency 
during the eighties and nineties, their economic consequences have been widely discussed. 
Proponents (Palepu, 1990) argue that the organisational changes associated with these 
transactions motivate managers to maximise value and can therefore lead to better operating 
and investment decisions. An opposing view presented in Palepu's study (1990) maintains 
that the increased financial leverage associated with leveraged buyouts make firms short- 
term-oriented and vulnerable to financial distress, leading to a decline in their 
competitiveness. Several studies presented in part E have attempted to address this 
controversy by documenting the economic consequences of leveraged finance transactions. 
2. Current evidence on the consequences of LM[BOs 
2.1 US 
In the US, Jensen (1986), Bull (1987), Kaplan (1989), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), among 
others, have published studies examining various aspects of the development of leveraged 
buyout transactions on the basis of public information. These studies - which will be 
discussed in detail in part E- come to the conclusion that ratios like return on equity, sales 
turnover and productivity increase significantly after the buyout transaction. The findings 
show also that only few companies failed and financial restructuring of some deals was only 
necessary in later transactions. 
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2.2 UK 
In the UK most LM[BO studies have been conducted by the Centre for Management Buyout 
Research (CMEBOR) in Nottingham. The surveys concerning LMBOs up to 1983 by Wright 
and Coyne (1985) and by Thompson et al (1989) found evidence of improvement in both 
turnover and trading profit. Another paper of the CMBOR by Thompson, Wright and 
Robbie (1990 and 1992) presented evidence that value gains from corporate restructuring 
resulted primarily from motivating managers through equity ownership. They found no 
evidence that leverage per se produced improvements in the return on total capital. In 1997 
Kevin Amess researched management buyouts and firm-level performance of management 
buyouts from 1984 to 1994. The results of the research indicated that there were two types 
of buyout firm: firstly there firms where the buyout served as kind of "shock-therapy") 
inducing one-time improvements. Secondly Amess found evidence that some buyout firms 
experience a negative shift effect of the production function while labour productivity 
increased up to 17 percent. 
The above mentioned studies examined mainly the short term performance of LM[BOs. 
Those of Bannock in co-operation with 3i (1989) and the Warwick Business School (1990) 
complemented them by focusing more on the long-term performance of LM[BOs. In their 
research they came to the conclusion that the long term financial performance of LM[BOs 
was worse than the industry average which is a complete reversal of the better-than-industry 
performance of LM[BOs in the short to medium term (up to three years). Wright, Wilson 
and Robbie (1995) who continued their research on long-term effect of management 
buyouts showed that on a variety of financial ratios they significantly outperformed a 
matched sample of non-buyouts, especially from year 3 onwards. 
The following study will among, other things, contribute to the existing knowledge of post- 
buyout performance of leveraged finance companies by comparing the post-buyout 
performance ( short term) of UK and German LMBO companies and by examining whether 




In Germany three studies by Forst (1992), Graper (1993) and Vest (1994) have been 
published outlining the development of LMBO companies. They are divided according to 
family-LMBOs, spin-offs, going concern and turnaround MBOs. Here, ratios concerning 
profitability and productivity show that the majority of all buyout cases have better 
performance after the buyout. The studies examined the short-term performance of LMBOs 
up to 1991. The evidence presented above is primarily drawn from a period of economic 
success in Germany, so it will be necessary to gather evidence about German LXMOs under 
difficult economic conditions. This study will therefore expand on the existing research by 
examining the post-buyout performance of German leveraged management buyout 
companies under the recessionary conditions between 1991 and 1994. 
3. Goals and objectives of the study 
The deal flow of LMBOs experienced in the UK was bound to eventually have an influence 
on Continental Europe, but the transaction flow has been slow to develop. Germany, the 
main focus of this study, has long been considered as a rich source for management buyouts 
but only recently has it begun to realise some of its potential. 
The purpose of this study is to describe the main factors that have a strong impact on 
LMBO activity in the UK and Germany, macro- and microeconomic aspects as well as legal 
and tax requirements and the corresponding LNIBO take-over models. Following, a 
comparison of post-buyout performance in the UK and Germany will answer the question 
how the differences in macro- and mircroeconomic factors have influenced company 
performance in both countries. Finally, the examination of post-buyout company 
performance in Germany under recessionary conditions will show to what extent 
deteriorating macro-econornic conditions mitigate the positive effects of leveraged 
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4. Steps of the study 
The steps of the study are as follows: 
Part A starts with a general description of the study focus, presenting the nature and intent 
of leveraged finance transactions as well as the goals and methods of the study. 
Part B describes the leveraged management buyout concept in general and provides 
information about the most important LMEBO company characteristics, the structure of the 
transactions and the various exit possibilities after the buyout. 
Part C of this study focuses on the comparison of macro- and microeconomic factors that 
influence LMBO activity in the UK and Germany and researches how the different LMIBO 
environments affect the development of LMBO activity in the respective countries. 
Part D continues the comparison of LMBO factors in the LTK and Germany by researching 
the differences in the legal and tax environment and illustrating the various take-over models 
which enable the LMBO participants to overcome these legal and tax barriers. 
Part E focuses on the research of post-buyout performance of LMBO companies and 
examines the theories and studies conducted in the US, the UK and Germany on this issue. 
Furthermore, this part of the study compares the post-buyout performance of UK and 
German LMBO companies, presenting the results of the empirical research on post-buyout 
company performance of LMBO companies operating under the difficult economic 
conditions between 1991 and 1994. It complements studies by Forst (1992), Graper (1993) 
and Vest (1994), which assessed the performance of LMIBOs until 1991. These studies 
show that the financial performance of LMBOs was not only better after the buyout, 
but 
also better than their industry average. 
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Part E of the study concludes with a summary of the implications of the findings. Here, the 
evidence for the hypotheses set out in the study will be summarised and its relevance for a 
number of related topics will be discussed. Furthermore, recommendations will be made for 
the further investigation required to fill the remaining gaps in the present LMBO research. 
Finally, part F concludes the study with a presentation the findings of the research. 
5. Method of study 
This study consists of several research sections in which the following methods have been 
applied: The descriptive method is used in sections C, D and partially in section E, which 
describes the differences between UK and Germany with respect to macro- and 
microeconon-lic LMBO factors. The goal of these descriptive parts is to examine the 
economic, legal and tax conditions for leveraged finance transactions in the UK and 
Germany, which should provide an explanation for the current level of LMBO activity in the 
respective countries. Hypotheses testing is applied in sections C and D in which the 
following factors in the UK and Germany will be compared. The hypotheses examined in 
part C of the study are as follows: 
Hl- The economic background for LMIBOs in the UK and Germany is equal. 
H2- The LMBO environment with respect to the data about LMBOs, the main sources 
for LMBOs and the volume of the LNIBO market in the UK and Germany is equal. 
HI The role of financial investors in the UK and Germany is equal. 
H4: The exit possibilities for LMBOs in the UK and Germany are equal. 
H5: The perspectives for the LMBO market in the UK and Germany are equal. 
H6: The form and legal structure of companies in the UK and Germany is equal. 
H7: The business activity of LMBO companies in the UK and Germany is equal. 
H8: The ownership, control and decision-making of banks in companies 
in the UK and 
Germany is equal. 




The hypotheses examined in part D of the study are as follows. 
HI: The legal framework for LMBO transactions in the UK and Germany is equal. 
H2: The LMIBO take-over models for LMIBO transactions in the UK and Germany are 
equal. 
HI The tax advantages resulting from take-over models for LMBO transactions in the 
UK and Germany are equal. 
Hypotheses testing is equally applied in the empirical research presented in section E in 
which the post-buyout performance is compared to the pre- buyout performance of LMBO 
companies in Germany during the recession from 1991 to 1994. In order to determine the 
affect of the recession on post-buyout performance of LMBOs, the first task was to identify 
a large number of deals completed between 1990 and 1994, from which a sample could be 
selected for analysis. This was achieved using the admit data base and supplemented by a 
search of corporate finance journals such as Acquisitions Monthly, Financial Times, 
Handelsblatt, Wirtschaftswoche, Manager Magazin, etc. To ensure that the survey is 
representative of LMIBO performance, a broad spectrum of industries was chosen for 
analysis. The selected 30 companies included the following industrial sectors. 
" Metal-working 
" Mechanical engineering 
" Electrical engineering 
" Wholesale trade 
Paper, Printing, Publishing 
Construction 
* Textiles 
9 Service industry 
* Wood processing 
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Once the companies were chosen as part of the sample, financial records were obtained from 
different sources such as equity investment firms, banks and the LmBO-comparues 
themselves. The following key ratios have been selected as indicator for the company's 
performance and ability to generate cash: 
o Net Sales 
Net Sales was chosen as an important indicator of overall volume growth and a measure 
of competitive performance. 
9 Operating income 
Operating income is the key indicator of operational performance in a corporation. Here, 
exceptional effects due to step-up depreciation have been ignored. 
* Operating cash-flow 
Operating cash-flow measures the company's ability to generate cash before deducting 
interest and taxes. 
All variables are taken before taxes, extraordinary depreciation and interest expenses, as 
leveraged finance transactions have a large effect on these expenditures in specific take-over 
models. However, only managerial operating decisions, not taxes or financial decisions, 
affect the variables used in this research. 
By comparing I year of post-buyout performance with 2 years of pre-buyout performance 
of the selected LMEBO companies, this study will examine whether the existing theory of 
post-buyout improvement can be confirmed for LME130s completed under difficult economic 
conditions. Furthermore, by comparing post-buyout performance to that of industry 
counterparts, it can be determined whether the LM1130-companies performed better than 
their respective industry average. 
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The hypotheses tested in this part of the research will be as follows- 
HI: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of sales 
after the buyout as before the buyout. 
H2: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same level of sales 
growth rates as their respective industry rivals. 
HI Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating income after the buyout as before the buyout. 
H4: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating income growth after the buyout as their industry rivals. 
H5-. Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating cash-flow after the buyout as before the buyout. 
H6: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating cash-flow growth after the buyout as their industry rivals. 
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U. History and development of LMBOs 
1. Development of L(M)BOs in the US 
In the US, the first leveraged finance transactions can be found in the beginning of the 
1960s, before the concept spread out internationally in the late 1970s (Moschner, 1989). An 
important aspect at that time was the increasing inflation rate in the US in the late 1970S 
which caused substantial differences between the book value and the market value of 
company assets. Additionally, the general crisis in the area of industrial production caused 
share prices of heavily industrialised companies to decline, so that the market value fell far 
below the book value of the company. Company value was not reflected in the share price 
and dissatisfied shareholders were more than willing to sell their shares in the company. 
Consequently, share prices declined even further and companies became easy targets for 
take-over transactions (Luippold, 1992) . 
In the beginning, leveraged buyouts were based on assets. As obvious assets are needed to 
leverage, buyers in the early days tended to look for heavily industrialised companies with 
very low purchase prices in relation to the value of their assets. All debt funding was limited 
to the value of the existing assets and therefore very restricted. (Kohlberg, 1989). Only 
through the innovation of new financial products on the capital markets, like venture capital 
or cash-flow oriented debt financing, could the LMBO market develop to its present size 
(Amihud, 1985). 
The real revolution occurred when banks and investment groups changed from asset-based 
lending to cash-flow lending. Only at this stage did it became possible for managers and 
purchasers to borrow the money needed to take-over companies and to aggressively use 
capital markets. In the course of this development, many companies started to view 
leveraged management buyouts as an attractive way to restructure their operations by 
spinning-off unprofitable units and returning to their core activities (Yago, 1991). 
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The resulting fourth merger wave which began in 1981 has been the longest standing and 
perhaps the most controversial force driving US businesses toward more competitive 
corporate and industrial reorganisation. Leveraged (management) buyouts were seen as an 
answer to the declining position of US firms in the world economy and to the growing 
world-wide competition of strean-Ained corporations and cost-effective strategies (Yago, 
1991). However, there has been increasing criticism in the US about Leveraged 
management buyouts, because of the possibility management has to purchase a company at 
a price which would disadvantage other shareholders. This line of argument was studied by 
Kaplan (1989) who found evidence to reject the 'information advantage' or 'underpricing' 
hypothesis claiming that management buys a company based on superior information or in 
the belief that the firm is significantly undervalued by external investors. In summary, the 
development of the US L(M)BO market has been enhanced by the following 
macroeconomic conditions: 
* An often inefficient stock market (Luippold, 1992) 
Assets were undervalued, share prices were low and shareholders were willing to sell. 
* Destruction of conglomerates (Yago, 1991) 
Conglomerates had to restructure due to the declining position of US firms in the world 
economy and the need for industrial reorganisation. 
Creation of , 
high yield securities Ounk bonds)" (Yago, 199 1) 
The creation of 'high yield securities" or 'junk bonds" was based on a period of high 
inflation and interest rates in the US in which companies, especially non-investment grade 
companies, were looking for cost-effective sources of capital and investors were 
looking 
for ways to increase their returns. ' 
I According to evidence by Jensen (Winter 1988) high yield bonds were first used in leveraged take-overs 
in 
1984 and only 12% of the estimated 14,3 billion dollars of newl), created high yield debt was associated 
with take-overs. Nevertheless, high yield bonds were an important innovation 
in the takeover field because 
they eliminated size as a deterrent to take-overs. 
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Since the beginning of the 1980s, there have been an unusually high number of leveraged 
buyout transactions in the US. According to the statistics of Mergerstat Review in Yago 
(1991), LBO values, as a percentage of the overall merger value, climbed from 3.8 percent 
in 1981 to 21.7 percent in 1987 increasing from 99 to 259 transactions. The average 
purchase price of the companies involved in leveraged buyouts increased from $137m in 
1981 to $311 m in 1987. 
The main buyout sources were here the following (Chiplin, Coyne, Wright, 1988). 
" Going privates 
" Divestment from national and international groups 
Buyouts of non-quoted companies 
According to statistics concerning the US buyout sources in 1984 (Chiplin, Coyne, Wright, 
1988) 61 percent of US Buyouts were divestments, a figure which rose to 74 percent in 
1986 and 79 percent by 1987. Over the same period the number of 'going privates' fell from 
59 percent in 1984 to 39 percent in 1986.2 The steady increase in LBO transactions was 
halted by the stock market crash for a short period in 1987 which resulted in the following 
changes for leveraged finance transactions in the macroeconomic environment (Patricof, 
1988): 
" Less aggressive valuation of companies and therefore lower purchase prices 
" Higher requirements set by financing institutions concerning the debt/equity ratio 
" Reduction of existing debt levels to avoid over-leveraged companies 
' According to Chiplin, Coyne and Wright (1988) part of the reason for the decline lies in the reduced 
appeal of listed companies appropriate for a management buyout - another reason Is the high level of 
merger activity which raises the price and may cause management to lose out in buyout attempts. 
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After the stock market crash in 1987,, the US L(M)BO market appeared to emerge stronger 
than before. LBOs with high transaction volumes, like the take-over of Kraft by Philip 
Morris for $13bn and the take-over of RJR Nabisco for $25.7m, were examples of a new 
dimension of buyouts (Fest/Wolbert, 1989). However statistics provide evidence that the 
number of US LBOs have declined slightly since 1986 (Yago, Mergerstat Review). LBO 
failures and company restructuring, as seen in Hillsborough Holdings, ICI Television and 
Leaseway, as well as the early conditions of recession made US financiers more reluctant to 
back 'highly leveraged transactions' and put an end to the LBO boom of the 1980s 
(Luippold, 1992). 
2. Development of LMBOs in the UK 
In the US,, the most spectacular development so far has been the leveraged buyouts (LBO) 
of publicly-held corporations. In the UK, by contrast, the equivalent is the leveraged 
management buyout (LMBO). While LBO transactions in the US came about mainly 
through undervalued assets and low share prices as well as the need for restructuring, much 
of the impetus for UK LMBOs came from the desire to make viable enterprises out of 
companies entering receivership because of the effects of severe recession. According to the 
statistics of the Centre for Management Buyout Research in Nottingham (Wright, Normand, 
Robbie 1987), over 12 percent of the transactions came from these sources at the beginning 
of the real LMBO movement in 1981. However, the most important source of UK LMBOs 
has always been the divestment of UK and foreign-based parent companies needing 
industrial restructuring. From 1987 on buyouts resulting from privately-owned family firms 
also became increasingly important as source for LMBO activity (Wright, Normand, 
Robbie, 1987). 
In their study about MBOs in the UK Wright and Coyne (1985) wrote the following about 
the development of the LMBO activity in the UK. 
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,, Aere is little doubt that there have always been instances where management have 
bought their companies, but what makes the current growth of buyouts significant IS the 
extent to which those numbers have grown and continue to grow, the way 1'17 which venture 
capital suppliers are looking specifically to finance such deals and the positive mood of 
encouragement which permeates all the way down ftom the government " 
As to the level of LMBO activity in the UK, the number of LMBOs was relatively low at the 
beginning, with 143 transactions in 1981 (Wright/Robbie, CMBOR Winter 1995/96). 
LMBOs were mainly considered as a means for the purchase of smaller companies or units 
which were unprofitable, in financial distress or even close to receivership. The LMBO was 
regarded primarily as an alternative to the liquidation of the company which would have 
meant redundancy for the managers (Luippold, 1990). 
Since the beginnings of the active LMIBO market in 198 1, the revival of the concept of 
entrepreneurship, promoted by the philosophies of the newly-elected Conservative 
government, encouraged managers to run their own business. Company owners were willing 
to sell their enterprise either as part of a group restructuring or due to their wish to retire. 
The increase in LMBO activity was further enhanced by the deep recession which began in 
1981. The number of LMBOs resulting in receivership increased dramatically to 12 percent 
and there was a radical appraisal of company structure (Wright, Normand, Robbie 1987). 
The buyout phenomenon was further encouraged through measures initiated by Margaret 
Thatcher's new government, which introduced important changes in British law, for 
example in the regulations concerning , the prohibition of 
financial assistance" I (Frommann, 
1989). 
For details concerning the prohibition of financial assistance see part D, 1.1.1. 
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The convergence of these factors attracted more LN1BO participants into the market and 
increased the available opportunities. According to statistics of the CMBOR (1987), rapid 
growth in the market occurred with the number of LMBO transactions increasing from 143 
in 1981 to 237 in 1982. The UK buyout volume exceeded Ilbn in 1985 and the number of 
buyout transactions reached 262. The value increased to f3bn with an average deal size of 
more than LlOm in 1987 for the first time. This increase in activity was also due to several 
financing factors such as the development of specialist venture capital funds and the US 
institutions willing to provide large amounts of funds (Wright, Normand, Robbie, 1990)4. 
The merger wave from 1987 to 1989 brought an additional flow of merger and acquisitions 
activity. The 344 LMBO transactions in 1987 had an average value of B. Ibn, this rose to 
375 transactions at an average of B. 8bn at the end of the decade. 
While the volume of deals declined in the 1990's, there was a significant increase in LMBO 
value: from 12. Ibn in 1991 to E2.5bn in 1994. According to Wright and Robbie (Summer 
1995), this increase reflects several factors of the LMBO market at this time. First, the 
recession-related programmes of the early 90's had come to an end, keeping the number of 
receivership transactions at a comparatively low level. Second, buyout prices increased due 
to high vendor price expectations and the development of vendor "auctions" where the deal 
was conceded to the highest bidder. In 1995, the total value of UK LMBOs was estimated 
to have increased by 12.2 percent to E2.8 bn. According to the Wright and Robbie 
(CMBOR, Winter 1995/96) this increase in deal flow was due to LMBO advisers having 
more success in identifying opportunities, entrepreneurs had become more important in deal 
generation and venture capitalists had been more proactive in initiating deals themselves. 
During 1996, the total value of UK LMBOs increased by 27.9 percent to E3.6 bn, almost 
reaching the previous record achieved in 1989 of : E3.8 bn. According to Wright and Robbie 
(CM[BOR, Spring 1997) the high level of activity has to be seen in the context of a still 
strong overall market for corporate control in the form of acquisitions and sell-offs where 
LMBO transactions played an important part. 
' For details concerning the development of LBO funds see part C, 1.3.1 
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3. Development of L(M)BOs in Germany 
In Germany the acceptance of the LMBO concept was slow in coming. The main reason for 
this was the source of LMBOs in Germany, which differed markedly from the UK, the most 
obvious difference being the predominance of family and other private companies as LMBO 
sources as opposed to divestments (Fahrholz, 1991). 
The small and medium sized companies in Germany, so-called 'Mittelstand' ' facing 
succession problems have always been regarded as the strongest source for LM[BOs- 
However, according to the statistics of the CMBOR/Initiative Europe (Europe Buyout 
Review 1995) in 1991 only II percent of all German LM[BOs resulted from the transfer of 
family businesses to management. However, since the 1990s, the market has grown slowly. 
The recessionary conditions in Germany in the 1990s forced company owners to sell rather 
than struggle through recession. While LM[BOs of family-owned companies accounted for 
only II percent of the total transactions in 1991, this proportion increased to 40 percent in 
1994, making it the main LMBO source in Germany (Initiative Europe, 1995). 
Furthermore, since the beginning of the 1990s, German industry has gone through an intense 
phase of restructuring due partly to the effects of German reunification and partly to 
recession. National and international corporations faced the pressure of growing 
international competition - especially through the 'Common European Market' in 1992 - 
and were forced to undertake restructuring efforts and spin-off unwanted subsidiaries in 
order to return to their core-businesses and to profitability. As a result of the above 
mentioned factors, LMBO activity increased continuously throughout the 1990s reaching a 
total of 59 transactions and a market value of 033m in 1994. The majority of LMBOs 
resulting from divestments made up 54 percent of the total transactions, with a majority of 
domestic transactions (41 percent). In 1995, Germany's LMBO market value fell back to 
E540m, however in 1996, the estimated market value exceeded Elbn ranking Germany the 
first time as number one LMBO market in Continental Europe before France (Initiative 
Europe, 1997). 
5 Small- to medium-sized companies in Germany are companies with less than 500 employees and sales 
which do not exceed DM 250m in sales are called the 'Nfittelstand' in Germany 
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The impact of the recession which hit the economy in the 1990s finally placed pressure on 
domestic and international companies to restructure their often diversified portfolios, 
providing an impetus for reinforced LMBO activity. 
Until the beginning of the 80's, the financing of LBOs depended greatly on the amount of 
security provided. However, due to a reinforced need for innovative finance transactions, 
cash-flow based lending in the form of LBOs and LMBOs became an interesting alternative 
(Dienst, 1989). In the beginning of the 1990s, some banks started to establish departments 
providing the specialised skills required to structure and monitor LMBOs. There were 
considerable differences between LMBO and the usual corporate lending transactions. 
These departments were created to ensure the speed and the quality of service in this new 
business area. However, regardless of the changing attitudes of some banks towards cash- 
flow oriented financing, banks in Germany have a wide range of possibilities to influence and 
regulate LMBO activity. One example in this context is the close relationship between 
companies and their so-called "house-banks 6. The supervisory board may include an 
executive of the 'house-bank' who may keep leveraged management buyouts out of 
discussion. 
It can generally be said that the German LMIBO market became quite active in the 1990s, 
especially in 1993/1994 and 1996 due to the recessionary conditions, the ongoing industrial 
restructuring and the increasing number of family-owned companies facing succession 
problems. Furthermore, the increased LMBO activity in the 1990"s suggests that several 
long-standing obstacles had been overcome, such as the realisation of investments, the 
complex tax regulations, the lack of entrepreneurial spirit in German managers and the role 
of the banking sector which had hindered the pace of growth of the LMIBO market in the 
past. 
' 'House-bank' is the bank with which a company handles most of their financial transactions. It has the 
status of the main bank due to a long standing relationship with the company. The dominant role of German 
banks - due among other things to their function as 'house-banks' - will be ftulher discussed in part C, 11, 
3.3 
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The following section will present the theoretical basis of the management buyout concept. 
It outlines the life cycle of a leveraged management buyout transaction, presenting and 
evaluating important general issues such as what company characteristics are necessary for 
a successful buyout candidate and a study of various methods of valuation as well as 
different financing and exit alternatives for investors. 
B. The Management Buyout Concept (non country-specific) 
1. The LMBO life cycle 
According to Wright, Thompson and Robbie (1991) the general LMBO is regarded as a 
finance concept consisting of several phases which constitutes what is commonly known as 
the LMBO life cycle. The phases of this life cycle are as follows: 
Phase I Generation of opportunities 
" Appraisal of existing ownership structure and the willingness of owners to sell 
" Existence of entrepreneurial culture of managers 
" Appraisal of company characteristics 
Phase H Structuring of the deal 
Provision of equity and debt 
Structuring of take-over models 
Phase M Completion of the deal 
Phase IV Consolidation, growth and strategy 
Phase V Realisation of gains 
* Flotation, trade sale or recapitalisation 
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The following section presents the most important stages of the LMBO cycle starting with 
the appraisal of the existing opportunities and the structuring of the transaction leading to 
the realisation of gains through the best exit alternative. 
H. Establishing the principle 
1. Company characteristics 
1.1 Management criteria 
A competent management team is the most important criteria for the success of a leveraged 
management buyout. Buyout specialist O'Brien (1995) states in this context that only an 
efficient management team is able to realise the projected goals after the transaction. Mac 
Millan (1987) underlines in his article about the criteria distinguishing successful from 
unsuccessful transactions that the most important criteria for investors in examining 
potential LMBO targets were entrepreneurial team characteristics and the experience of the 
management only followed then by product, market and financial characteristics of the 
target company. 
Also according to research by Wright and Coyne (1985), the existence of a well-balanced, 
highly-motivated and able management team is crucial to the success of the buyout. The 
survey revealed that the LMBO team generally consists of managers from the key areas 
sales, marketing, production and finance, however evidence (Wright, Coyne 1985) suggests 
that there is a wide spread around this figure. 7 Wright and Coyne (1985) find a correlation 
between the size of a buyout team and the number of employees in the target company. 
Although evidence (Wright, Coyne, 1985) confirms this, the number of employees is not the 
only explanation for the size of the team. According to the authors, the second explanation 
is the purchase price of the company; there is evidence that the higher the purchase price, 
the higher the possibility of increasing the numbers in the buyout team even by involving 
company employees. 
' Over the sample the range was from one to forty-two. The buyout with forty-two in the team represented a 
company active in the area of international stock trade with a work force of 329 employees spread across 
twenty-five subsidiaries. 
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1.2 General and business criteria 
Leveraged management buyouts have often been referred to as a method of acquiring a 
business with debt (Wright, Normand, Robbie, 1987). One of the crucial elements is the 
purchase price which determines the structure of the LMBO. Financing is structured with a 
balance between equity and debt which ensures funding of the purchase price without undue 
risk of bankruptcy. In general, Fried and I-Esrich (1994) suggest that investors use three 
criteria for evaluation investments: 
9 the viability and novelty of the project 
the integrity, track record and leadership skills of the management 
and the possibility for high returns and exit. 
Concerning the general criteria for the evaluation of investment opportunities Fried et al 
(1993) revealed that in their article about venture capitalists investment criteria that 
investors had become more concerned over market acceptance and less demanding on high 
rates of return and quick exits. In this context Muzyka et al (1995) found out in their 
research about investment decisions of European venture capitalists that investors had to 
make trade-offs between various criteria and that investors would prefer to select 
investments which offer a good management team and reasonable financial and product 
characteristics even if the transaction does not meet the overall funding and deal 
requirements. 
Concerning the business criteria for LMBO companies buyout experts (O'Brien, 1995) 
consider the high leverage of an LMBO inappropriate when the cash-flow required to 
service debt is subject to high business risk. 
' Potential investors in the transaction must be 
assured that the target company fulfils the following prerequisites: 
"a secure market position 
"a good predictable cash-flow 
" areal growth potential 
" the ability to cope with business cycle fluctuations 
8 Business risk is here expressed as the risk that a company will not meet its cash flow projections for 
normal business reasons such as competition, recession, a strike or cost overruns. 
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The effect of business cycles is an essential aspect in the evaluation of business criteria for a 
leveraged buyout transaction. I-Egh tech companies, for instance, are generally not 
considered to be good LMBO candidates,, both because their future business prospects are 
often uncertain and because new, growing technology companies generally reinvest a large 
portion of their earnings in the business and therefore lack the necessary cash-flow volume 
to service the interest and debt of an LMBO-loan. Companies from the supplier industry are 
also not very good LMBO candidates,, because they cannot control prices and are 
vulnerable to market over-capacity over long periods during which selling prices can fall 
below production costs (O'Brien, 1995). 
1.3 Financial criteria 
1.3.1 Cash-flow analysis 
A prime condition for a solid leveraged management buyout transaction is a strong profit 
situation with growth potential and a guaranteed steady cash-flow. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1988), desirable leveraged buyout candidates are frequently firms with stable 
business histories, low growth prospects and high potential for generating cash-flow. 9 A 
steady cash-flow serves primarily to judge the actual and future financial power of a buyout 
company with respect to its future investments, its pay-back obligations or its ability to 
distribute dividends. 
There are generally 2 different ways to calculate cash-flow. 'O They can be defined as 
follows: 
1.3.1.1 The indirect method 
Net profit/loss 
" depreciation (- additions) 
" increase/decrease of long-term provisions 
= cash-flow 
9 Evidence concerning industry distribution of leveraged finance transactions by Jensen (1986) indicates 
that LBOs tend to occur in mature industries like the oil, forest and food industry generating high and stable 
cash flow. 
'0 Definition by Coenenberg, 1992 
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This method of cash-flow calculation shows that the positions depreciation and provisions 
play a key role in the development of the future cash-flow. If the LMBO model is 
constructed so that depreciation and provision increase, the reduced tax liability will lead to 
increased cash-flow after the buyout. 
In contrast to the above method, which focuses on the aspects of tax reduction, the 
following cash-flow method is a multi-step model better suited to the analytical needs of 
LMBO target company valuation. 
The direct method 
Operative revenues, which led to income in the corresponding period 
Operative expenses, which led to costs in the corresponding period 




= Retained operating cash-flow 
net capital expenditures 
Free cash-flow available for repayment of interests and existing debt 
repayment of existing debt 
Cash-flow available for LMBO financing 
The cash-flow available for LMBO financing is especially interesting for LMBO investors 
and financiers, since it determines the amount available for interest and repayment of the 
additional debt involved in LMBO financing. 
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1.3.2 Evaluation of debt levels 
The following ratios are also very important in cash-flow calculations, as they indicate the 
debt repayment potential of a LMBO company. 
1.3.2.1 Long-term debt service capacity 
debt 
average of future cash-flow per year 
This ratio indicates the number of years in which the LMBO-company is required to pay-off 
the interest bearing LMBO debts. 
1.3.2.2 Gross gearing 
The following ratio is only important for LMEBO financiers and investors when compared to 
other companies in the same branch. 
debt 
total capital 
Lerbinger (1986) writes in this context that the gross gearing ratio of a potential LMBO 
candidate should not exceed the average gross gearing ratio of the industry the company 
operates in. Only if this ratio is below or equal the industry average does the LMBO- 
candidate have sufficient potential for the new debt necessary in LMBO purchase price 
financing. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that the cash-flow potential is a key factor in the 
evaluation of the LMBO company. Since the LMBO transaction is not, as in normal take- 
over transactions, based on the potential of the purchasing company but on the cash-flow 
capacity of the target company, this reference primarily determines the practicality and the 
feasible financing volume of the LMIBO transaction. 
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1.3.3 Investment intensity 
According to the experience of LMBO experts (von der Groeben, 1988), the investment 
needs of LMBO companies should not be too high or restricted to the replacement of the 
existing assets as a result of the initial high debt burden caused by the buyout. However, 
Vest (1994) found evidence in his research on German spin-off LMBOs that the sample 
companies had a significant need for investment in the area of research & development due 
to the restrictive investment policy of the former parent company. These findings were also 
confirmed by Forst's study of German LMBO companies (1992), in which 35,7 percent of 
the selected buyout companies reported a5 percent annual increase in research and 
development after the buyout. 
Increased cash-flow requirements of LMBO companies - especially for research and 
development - can, however, be compensated through an 'asset stripping programme' 
carried out after the buyout (Vest, 1994). The LMBO company focuses on its productive 
assets which support core business and produce enough cash-flow to meet the debt 
servicing requirements. They 'strip' away all unproductive, non-core assets. This procedure 
enables the company to release existing cash-flow potential which can then be used to 
reduce the debt burden caused by the LMBO structure. 
2. Conception and implementation of a buyout 
2.1 The business plan 
The main objective of a business plan is to help raise finance by presenting the goals and 
ambitions of the target company and the means to achieve them. A clear, well presented 
business plan is an important factor in securing investor confidence in the management team 
and the LMBO proposal. The plan should therefore: 
" Emphasise the strengths of the business and its position in the market 
" Recognise the risks 
" Project the development of the business 
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2.2 Due diligence - the role of the reporting accountant 
Due diligence is the legal term for the careful analysis a potential purchaser/investor carries 
out in the negotiation process. The due diligence process usually begins with the analysis of 
the target company's financial performance and condition in order to arrive at a company 
value and should continue until all questions are answered and a final agreement reached. 
Hoffmann/Ramke (1992) see the main elements of the due diligence as follows: 
9 Examination and evaluation of the business plan 
e Audit of financial accounts 
* Evaluation of tax consequences resulting from the LMBO transaction 
Harvey and Lusch (1995) state in their article about the nature and scope of the financial 
due diligence process that a variety of issues can directly impact the level of the due 
diligence conducted during the acquisition process. According to the authors these issues 
can be divided into aspects like time constraints, cost restrictions and situational factors. 
However Wright and Robbie (1997) underline in this context that there are signs that 
investors have found a viable solution to those problems through recent measures like 
involving inside and outside management in direct negotiations between vendors and 
investors. Wright and Robbie (autumn 1997) write further that UK based venture capitalists 
placed much importance on the use of an independent accountant's report and that never 
the same reportant accountant as management's accounting adviser was used. 
3. Valuation of the company and determination of the total financing volume 
The valuation of the company and the resulting purchase price estimates are key factors in 
the negotiation process of an LMBO. There are several methods to determine the value of 
an unquoted company. The vendor always calculates the purchase price by means of the 
discounted cash-flow method, using the estimated value which the target company would 
have achieved under the best possible management. The minimum purchase price the vendor 
demands is calculated on the basis of realistic going-concern prospects or of the required 
expenses should the company be liquidated (Vest, 1994). 
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The purchaser, on the other hand, tries to negotiate a minimal purchase price by citing 
conservatively calculated incoming cash-flow streams and cash-flow burdens due to the 
additional investments he must make after the buyout (Vest, 1994). According to Wright 
and Robbie (1997) evidence suggests that venture capital projects are typically valued by 
applying one or more valuation techniques based on the financial and accounting 
information contained in the business plan projections of the target company. De Angelo 
(1990) suggests in this context that investment banks apply a variety of techniques including 
the discounted cash-flow method or asset and earnings-based methods which can be 
provided by highly developed capital markets. According to a research by Wright, Robbie 
and Chiplin (Autumn 1997) methods based on price-earnings were very popular in the UK 
whereas discounted cash-flow methods ranked in general less important than earnings-based 
methods. The following paragraphs will give an overview over the most frequently applied 
valuation methods in LMBO transactions: 
3.1 The discounted cash-flow method 
., valuations 
based on assets or current price/earnings ratio have As described in section 3.1.2, 
a number of weaknesses, which can be overcome with the discounted cash-flow method. 
Being cash based, this method does not rely on accounting conventions. As projected cash- 
flows are the basis here, it views the business on a going concern basis. The discounted 
cash-flow method considers the value of the LMBO company as equal to the value of its 
future cash-flow discounted to the present value. In this calculation, four criteria are 
important: 
" Cash-flow projections 
" End value of the company (liquidation value, future profits or profit multiplication) 
" Length of the projection period 
" Interest for the discount of the cash-flow 
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Generally, one can distinguish between the gross and the net discount method. Whereas the 
gross discount method calculates the future cash-flow before payment of interest and debt, 
the net cash-flow method represents the available cash after payment of debt servicing costs 
and the LUBO loan. According to Karsunky (1992), however, the gross discount method is 
more important in LMBO evaluation, as it determines the amount available for interest and 
repayment of LMBO debt. Therefore, the value of the LMBO company determined by the 
gross discount method highlights the debt potential of the target company free of debt. The 
formula for the discounted cash-flow method " is as follows: 
Earmng value= CF L 
(I +j) n (I+i)n 
CF= future cash-flow in year t 
i= interest for discount 
L= liquidation value in the year t 
n= time in years 
The discounted cash-flow enables the purchaser to recognise the time element of the cash 
tied up in the project. By discounting the cash-flow stream, the tied-up capital is certain to 
be fully costed. This method also considers the purchaser's 'opportunity costs' of capital, 
based on the return he would get with the best alternative investment. The cost of capital is 
generally the vital link between a firm's financing and its investment, so the cost of capital 
determines the discount rate for the valuation of the firm as a whole. Since the firm usually 
uses both debt and equity finance - and these have different costs - 
it is necessary to 
calculate the weighted average cost of capital (WAC). The gearing 
is measured according 
to the permanent capital structure the target company is expected to have. If short term 
sources of finance are expected to be a permanent feature of the 
balance sheet, then it 
would be appropriate to use a gearing concept which includes them (Higson, 
1995). 
II According to the definition of W6he, 1992 
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By discounting the cash-flow of the company, the resulting net present value shows the 
purchasers the immediate increase in their wealth through ownership (IFEgson, 1995). The 
interest used for the discounted cash-flow method can vary the value of the company by 
definition. One possible formula, used by Braun (1989), includes the following elements- 
Market interest rate 
inflation rate 
= basic interest rate 
" supplement for operative risk of the LM[BO-transaction 
" supplement for the lack of mobility of the investment 
" supplement for financial risk of the LMBO-transaction 
= Discount rate 
The asset based valuation method 
The asset based valuation method calculates the value of a company as the sum of the value 
of its assets. In general, there are two ways in which the underlying assets are evaluated. 
The liquidation value method 
According to Wk5he (1996), the liquidation value of a company shows the net proceeds 
(after all expenses and taxes) from the sale of the company's assets at fair market value. The 
liquidation value of a company generally represents the absolute minimum value of a 
business. 
The replacement value method 
The replacement value of a company represents the cost if the assets were replaced at the 
current market price. Assuming the buyer is willing, the replacement value is higher than the 
liquidation value. As in the above method, replacement value is used to establish the floor or 
minimum value of a company. The problem with asset based valuations is that they fail to 
consider the business as having any value apart from its assets - completely ignoring earning 
power. Therefore, the asset valuation method can only be a supplement to the discounted 
cash-flow method in determining the exact value of the target company. (Wohe, 1996) 
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3.3 The price/earnings ratio valuation method 
Another commonly used method in company evaluation is the price/earnings ratio method 
which assigns a comparable publicly-traded company's price/earnings ratio to those of the 
target. Price/earnings ratio is defined as follows 
12 
: 
P/E = Share price 
Earnings per share 
However, Ballwieser (1991) points out the disadvantages of the method: 
* Earnings are historical and say nothing about the future. A buyer is more interested in 
earnings trends that may carry into the future than current earnings levels. 
* Earnings are defined by accounting standards. Being accrual based, earnings do not 
recognise the time value of money. 
Whatever the various evaluations may show, the negotiated take-over price has to consider 
what the respective buyout company is able to support. In the end the management team 
might be confronted with a bidding situation and be tempted to offer a price, but the amount 
of leverage might exceed the debt service capacity of the LMBO company. In this situation, 
the financial advisers and bankers should ensure that any overpricing of the deal is avoided 
and that they do not exceed the maximum price which the management buyout vehicle can 
support (O'Brien, 1995). 
3.4 Determination of the total financing volume 
In the next step, the LMBO advisors calculate the total financing volume of the transaction 
which, according to Hoffinann/Ramke (1992), has the following elements: 
Purchase price 
" costs for foundation of Newco and consulting fees 
" repayment of existing debt 
" investments, which should not be financed out of the cash-flow 
- Total financing volume for an LMBO transaction. 
12 Definition according to I-ligson. 1995 
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3.5 Example for the determination of the total LMBO - financing volume 
Share capital: DM 20m 
Reserves: DM 50m 
Equity: DM 70m 
Planned Net Cash-flow: DM 34m 
Long-term debt: DM 30m 
Calculated Potential long term debt: DM 120m 
3.5.1. Subtraction of long-term debt from potential debt volume: 
Max. potential long term debt: DM 120m 
I existing debt DM 3 Orn 
= Available volume of LMBO debt DM 90m 
3.5.2. Calculation of necessary equity 
Purchase price DM 100m 
I available LMBO debt DM 90m 
= Necessary equity DM I Om 





= 3.52 years to pay back the LMBO debt 
Given the above restriction, the purchase price of the company should not exceed DM 90m. 
If the purchase price and consequently the resulting debt burden is too high, the target 
company risks failure in times of recession. 
13 Example taken from Hoffmann/Ramke, 1992 Management buyout in Germany 
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M. The impact of debt on the capital structure of the LMBO company 
Before beginning the next chapter which describes the steps for optimal structuring of an 
LMIBO transaction,, it is important to outline the role of debt in the LMBO structure. As 
management led buyouts are generally heavily financed by debt, it is necessary to assess and 
evaluate the impact of debt on LMEBO company performance and to what extent leverage 
has a positive effect on company performance. 
1. The development of debt in the capital structure of companies 
According to evidence in the US (Yago, 1991), where the role of debt in the capital 
structure of leveraged buyout companies has been researched extensively, the higher cost of 
capital of US firms relative to their competitors can significantly weaken their 
competitiveness. According to studies by the International Trade Commission (1983), the 
weighted cost of capital in the US in the early 1970s was disproportionately high in 
comparison to other countries (the weighted average cost of various investments in the US 
was 10,7% compared to those in Japan for example with 4,1%). Therefore, the increase of 
debt in the company's capital structure was strongly influenced by the relatively low costs 
of debt capital. According to Yago (1991), US corporations steadily increased their 
dependence on debt from the early 1950s to the mid 1970s. 
As a consequence of rising corporate debt levels in the US, many companies started to see 
leveraged buyouts as an attractive way to restructure their operations and improve their 
competitive positioning. Over the years, leveraged buyouts have resulted in a great number 
of ownership changes in the US, from 3.8 percent in 1981 to 21.7 percent in 1987, and have 
become an important part of the take-over market, moving on into the UK and Continental 
Europe. 
35 
According to Altman/Smith (1991), these highly leveraged transactions in the US 
challenged conventional wisdom of the time regarding the relationship between company 
value and capital structure. After a very successful period for LBOs in the US in the 1980s, 
a sharply increased default rate followed in the early 1990s, mostly on debt issued in highly 
leveraged deals. This development appeared to be a justification for those who favoured 
much more conservatively capitalised companies. 
2. Capitalisation theory and the role of debt in leveraged buyout transactions 
The relationship between a firm's capital structure and its true value was the subject of 
Modigliani's and Nfiller's work in 1958 which called the subject to the attention of the 
financial world. In their article from 1958, Modigliani and Nfiller argued that the relationship 
between a firm's debt and equity had absolutely no impact on its overall value. The only 
variables determining the firm's value were its future earnings in terms of expected cash- 
flow (Altmann/Sn-lith, 1991). This method evaluates a firm based on the net cash-flow 
provided by its assets. Thus, a firm with underperforming assets may be priced in such a 
manner that its liquidation or break-up value exceeds its going concern value. If this is the 
case, then there is an opportunity for an 'arbitrage' which entails purchasing the equity of 
the firm and restructuring its asset composition to increase the value. In such an arbitrage 
there is an advantage to the use of debt. Since the goal is to acquire the capital gains which 
result from restructuring, the effective use of leverage multiplies the equity holder's return 
when the company is sold. In this context Kieschnik (1987) refers to this construction as a 
(call option' in which the buyout group has bought an option on any added value created by 
restructuring the firm's asset structure. 
Altman/Smith (199 1) write further that when a company can potentially improve their value 
with the changes imposed by the new owners, they must have been strategically unsound, 
poorly managed and/or disproportionately capitalised. In such cases, full realisation of the 
company's value is only possible through management initiative and substantial changes in 
leverage. 
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3. The risk in using high leverage in buyout transactions 
As will be described more in detail in the following sections leveraged buyout transactions 
in the US and Europe offered attractive investments opportunities in the last years and have 
made using debt in buyout transactions a common way of restructuring corporations. 
However, according to Roach (1989), a buyout structure plan must consider the inherent 
risk and the potential vulnerability of increasingly leveraged borrowers. In the US, for 
example, innovative financing techniques have been designed in order to minimise the 
impact of unexpected interest rate changes. The real test, however, is in times of recession 
when the crucial questions are if high leverage still has a positive effect on the return on 
equity 14 and how much interest the company will be able to cover in a deteriorating 
business environment. Shleifer and Visny (1992) and Kaplan and Stein (1993) write in this 
context that the difficulties that many leveraged transactions encountered resulted from 
excessive leverage, problems in disposing of non-core assets at predicted prices and 
problems in servicing the LMBO-debt when stable cash-flows became affected by 
recessionary conditions. These developments seem to have led to a reassessment of the 
degree of leverage the target company is able to support and also to the reliance on the 
secure disposal of assets (Wright and Robbie, 1997). 
The next chapter will discuss the structuring process of LMBO transactions and how the 
level of internal and external financing is determined according to the cash-flow capacity of 
the target company. 
14 Leverage-effect of corporate debt: debt, as a relatively cheap source of corporate funding, especially 
in 
companies targeted for a LBO, requires careful examination of the impact of 
debt on return on equity. The 
so-called 'Leverage effect' can only be positive if the return on capital of a company 
is greater than the 
interest paid for the existing debt. (H61ters, 1992) 
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IV. Structuring the transaction 
The appropriate structuring of LMBO transactions has an important impact on the investors 
desired rate of return. According to Sahlmann (1990) the desired rate of return can be 
reached by investors applying several mechanisms which should encourage the 
managers/owners of the target to increase the value of the firm. Among those measures are 
cited information rights obliging the management team to provide periodic reports, the 
active involvement of the investors in their portfolio companies, incentive schemes like 
equity ratchets and compensations based on value created. However, the optimal 
structuring of the transaction at the initial stage of the deal will be of outmost importance 
for investors in order to reach their desired rate of return. Concerning the structuring of the 
transaction the different layers of external funding in an LMBO transaction may be 
structured as follows: 
1. Debt/equity components 
External funding for a typical management buyout is likely to come from a combination of 
sources, such as: 
" Secured or unsecured debt providers 
" Mezzanine providers 
" Equity investors 
1.1 Debt financing 
1.1.1. Non subordinated, secured or unsecured debt (senior debt) 
When issuing credits for an LMBO, banks prefer as a rule to provide non subordinated, 
secured debt based on the assets of the target firm. According to Hoff-mann/Ramke (1992), 
senior debt is provided primarily by conu-nercial banks and normally accounts for 50 percent 
to 60 percent of the LMBO financing. All senior debt in an LMBO structure implies certain 
legal and contractual obligations between the banks and the borrower. These include 
15 
guarantees, first security interests, mortgage deeds and positive and negative covenants 
11 According to a research by Wright and Robbie in the quarterly review of the CNIBOR summer 1995, 
buyouts involve a much higher use of both accounting and non-accounting based covenants than other types 
of corporate borrowing. There has been a marked increase in the range and tightness of debt covenants over 
the last five years, particularly for loss-making buyouts and those acquired from receivership. 
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1.1.2. Subordinated debt (mezzanine) 
The term 'mezzanine' applies to debt instruments that have unsecured equity characteristics 
and therefore carrying an equity risk that demands a higher rate of return. Very often this 
form of debt can be converted into equity in the form of warrants. In connection with the 
development of mezzanine financing in the UK, Wright, Normand and Robbie (1987) write 
that increasing price/earnings ratios in the context of LMBO purchase prices and the focus 
on cash-flow oriented financing were the main reasons for the popularity of mezzanine or 
intermediate finance in the UK. 
In the beginning of the buyout movement in the UK, the usual instrument of mezzanine 
finance was preference shares. The new form of mezzanine finance that followed was 
structured as 'quasi-debt' ranking in one or various layers after senior debt, representing 
different levels of risk requiring a higher interest rate and often equipped with equity 
warrants. (Wright, Normand, Robbie, 1987). 
From a general, non country-specific point of view, the following instruments are the most 
frequent in mezzanine financing: 
9 Subordinated loans in the form of zero coupon bonds or low interest bonds. 
Subordinated loans which have previously discounted the future interest payments or low 
interest bonds carrying equity warrants. 
e Seller's notes 
Seller's notes are probably the most variable element in any structure. They can take first 
priority if they are in the form of a deferred consideration, or, as is more commonly the 
case, they can be subordinated, just ahead of management. Traditionally, seller's notes 
are interest free and subordinate to all other debt. Frequently, they include the right to 
share in the company's upside potential. In this case, sellers are seeking to retain a share 
in the future equity value of the company (Wright, Normand and Robbie, 1987). 
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Unsecured loan stock or convertible unsecured loan stock ('quasi-equity') 
These forms of debt seem to be of more use in large buyout transactions than in small 
ones due to their inherent degree of risk which could make them unattractive to loan- 
stock holders. However, they might be a useful financing instrument if the subscription of 
the same amount as risk capital would dilute the management stake to such an extent 
that it would de-motivate the management team (Wright, Normand and Robbie, 1987). 
Silent partnership 
In this kind of mezzanine-financing, frequently used in German buyouts (Vest, 1994), the 
silent partner traditionally shares in the profit of the respective buyout company. 
Additionally, the parties might also agree on interest payments or on participation in the 
event of a loss in the target company. If a loss-sharing agreement is made, the 
partnership is considered 'quasi-equity' if the company is liquidated (Vest, 1994). 
High yield bonds (especially in the US) 
fligh yield bonds are tradable bonds equipped with high interest rates due to the high risk 
caused by their subordination 16 . 
2. Capital financing 
2.1. Institutional and management equity 
Leaving the area of debt financing, the next financing source takes into account the equity 
elements of the capital structure. Traditionally, the required capital structure for a leveraged 
management buyout is determined by calculating the volume which might be provided by 
bank facilities. This calculation identifies the 'financing gap' wl-&h has to be funded by the 
risk capital of management and financial investors. The equity share capital can be divided 
into different layers with different rights and priorities in the form of common stock, 
preferred stock or warrants provided by the buyout team and the financing institutions. 
16 This kind of mezzanine became famous in the 1980s in the US, where these bonds are known as 'junk 
bonds'. Although there are no legal barriers for German firms to issue this kind of bonds the German junk 
bond market has been very slow to develop. In Germany, only the take-over of the European subsidiary 
Memorex from the US parent Burroughs is known to have been financed mainly by junk bonds (Seifert. 
1991). 
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In certain buyouts, it may be possible to fund the purchase price entirely from personal 
resources of the management team, who may acquire all the ordinary share capital with the 
support of a bank. According to the statistics of the CMIBOR (Spring 1997), in LMBOs 
with less than LI Om financing the average proportion of equity held by management ranged 
from 55 to 68 percent between 1990 and 1996. In LMBOs with at least 110m financing, the 
average proportion of equity held by management ranged from 26 to 31 percent between 
1990 and 1996. 
From the result of these statistics it can be said that the larger the buyout, the lower the 
management's stake in the equity of the company and the higher the involvement of 
financial institutions. According to Wright, Normand and Robbie (1987), a financing 
package of a large LMBO may include the following components: 
" Bank term loans (Senior Bank Debt) 
" Loan Stock ranking after the banks but before the equity 
Equity 
- Ordinary shares - usually signed by management and financial investors 
Preference shares - usually signed by financial investors 
Referring to the use of preference shares by financial investors Norton and Tenenbaum 
(1992) write that the inclination of investors for preference shares is not based on deal size, 
financing stage, technical risk or type of product. According to a research by Sawman 
(1988) investors prefer the use of preferred stock due to the fact that it places them in a 
preferred position relative to common equity investors with respect to cash flow and 
liquidation. Concerning the use of debt Norton and Tenenbaum (1992) found evidence that 
positive influences on debt finance was based on the expectations that the target company 
* would generate taxable income 
9 would have collateral assets 
e and would have products resistant to economic cycles. 
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V. After the buyout/Exit strategies 
A key issue in planning an LMBO transaction is when and through what exit routes 
investors can realise their gains. Jensen (1989) wrote in this context that an important issue 
of leveraged buyouts was investors' prospects of getting their return without need of a 
public listing. Capital restructuring or a trade sale to another group were considered as 
equally important exit alternatives. According to Wright, Thompson and Robbie (March 
1990), the choice of the right exit alternative depends on three sets of interests: 
management, institutional investors and the buyout company itself. For the existing 
management, realisation may be a means to repay the personal loans to finance the 
management stakes. For the investors, realisation enables them to obtain the desired rate of 
return and to release capital for new investments. For the buyout company itself, the right 
exit alternative might enable the company to raise new funds to finance expansion. The 
choice of the right exit alternative will combine the different interests of the parties involved 
and will have to take into consideration the status and level of the existing conditions in the 
respective country. (The chosen exit alternative should satisfy all the interests of the 
different parties involved as well as the conditions of the corresponding country. ) 
The realization of an investments may be achieved through the following exit channels: 
9 Going public 
9 Trade Sale 
Secondary Buyout 
Receivership 
According to Wright and Robbie et al (1994) it is important to take into consideration that 
the timing and the form of the realization must aim at having the objectives of all parties 
involved being satisfied. Barry et al (1990) found evidence in their empirical investigation of 
I[POs by venture-capital-backed companies between 1978 and 1987 that the quality of the 
monitoring services of the involved financial investors appeared to be recognized by capital 
markets through lower underpricing of ILPOs of the respective companies. 
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1. Going public 
The main goal for a large proportion of LMBOs is to be floated on the stock market. The 
main admission requirements for an official stock market listing in the UK and German), are 
as follows- 
UK: 
Most important admission criteria for listing on the official stock exchange- 
" Trading record of 3 years 
" Minimum stake held by outside shareholders 25% 
" Minimum market capitalisation of 1700.000 
Most important admission criteria for the listing on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM)- 
" Trading record of 2 years 
" NEnimum stake held by outside shareholders 10% 
" No minimum limit for market capitalisation 
(Source: Wright, Normand, Robbie, 1987) 
The flotation of small to medium sized companies was made possible by the former Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM) created in 1980 and the opening of the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) in 1995 17 . These markets for small to medium sized companies have 
provided a stimulus to a larger number of LMBO companies which would have otherwise 
not floated. In the first quarter of 1996, for example, the number of flotations rose sharply 
to 46 from 22 in 1995, including the issues on the Alternative Investment Market (Financial 
Times, Management Buyout, May 1996). 
" Established in 1980, the USM was designed to attract small- to medium-sized companies. At that time, a 
company needed a five-year trading record to qualify for the main market listing but only 3 years for the 
USM. However the USM was closed at the end of 1996 and was succeeded by the AIM in January 1995. 
The need for an exchange such as the USM has declined with the gradual easing of the rules for companies 
seeking a listing on the main market and with the opening of the AIM. 
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Germa 
Most important admission criteria for listing at the official stock exchange (Amtlicher 
Handel): 
" Legal form 'corporation' for at least 3 years 
" Sales turnover of minimum DM I 00m 
,P Minimum nominal value of the emission DM 2.5m 
Most important admission criteria for listing at the Geregelte Markt: 
Legal form "corporation' for at least I year 
Nlinimum nominal value of the emission DM 500.000 
Introduction at the exchange possible through non-bank financial institutions 
(Source: Luippold, 1992) 
In Germany, due to the strict conditions for admission to the official stock market and the 
difficulty of finding an institution to accept responsibility for the transaction, 
('Prospekthaftung'), the demands on LMIBO companies were traditionally very high, 
especially for small to medium sized companies. 
However, in support of the flotation of small- to medium-sized companies, which represent 
the important German 'Mittelstand', the 'Geregelte Markt' (1987) and the 'Neue Markt' 
(1996) were created to give an impetus to Germany's inactive equity culture (Financial 
Times, May 13,1997). These markets have less strict admission criteria and therefore offer 
small to medium sized companies the possibility of external funding through capital markets 
(Luippold, 1992). 
The statistics on the number of flotations in 1994 show that, although the number of IPOs 
remained low in Germany with 15 transactions (Lake, 1995) compared to 256 new issues in 
the UK (Financial Times, 1997), innovations in the market place - like the New Market or 
increasing capital needs and a slowly changing equity culture in Germany - resulted in an 
increase to 20 EPOs in 1995. (Lake, 1995). 
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2. Sale of the company to another company (Trade sale) 
If the stock market listing is impossible because of the required admission criteria, the sale 
of the LM[B0 company to another investor, to an LBO-group or to another company is a 
viable alternative. In the UK,, trade sales were the most conu-non exit form for LM[BOs in 
1994 with 44 percent (CNMOR, Summer 1995). In Germany - according to the statistics of 
the BVK in 1994 - buy-backs were the most common exit forms for LMIBOs. They 
accounted for 58 percent of all transactions, trade sales for only 26 percent. 
3. Releveraging/Secondary Buyout 
In the UK and Germany, it has become increasingly common for an LM[BO team to execute 
a second buyout, replacing the original investors with new investors. According to the 
statistics of the CMEBOR (Quarterly review summer 1995) this kind of exit was 
implemented by only 3 percent of all buyout companies up to 1987, but increased to over 9 
percent in 1994. In Germany, this exit channel accounted for 3 percent of all exits in 1994. 
According to LM[BO experts (O'Brien), this transaction requires all the management team's 
negotiating expertise in order to convince new investors to accept the risk inherent in a 
newly leveraged buyout. 
VI. Summary concerning the Management Buyout concept 
To sum up the previous sections on the management buyout concept, it can be said that 
several factors are responsible for the success of a leveraged buyout. However, one crucial 
aspect which is continuously emphasised by LMBO managers and financiers is the necessity 
to adopt the most appropriate structure for the transaction from the beginning. The variety 
of different financing instruments like equity, mezzanine, senior debt or seller's note allows 
LM[BO managers to find a structure which gives the company enough flexibility to survive 
in a declining economic environment. However, in periods of increased LMBO activity 
where divested company units or private companies are sold via an 'auction-process', 
vendors try to get the highest possible purchase price. Whatever take-over prices the 
respective auctions might generate, buyers must carefully examine the cash-flow capacity of 
the target company to determine the leverage the company is able to support. 
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A second important issue for the investors and the management team are the existing exit 
alternatives available for the respective LMBO company. In the UK small- to medium-sized 
LMBO companies have the possibility to be floated on the former USM or now on the AIM 
market which have less stringent admission criteria than the official exchange. 
In Germany, the exit possibilities are less varied than in the UK due to the less developed 
equity culture. Although innovations like the 'Geregelte MarkC or the 'Neue Markt' have 
stimulated Germany's equity culture, the number of EPOs in Germany has remained low 
compared to the UK. 
To conclude this section about the management buyout concept, it is important to realise 
that LMBO transactions cannot be implemented homogeneously across Europe. Each 
European country has adopted the idea from the US and has had to adapt it to its own 
interests. The structuring of LMBOs is driven by internal infrastructure and is closely linked 
to both legal and tax requirements, the level of sophistication of the financial markets and 
the existing macro- and microeconomic factors in the corresponding countries. 
By researching the different conditions surrounding LMBO transactions in the UK and 
Germany, the following section will present the different macro- and microeconornic factors 
which have influenced LM[BO activity in the UK and Germany and will present a 
comparison of these factors and provide an explanation for the difference 
in LMBO activity 
in the two countries. 
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C. Comparison of macro- and microeconomic LMBO factors 
in the UK and Germany 
In researching mature LMBO market places like the US and the LJK it was evident that 
there are a number of key factors which contributed to the rapid development of LMBO 
activity. According to Chiplin, Wright and Coyne (1988) these factors can be divided into 
the following three broad areas- 
" The generation of opportunities 
" The infrastructure to complete a deal 
" The opportunities available for the realisation of investments 
These broad areas have been further subdivided by the authors into the Mowing factors 
which were found to have a profound influence on the market for leveraged management 
LMBOs: 
" The industrial structure and the need for organisational change 
" The nature and development of venture capital firms 
" Existing practice and flexibility in banking attitudes 
" The acceptance and the development of the stock markets 
In addition to these macroeconomic factors,, there are several microeconornic factors which 
equally influenced LMBO activity: 
The type and structure of (target) companies 
The sector in which target companies operate 
The nature and the role of banks 
The willingness of owners to accept an LMBO 
The willingness of managers to become owners 
47 
According to Chiplin, Wright and Coyne (Ten country study), a country's potential for 
LMBO activity depends on the combination and the strength of each of these micro- and 
macroeconomic elements. Problems or weaknesses in one or more of them can seriously 
retard the market development in the respective countries. In the following section, research 
on the above macro- and microeconomic factors are presented and evaluated, followed by a 
comparison of the key factors in the UK and Germany and the resulting explanation of the 
different levels of LNIBO activity in these countries. The following part is divided into five 
sections presenting the following issues: 
Section I and 11: Macroeconomic key factors in the UK and Germany 
The first and second chapters will give an overview of the economic situation and industrial 
structure in the countries under examination and characterise the LMBO environment, 
describing the main sources and the volume on the respective markets. The third chapter 
will evaluate the role of financial investors, venture capital funds and banks. In the fourth 
chapter, exit possibilities for investors will be examined as well as the impact of LMBOs on 
the national economy. The fifth chapter presents perspectives for the LMBO market in the 
LTK and Germany. 
Section III and IV: 
The first and second chapters of this section will describe the form and structure of potential 
target companies in their respective countries and sectors. The third chapter examines the 
role and influence of banks on companies in the UK and Germany. The fourth chapter 
presents the motives of managers and owners who participate in LMBO transactions with 
respect to the entrepreneurial culture in each country. 
Finally, section V will surnmarise the companson of the key rnicro- and macroecononuc 
factors which have influenced LMBO activity in the past and will continue to influence in 
the future. 
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1. Macroeconomic LMBO factors in the UK 
I Economic background 
1.1 Economic situation 
The development of the UK LXIBO activity and the respective LN11BO sources is closely 
connected to changes in the economic environment of the UK. At the beginning of the 
buyout movement in 1981, the LJK economy was experiencing a deep recession, which 
caused a tremendous amount of receiverships and demanded a radical review of company 
structures and activities. 
In the following general industrial recovery from 1982 on, a large number of groups applied 
post-recession measures which led to a growing number of sources for LMBOs from 
divestment. In the early 1990s, recession emerged again and lasted until 1992, when the 
economic recovery in the UK came full circle. The UK OECD report in 1996 stated that the 
fundamentals for continuing medium-term growth and low inflation in the UK would remain 
positive. It seems that the UK economy, after 15 years of microeconomic reform had 
become more flexible, competitive and less resistant to inflation despite modest growth in 
inflation and a lower employment rate. 
1.2 Industrial structure - competition in the UK 
The United Kingdom had long recognised that competition is in many ways the driving 
force behind economic success. Due to the fact that competitive pressure demands 
increased efficiency and productivity as well as new and improved products, the UK saw a 
need for an active competition policy. Two government papers in 1994 and 
1995 reinforced 
the importance of competition policy in maintaining competitiveness. In a wider perspective, 
competition policy is seen as the one element of strategy that can 
improve economic 
flexibility. The UK OECD report of 1996 states that two developments over the past twenty 
years had a significant effect on competition in the UK: 
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The first development came with the founding of the "Common European Market" in 1992,, 
which, for many industries, accentuated the competition from abroad and made competiti',, 'e 
discipline in domestic companies stronger. 
The second development were the privatisation and deregulation programs since 1980 
which brought the performance of various sectors under close scrutiny. The pressure 
applied by each of these factors have led to substantial improvements in productivity and 
efficiency in the UK. 
2. Description of the LMBO environment in the UK 
2.1 Economic environment for LMBOs 
In the early 1980s, LMBOs became a significant factor on the overall mergers and 
acquisitions market and played an important role in the restructuring in the UK. Due to 
recessionary conditions in the beginning of the buyout movement in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, LMBOs resulted mainly from the divestment of UK parent companies at 60 percent 
and foreign parent companies at 14 percent, from family-owned businesses at 12 percent 
and from receivership at II percent (Chiplin, Wright, Coyne, 1988). According to Wright, 
Thompson and Robbie (1991), buyouts were seen in this period of recession as an 
alternative to the full or partial closure of business units in a period of recession or as a 
means to save companies which were already in receivership. 
As economic recovery followed after 1982, LMBOs from receivership became less 
important accounting for only 1.7 percent in 1986. Management LMBOs were mainly 
implemented in the divestment of divisions or subsidiaries from conglomerates, domestically 
at 59 percent and internationally at 14 percent, with a an increase in the number LMBOs of 
family-owned companies to 21 percent. According to Chiplin, Coyne and Wright (1988), 
the pattern of LMBOs in the mid 1980s in the UK reflected the decision of parent 
companies to dispose of divisions or subsidiaries which were financially healthy but which 
didn't fit to the group strategy. 
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Between 1987 and 1989, the volume and the value of management buyout transactions 
increased sharply with a record of 375 transactions and a total value of 318 billion pounds in 
1989 (CM[BOR, June 1996). These developments took place as new financiers and 
financing techniques were introduced into the market and the funding of larger LMBOs was 
made possible through greater availability of funds. Growing competition between financial 
institutions which began to show interest in financing management LM[BOs was an added 
impulse (Wright, Normand and Robbie, 1990). The merger wave" observed from 1987 to 
1989 provided yet further incentive for LNMOs due to the divestment of unwanted 
subsidiaries following major acquisitions. 
During the recession of the early 1990s - as in the early 1980s - LMIBOs played a major role 
in restructuring failed or failing businesses and were identified, in an environment of 
generally declining performance, as the only viable means to sell a company or to spin-off 
divisions or subsidiaries (CMBOR, June 1996). After having virtually disappeared at 0.8 
percent in 1989, LMBOs resulting from companies in receivership then rose to 20 percent, 
whereas LMIBOs from divestment and family take-overs with 49 and 24 percent respectively 
remained important buyout sources (CMBOR 1997). 
From 1992 on, economic recovery in the UK came full circle. In the context of management 
buyout activity, this meant that LMBOs resulting from the recession related divestment 
programmes of the early 1990s slightly declined and divestments became more important 
due to strategic repositioning. In 1994, divestments accounted for 54 percent, down from 
52 percent in 1991. Receivership transactions remained low at 3.9 percent in 1994 and 
LMBOs from family-owned companies became more important at 35 percent of the total 
transactions (CMBOP., Spring 1997). In 1994, privatisation regained position as an LMBO 
source due to the privatisation programs initiated in July 1994. 
18 1\4 &A volume in the UK from 1985 to 1989 developed as follows according to statistics from the 
Ten country study of Chiplin, Coyne and Wright: 
in 1985: 474 transactions with a total transaction volume of 7 billion pounds 
in 1989: 1.330 transactions with a transaction volume of 27 billion pounds 
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Although there had been relatively few LMBOs of state-run enterprises before 1986, they 
became the most common form in the following years. Privatisation offered opportunities 
for manager and employee ownership when flotation was not possible, and thus became a 
popular source. In 1994, LMBOs from privatisation became the fourth common source 
amounting to 6 percent of all transactions. In 1995 and 1996 the value of LMBOs increased 
from E2.5 in 1994 bn to f-2.8 bn in 1995 and f-3.6 bn in 1996, almost reaching the peak 
level of 1989 with E3.8 bn (CMBOR, Spring 1997). In 1995 and 1996 divestments were 
still the most important source for LMBOs accounting for 50 percent and 47 percent of all 
transactions followed by LMBOs from family ownership by 40 percent and 41 percent in 
the respective years (CMBOF, Spring 1997). 
2.2 Data on UK LMBOs 
The most reliable and best researched data of all European countries concerning LMBO 
activities comes from the Centre of Management Buyout research (CMBOR) resident in 
NottinghanifUK. The CMBOR was founded in March 1986 by BZW Private Equity Limited 
and Deloitte Touche Corporate Finance to monitor and analyse management LMBOs 
comprehensively and objectively. It has developed a wide-ranging and detailed database and 
is the only set of statistics on management LMBOs and buyins in the UK and Continental 
Europe. 
2.3 Main sources for UK LNIIBOs 
In the UK there are five main sources for LMBO transactions: 
9 Divestment of national and international companies 
Sell-off of family companies 
Privatisation of state-owned companies 
Going private deals 
Receivership companies 
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Table 1: Development of LNIIBO sources 
Development of LMBO sources 
(in percent ) 
Pre- 1982 1981 1986 1991 1994 1995 1996 
Divestment domestic 59515 595-5 58,18 431,4 41113 4052 38), 8 
Divestment foreign 14ý17 14,17 13,17 9517 123,6 10ý1 8ý2 
Family ILI I 15ol. 193,6 24500 355,3 39ý9 401,9 
Going private 0 0 03,7 1 ýA 0138 0516 173 
Privatisation 21,6 23,6 51.5 21,3 6311 4112 61,3 
Receivership 12,1 121,1 1,7 195-2 3319 5.11 43,5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number 190 239 316 447 404 356 379 
(Source: CMBOR/BZW Private Equity/Deloitte & Touche Corporate Finance 1987,1997/Initiative Europe 1995) 
As seen in the above table the wide range of buyout sources underlines the diversity of the 
UK market place. According to Wright, Normand and Robbie (1990), much of the initiative 
for LMBOs in the early 1980s came from the desire to take over companies close to 
receivership due to the recessionary conditions in the UK. According to the database of the 
CMBOR (Wright, Normand, Robbie 1987), over 12 percent came from this source in 1981. 
With the end of the recession in 1982, receivership declined in importance to 1.7 percent in 
1986 from 12 percent in 1981. Divestment from LJK parent companies became the most 
common LMBO source at 59 percent, followed by LMBOs from family-owned companies 
at 21 percent in 1986. 
LMIBOs of firms quoted on the stock market, so-called 'going privates', first appeared in 
the UK in 1985. Evidence examined by Wright, Normand and Robbie (1990) suggested that 
LMBOs from quoted firms have only slowly increased since 1985, reaching their peak of 
2.4 percent after the stock market crash in 1989, when a number of deals were made. 
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In the beginning of the 1990s, recession emerged again and receivership regained 
importance as an LMBO source amounting to 20 percent, while divestment of UK parent 
companies at 43 percent and from foreign parent companies at 10 percent continued to be 
the most common LMBO source. LMBOs from family-owned companies increased to 24 
percent of all transactions. 
Towards the mid 1990s, the economic recovery in the UK came full circle and the 
distribution of LMBO sources reflected this development. In 1994, the major LMBO 
sources were large strategic divestments at 54 percent and LMBOs from family-owned 
companies at 35 percent. The privatisation program of the public sector'9 initiated in July 
1994 increased the LMBOs from this source to 6.1 percent . In 1995 major buyout sources 
have been large strategic divestments with 50 percent and public sector privatisations with 
4.2 percent. According to Wright and Robbie (CMBOR, Winter 1995/96) the increase in 
the number of buyouts from privately owned sources with 40 percent have been driven by 
the growth in secondary buyouts of venture backed companies. In 1996, divestments 
remained the most important buyout source with 47 percent closely followed by LMBOs 
from private vendors reaching 40 percent of all transactions. According to Wright and 
Robbie (CMBOR, Spring 1997) the share of buyouts rose notably in advance of the General 
Election taking place in the spring of 1997. 
3.4 Volume of the UK LXMO market 
Like in the US (Chiplin, Coyne and Wright, Ten country study), the volume of LMBO 
transactions in the UK has continuously increased. As shown in the following table, the 
overall value of LMBOs in 1981 amounted to 1180m from 143 transactions. By 1987, the 
transactions had increased to 344 and the transaction value had breached the Dbn barrier 
for the first time. These developments took place as new financing sources and techniques 
were introduced into the market allowing for the funding of larger LM[BOs against the 
background of high stock market levels until October 1987 (Chiplin, Coyne and Wright, 
1988). 
19 According to the CMBOR (Winter 1995/96) the government's privatisation programme included large 
sell-offs from British Coal and British Rail. 
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In 1995 and 1996 the total value of buyouts have increased to E2.8 bn and f-3.6 bn the 
second highest level ever reached since the record year of 1989 with E3.8 bn. This increase 
in volume was driven by the ongoing strategic disinvestments and public sector 
privatisations and the growth in the number of LMBOs from privately owned sources 
resulting of secondary buyouts of venture backed companies. 
Table 2: Volume of the UK buyout market from 1981 to 1996 
Year Number Value (million pounds) 
1981 143 180 
1982 237 346 
1983 234 309 
1984 240 408 
1985 262 1,141 
1986 316 15.178 
1987 344 35,215 
1988 375 35,715 
1989 375 3ý, 893 
1990 486 2,452 
1991 447 25,158 
1992 451 21,549 
1993 386 21,156 
1994 404 22592 
1995 372 2.819 
1996 402 3.607 
.I ---*---- 117-*-, -- innc/Ojc C! -"-- Source: (CUBOR/13ZW Pnvate Equityweloitte ioucneUOrPOPlLC rllLdIWU, YMULC-Ily 1ý, VJAvv, T-L-L 
1997) 
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From 1989 on, the number of LMBOs steadily increased with the total value remaining at a 
level of ; E2.5bn. As the total transaction volume, the average deal volume also increased 
dramatically. For the year 1981, the CMBOR database (CMBOR Spring 1997) revealed 
that 84 percent of all transactions had a transaction value under Lim,, 2 percent between 
f-10-25m and 0.4 percent over 125m. In 1994, however, 20 percent of all transactions had a 
transaction value under Lim, 8 percent between 110-25m and 7 percent over 125m 
(CMBOR Spring 1997). In 1996, associated with the rises in average value of buyouts. 
there has been an increase in importance of middle and larger transactions where buyouts 
between E5 m and E25 m increased from 20 percent in 1995 to 23 percent in 1996. In 
contrast hereto, transactions below a transaction value of f, Im declined from 21 percent in 
1995 to 13 percent in 1996 (CMBOR, Spring 1997). 
3. Financial investors in UK LMBOs 
3.1 The role and importance of venture capital firms 
Until the mid 1970s, the venture capital industry in the UK was dominated by a small 
number of pioneers and specialists. An established market for professionally raised and 
invested pools of equity capital for entrepreneurial firms was limited due to the fact that, for 
many years, the provision of equity capital had been the exclusive providence of 
entrepreneurs in the case of private companies and the London Stock Exchange in the case 
of public companies (Lorenz, 1989). 
There were about a dozen professionally managed venture capital companies in operation at 
the end of the 1970s. (Lorenz, 1989). It is only since the mid 1970s that the UK venture 
capital community has been an industry of substance, essential impulses for this 
development came from the conservative government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 
In 1989, the volume of venture capital in the market in the UK amounted to ECU 11,8 bn 
(Karsunky, 1992) and increased to ECU 25,8 bn in 1996 which presents 45 percent of the 
total venture capital volume in Europe with ECU 58,6 bn (European Private Equity Survey, 
1997). As presented in the following table, the main institutional sources of venture capital 
include pension funds., insurance companies, banks and finally corporate investors and 
government agencies. 
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Table 3: The Sources of British venture capital 
Pension funds 41.4 percent 
Insurance 14.9 percent 
Banks 10.2 percent 
Private 5.8 percent 
Corporates 3.8 percent 
State 2.3 percent 
Others 21.6 percent 
(Source: European Private Equity Survey, 1997) 
3.2 The role and importance of venture capital funds 
Further impulses for the development of the venture capital industry came with the 
introduction of venture capital funds in the UK in the middle of the 1980s. Financial 
investors who had directly invested in small and medium entrepreneurial businesses before, 
recognised the advantageS20 of using venture capital funds in order to achieve their 
investment goals. For venture capitalists, the creation of investment funds brought the 
following advantages with respect to their investment activities: 
Increased flexibility with respect to investment in buyout opportunities 
More freedom to manage their own portfolio 
9 Greater liberty in purchase price negotiations 
As presented in the following table, significant amounts of venture capital in form of 
investment funds were in the hands of the following financial investors between 1992 and 
1996: 
20 Advantages for the corporate venturer: in addition to the financial reward, the venture capitalist's 
e, -. -pertise and knowledge as well as the 
fund's deal flow are accessible. 
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Table 4: The most important UK venture capital funds from 1992 to 1996 
Phildrew Ventures Third Fund 1992 flo8m 
Schroders UK Buyout Fund 1993 E140m 
Legal & General 1995 Fund 1993 L120m 
Charterhouse Capital Partners V 1994 1338m 
Morgan Grenfell Equity Partners 1994 f300m 
Candover 1994 Fund 1994 L270m 
HSBC Private Equity Partnership 1994 L170m 
3i UK Investment Partners 1995 f-200 m 
Apax Ventures V 1995 f- 164 m 
Cinven Fund 1996 f-300 m 
Phoenix Equity Partners 11 1996 f-133 m 
Schroder UK Venture Fund IV 1996 110 m 
k3ource: licquismons Monthly, March 1997) 
3.3 The role and importance of banks 
The discussion of the role of UK banks in leveraged corporate finance transactions like the 
LMBO must consider the still prevailing 'Trennbankensystem' in the UK which separates 
the activities of deposit banks or commercial banks and investment banks. With respect to 
the providers of LMBO financing products, one must distinguish between deposit banks and 
investment banks. In addition to the traditional deposit and credit bank products, deposit 
banks offer the entire spectrum of banking products through their subsidiaries and holding 
companies. 
In the course of an LMEBO transaction, the deposit banks offer the participation in senior 
debt facilities, but the investment bank acts as project leader of the transaction (Karsunky, 
1992). Investment banks with specialities in certain banking areas like corporate finance and 
corporate engineering have developed a huge expertise in the area of Mergers & 
Acquisitions and especially in the area of leveraged financial transactions like LMBOs. 
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As opposed to deposit banks, investment banks do not provide debt facilities, but rather 
supply the target company with equity capital from their own LMBO funds and act as an 
advisor throughout the transaction. 
According to the research of Braun (1989) the following banks are the most active debt 
providers in the UK LMBO market: 
Table 5: Most active debt providers for LMBOs in the UK 
1. Bank of Scotland 
2. Natwest 
3. Barclays 
4. Standard Chartered 
5. Royal Bank of Scotland 
7. Lloyds Bank 
8. Bankers Trust 
9. Citibank 
10. Schweizer Bankverein 
(Source: Braun, 1989) 
After the LMBO 
4.1 Exit possibilities 
An important aspect for LMBO investors is the availability of exit routes by which they can 
realise their gains. The CMBOR conducted a survey of LMBOs between 1986 and 1996 of 
which the results concerning exit routes are shown in table number six. 
4.1.1 Going public 
In the first exits of the mid 1980s, going public seemed to be the most frequent exit route at 
37 out of 78 exits in 1986. The main goal for a large proportions of LMBOs was to obtain 
flotation either on the Stock Exchange or the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), which 
offered less stringent admission criteria than the full listing2l (Wright, Normand and Robbie, 
1987). 
2' For details on admission criteria see part A, V, 1. going public 
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From 1990 to 1992, going public became less and less frequent, only 2 out of 123 exits 
sought a listing. Post-recession going public has again become the second frequent exit 
channel in the UK after trade sales since 1993. 
From 1994 to 1996 the numbers of flotations increased significantly to 12 and 6 percent in 
1996 in comparison to previous years from the early 1990s which had been negatively 
affected from the poor after-market performance of a small group of larger buyouts. A 
major change from previous years from the early 1990s was the floating of buyouts on 
markets other than the Official list, for example the AIM (CMBOR, Spring 1997). 
4.1.2 Trade sales 
Sale to a third party was seen as an increasingly attractive alternative to going public. In 
1986, already 34 of 78 exit routes were trade sales to third parties. From 1987 on trade 
sales exceeded going publics as exit alternative for the first time and kept its position as 
most frequent exit alternative with 80 trade sales out of 181 exits in 1994. The reason for 
the success of trade sales was mainly due to the fact that smaller LMBOs or those without 
requisite track record could not easily get a stock-market quotation, so trade sales were a 
more feasible exit option. They were also considered appropriate exit alternatives when the 
management was not strong enough to lead a floated company (Wright, Normand and 
Robbie, 1987). In 1995 and 1996 trade sales continued to be the most important exit 
channel representing 50 and 48 percent of all exits in the respective years. 
4.1.3 M1BO/MIBI 
Occasionally, a new set of investors may replace the original ones, making a second MBO 
an alternative exit route, although to date it has been the least frequented exit route in the 
UK. A second LMBO transaction may take place when the original institutional investors 
are replaced, the existing buyout group is enlarged or an external manager is brought in 
order to participate in a LMBI transaction. In 1996, secondary LMBOs reached its highest 
level with 15 percent which was also confirmed by the fact that the increase in numbers of 
buyouts from privately owned sources has been driven by the growth in secondary buyouts 
of venture backed companies (CMBOR, Winter 1995/96). 
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4.1.4 Receivership 
Receivership, as an exit route, occurs when projections were made on over-optimistic 
assumptions or when a sudden decline in the business environment put the company at risk 
of failure. Receivership exits in the UK reached a peak in the recessionary conditions 
between 1990 and 1992 where 92 out of 152 exits resulted in receiverships. In contrast 
hereto, in 1995 and 1996 buyouts from receiverships declinýd amounting to 26 percent and 
21 percent in the respective years. 
Table 6: Distribution of UK exit routes 
Year of Exit Trade Sale Flotation MBO/MBI Receivership Total 
N umber % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
1986 34 43 37 47 7 10 78 100 
1987 40 49 33 40 3 4 6 7 82 100 
1988 52 50 34 34 9 8 9 8 104 100 
1989 85 63 11 8 13 10 26 18 135 100 
1990 46 37 3 2 13 10 62 51 124 100 
1991 29 24 2 2 4 3 88 71 123 100 
1992 42 28 7 4 11 7 92 61 152 100 
1993 60 37 31 19 17 10 55 34 163 100 
1994 80 44 43 24 16 9 42 23 181 100 
1995 81 50 20 12 19 12 42 26 162 100 
1996 91 48 30 16 29 15 39 21 189 100 
(Source: CMBOR/13ZW Private Equity/Deloitte & Touche Corporate Finance, Management LMBOs, Spring 1997) 
The average age of the LMBO when exited was the subject of research by Wright, 
Thompson, Robbie and Wong (1995). The results showed the cumulative exit status of 
buyouts in the long term post-buyout period. Empirical evidence revealed that the 
proportion of buyouts which had not yet exited in any form declined monotonically, so that 
seven years after the buyout some 40 percent of the sample had exited. 
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The greatest number of exits occurred 3 to 5 years after the buyout. The research also 
showed that after year seven, 60 percent of the sample was still privately owned, indicating 
that the LMBO can also become a long term form of organisation. 
4.2 Main impacts of LMBOs on the UK economy 
Like in the US, LMBOs play an important part in the way UK corporations deal with the 
pressures of a highly competitive global economy. Deconcentration and deconglomeration 
have been the central tendencies of the latest wave of restructuring in the UK. 
John Coyne and Mike Wright (1985) describe LMBOs in the UK as a means for the 
necessary realignment of firms as an economy evolves. In the past, the trend in corporate 
activity had been to achieve additional growth through mergers and acquisition activity 
which led to the formation of many conglomerates. This trend was significantly reversed 
during the 1970s and into the 1980s and, according to Coyne and Wright (1985) much of 
the LMBO activity may be part of the reaction to this period of acquisition activity. 
In the following period of recession many conglomerates dismantled and attention has been 
focused on the divestment activities of UK companies rather than on their merger and 
acquisition activity. Thus, Coyne and Wright (1985) conclude that reactions to poor 
performance, the emergence of managerial diseconomies and the more favourable climate 
for independent small business have all contributed to the role of the LMBO as part of the 
evolution of the economic structure. 
Research by Bannock for 3i (1990) concerning the economic impact of LN11BOs came to the 
following conclusion: 
"WOs are goodfor managers. For vendors AIL60s have solved succession problems in 
family-owned businesses and helped overdiversified companies to get back to core 
activities and to raise cash which they believed can be more profitably invested elsewhere. 
... 
WOs are also goodfor the professional advisers and other intermediaries involved 
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Buyout activity has helped to promote the spectacular growth of the venture capital 
industty in the past decade, and the response of this industry has made the rapid growth it, 
MBOs possible. Finally, MBOs are goodfor the econom " Y- 
5. Perspectives for the UK LMBO market 
To date, leveraged management buyouts have become well established in the UK as a major 
element in corporate restructuring. The 1980-81 recession and subsequent competitive 
pressure seem to have forced companies to concentrate on core activities. Although the UK 
seems to have overcome the recession, these pressures are unlikely to go away and should 
increase as global competition continues to intensify. Once the mechanism had been 
established, the opportunities remained relatively constant and the sources of management 
LMBOs reflected the state of the economy, be it recession or economic recovery. Therefore 
there need be no fear that lack of buyout opportunities will severely curtail the LMBO 
activity in the future. 
According to Bannock (1990) a large number of family-owned businesses will probably face 
succession problems in the coming years, while the expansion of the small and medium- 
sized corporate sector will eventually create more opportunities for LM[BOs over the next 
two decades. At the same time, larger corporations have enormous scope for spinning off 
subsidiaries. The prospect of managers owning a stake in the company they work for has 
also become more favourable in recent years so that both the supply of companies for sale, 
and the will and ability of managers to buy them, seem assured. 
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H. Macroeconomic LMBO factors in Germany 
Economic background 
Economic situation 
Following the period of reunification in 1989, Germany enjoyed a period of post- 
reunification euphoria with growth rates well above the European average. However, when 
the recession caught up with Germany in 1993, the country experienced a considerable 
decline in gross domestic product of 1.3 percent which was the sharpest the country had 
seen since World War 11. In 1994 however the recovery of the German economy gained 
strength and the economy had a positive growth rate of 2.25 percent with the main driving 
force being the exports of goods which increased by 9 percent. (OECD Germany, 1995). 
However, despite these positive factors, Germany has wrestled with structural problems like 
a relatively weak private consumption with an increase of only 1.3 percent, as a result of a 
decline in disposable income. According to OECD reports (Germany, 1995) wage incomes 
grew by less than 0.5 percent due to declining employment and more flexible work patterns, 
resulting in lower overtime pay and cuts in benefits such as the Christmas bonus. Although 
exports were increasing, they suffered from a strong Deutschmark and high labour costs 
which were increased by 3.5 percent in 1995 and 1996 respectively. In addition, an 
agreement between the government and the unions reached in 1990 reduced the working 
week to 35 hours as of October 1995 which was additionally increasing labour costs by 2.8 
percent. 
The short recovery from recession Germany experienced in 1994 ended in the last quarter 
of 1995 when the economy went into reverse. This situation which was aggravated by an 
unusual hard winter, continued into 1996 where economic growth reached a GDP rate of 
1.4 percent compared to 2.1 percent in 1995. However, factors like inflation which 
remained low at 2 percent and the decline in the cost of domestic products which was 
helped by the decline in Germany's historically high labour costs gave reason for a slighly 
more positive outlook for the German economy in the future (Initiative Europe, 1997). 
1.2 Industrial structure 
Before the early 1990s and especially before the recession emerged in 1993, diversifying 
acquisitions by industrial firms in Germany were relatively low, which made LMBOs 
resulting from the restructuring of firms and the refocusing on core-activities rare. 
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However, increasing competition and ongoing globalisation with respect to the "Common 
European Market" in 1992 combined with the impact of recession starting in 1993 led to an 
industrial restructuring which affected both national and international groups as well as the 
important small to medium-sized companies trying to remain competitive in a changing 
economic environment. 
1.2.1 The strategic repositioning of national and international groups 
With respect to the ongoing globalisation of markets - especially in the context of the 
"Common European Market" - almost every European company was forced to examine its 
current business strategy and decide whether to expand or restrict their existing activities 
and whether to enter into new markets and additional business areas. The free trade zone of 
the European market required stronger and more efficient company units but equally an 
extremely focused company strategy. Large companies found themselves under pressure to 
review their performance which resulted in disposing of under-performing group assets and 
returning to core-activities (Luippold, 1992). The business consultant Roland Berger (1990) 
summarised this development in the following sentence: "In view of 1992 companies must 
move from being good at a lot of things in their home market to being good at one thing in 
every market". 
According to a study by Luippold (1992), the potential for restructuring in German industry 
is enormous. Especially the established, traditional groups have far too diversified structures 
and not enough focus on their strengths. Much of these diversified structures resulted from 
mergers and acquisition activity in the past years, were unprofitable and therefore had to be 
supported by the other profitable units of the group (Berger, 1990). In addition to this 
company restructuring, companies in Germany started divestment activities in the context of 
a new portfolio management concentrating more on core-activities. As a consequence, 
several profitable and interesting units were also spun-off in order to release financial 
resources and management capacity which could than be used for to expand existing core 
activities (Luippold, 1992). 
1.2.2 The strategic repositioning of small to medium-sized companies 
The necessity to respond to increased competition in the context of the "Common 
European Market" was also an important aspect in repositioning and restructuring small- to 
medium-sized companies in Germany. These companies had to face the fact that they would 
not only have to compete with their traditional competitors in the future, but also with new 
contenders on the new common market. 
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Therefore, in order to secure the going concern of their companies, German Mittelstand 
companies owners were forced to analyse the new macroeconomic environment and to 
respond actively with the necessary changes in the management of their companies. 
In the context of the changing industrial environment from the beginning of the 1990s on, 
the following chapter will give an overview about the development of LMBO activity since 
the late 1980s which is closely associated with the changing economic environment in 
Germany. 
2. Description of the LMBO environment in Germany 
2.1 Economic environment for LMBOs 
From the beginning of its existence in the late 1980s the German LMBO market has been 
slow to develop. According to the statistics of the CMBOR (Winter 1995/96) the number of 
LMIBOs in 1989 amounted to 25 deals. The underlying reasons for this were the stable 
macroeconomic environment in Germany making divestments and the sale of family-owned 
companies less urgent, the highly remunerated managers unwilling to take risks, the strong 
relationship between banks and firms and the underdeveloped venture capital and stock 
markets. 
However, due to an economic downturn in the early 1990s, industries had to fight against 
inefficiencies such as outdated working practices and inflated wages. These inefficiencies, 
able to emerge unnoticed during the years of economic success, increased the need for 
industrial restructuring and the LMBO concept began to gain recognition. 
Between 1992 and 1993 LMBO activity increased slightly to about 51 deals, a significant 
increase in comparison to the 27 deals in 1991. The majority of LMBOs continued to be 
divestments from German parent companies at 37,5 percent and foreign parents at 20 
percent followed by LM[BOs from family-owned companies at 35 percent . 
The impact of 
recession had finally pressured domestic and foreign companies to consider restructuring 
their diverse activities, providing the potential for further LMBOs (Wright, Robbie, March 
1995). 
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While small- to medium-sized companies in Germany facing succession problems have 
always been regarded as the strongest source for management LMBOs, owners' attitudes 
toward selling in general as well as to selling to management presented the greatest barrier 
for LMBO transactions in the past. However, difficult economic conditions changed C7 -- 
especially elderly company owner's attitudes and encouraged them to sell rather than 
struggle through recession (Initiative Europe, 1995). 
In 1994 against the background of a slight economic recovery, there was a major increase in 
deal volume to 59 transactions with a total transaction volume of f-733m. According to 
Wright and Robbie (Summer 1995), this highly secretive market seemed have to opened up 
in terms of the readiness to report deals and the willingness of private and corporate 
vendors to consider LUBOs as viable alternative to trade sales. In 1995 the number of 
transactions increased to 74 reaching a market value of E540m which signified a slight 
decline from 1994. In 1996, although the number of transactions fen to 62 transactions the 
overall market value exceeded all previous years with a transaction value of -L 1.1 bn 
(Initiative Europe, 1997). 
2.2 Data about German LMBOs 
Availability of data about German LMBOs is problematic due to the German tendency 
towards secrecy. Schmid (1994) states in this context that the only precise data about the 
intensity of LMBO activity exist about LMBOs in the 'Neue Bundeslander', the former East 
Gen, nan states, due to the fact that the German 'Treuhandgesellschaft, the national trust 
company, kept comprehensive records on their completed transactions. Accurate 
information on LMBO activity in the 'Alte Bundeshinder', the former West German states, 
is very hard to obtain. This is particularly due to the lack of an institution 
Eke the CMIBOR 
in the UK and the fact that LMIBO transactions in Germany are arranged and completed 
with utmost discretion. Especially owners of small- to medium-sized companies prefer to 
keep the transaction silent in order to avoid the impression that their succession problems 
were insurmountable or that they 'cashed in' the family business. The 
following data about 
the LMBO activity in Germany by the CMBOR is mainly based on information given 
by 
German banks or venture capital firms involved in LNMOs. 
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2.3 Main sources for German LMBOs 
Like in the UK,, there are five main sources for German LN[BOs. From 1980 to 1994 the 
distribution of LMBO sources was as follows: 
Table 7: Distribution of German LMBO sources 
1980-1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
(in percent ) 
Receivership n. a. 3.8 2.3 7.5 5.6 1.6 2.1 
Divestment domestic 19.0 46.2 39.5 37.5 33.3 58.1 42.6 
Divestment foreign 38.1 38.4 23.2 20.0 18.6 21.0 21.3 
Family-owned 38.0 11.5 32.6 35.0 40.7 16.1 34.0 
Other 4.9 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.9 3.2 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sample size 121 26 43 40 54 74 62 
(CMBOR/BZW Private Equity/Deloitte Touche Corporate Fmance 1997/Initiative Europe, 1997) 
As seen in the above table from the beginning of real LMBO activity in the late 1980s until 
1994, divestment of subsidiaries from domestic and foreign groups were the most important 
LMBO source, ranging from 84 percent of all transactions in 1991 to 52 percent in 1994. 
Divestments of German and non-German parent companies peaked as sources of LMBO 
activity with 46 and 38 percent respectively in 1991. This development was mainly due to 
the impact of German reunification. Many LMBOs occurred in the former German 
Democratic Republic to save the companies. From 1991 on, LMBOs from divestment from 
non-German parents remained stable at approximately 20 percent, whereas divestments 
from German parents declined from 40 percent in 1992 to 33 percent in 1994. In 1995 and 
1996, divestments continue to be an important source of deals, reflecting the consequences 
of industrial restructuring. Especially domestic divestments were a particularly strong 
source in 1995, representing 58 percent of all transactions, although this figure declined in 
1996 to 43 percent. 
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In the beginning of the LMBO market most of these businesses have been sold by medium- 
sized groups rather than the German corporations - however spin-offs of businesses of well- 
known German corporations like AEG, a daughter of Daimler-Benz, sold nine divisions to 
buyout teams or Mannesmann divested its printer manufacturing subsidiary to an LN1BO 
team (Initiative Europe, 1997). 
In the late 1980s family-owned companies were the most frequent LMBO sources reaching 
38 percent. In the beginning of the 1990s this figure declined slightly, reaching its lowest 
point at II percent in 1991. From 1991 on family-owned companies regained importance as 
an LMBO source peaking at 40 percent of all LMBO transactions in 1994 from II percent 
in 199 1. 
This development is mainly due to succession problems in German small- and medium-sized 
companies and is likely to gain even more importance by the end of the decade. Especially 
economic difficulties have encouraged some elderly owner-managers to sell rather than to 
have to struggle through recession. Consequently, the effect of this development can be 
seen in the statistics which reveal that with the exception of 1995 when the percentage of 
deals from this source dropped to 16 percent, LMBOs from family-owned companies 
accounted for more than a third of all transactions in 1996 (Initiative Europe, 1997). 
Receivership deals, at 3.8 percent of all transactions, didn't play an important role at the end 
of the 1980s and increased little in the course of the 1990s due to the recessionary 
conditions. The receivership source peaked in 1993 at 7,5 percent and declined steadily 
reaching 2.1 percent of all transactions in 1996. 
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2.4 Volume of the German LMBO market 
Table 8: Volume of the German LMBO market 
Year Number Value (in million pounds) 
1988 36 N/A. 
1989 25 N/A. 
1990 36 292 
1991 27 224 
1992 51 322 
1993 44 397 
1994 59 733 
1995 74 540 
62 1.148 
(Source: Initiative Europe, Buyout Review 1995-1997) 
As seen in the above table, LMBO activity in the late 1980s was quite moderate, the annual 
rate of transactions ranged between 25 and 36 between 1988 and 1990 and the transaction 
value amounted to DM 292m in 1990. (Figures for transaction value are not available for 
1988 and 1989. ) In their article of 1992, Tanner, Graper and Wright discuss the 
development of the German LMBO market and conclude that, due to the impact of German 
reunification in 1989, Germany became the largest buyout market in Continental Europe 
with 36 transactions in 1990. 
However, this dramatic increase in deal volume was due entirely to the restructuring taking 
place in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). In the western part of Germany, 
the slow but steady growth of MBO transactions has continued. Lack of information 
remains a problem in monitoring market developments, so the estimated numbers of 
transactions is likely to be recorded under value. 
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Wright and Robbie (1995/96) conclude that 1994 saw record levels in both the volume and 
value of LM[BOs in the former West German states. By increasing the number of deals 
completed by a third to 59 in 1994, Germany became the second largest LMIBO market in 
continental Europe with an LM[BO market value of 033m, twice the level of 1993 (Wright, 
Robbie, 1995/96). In 1995 the market has developed steadily and 74 deals were recorded 
with an estimated value of E540 m. In 1996 the number of transactions declined slightly to 
62 transactions, however the estimated market value reached its peak breaking for the first 
time the f, I bn barrier and placing Germany on number one in the Continental LMBO 
market above France (Initiative Europe, 1997). 
In this context it is worthwhile examining the development of the average LM[BO 
transaction volume which is closely related to the growth of the overall LMBO market 
value and which has developed as follows. According to statistics of the Initiative Europe 
Buyout Review (1995) more than 50 percent of all transactions were below 15m. from 1980 
to 1990, only 30 percent fell below this range in 1994 and 37 percent were below this range 
in 1996. LM[BOs ranging between E5m. and E25m. accounted for 30 percent of all 
transactions between 1980 and 1990, increased to 55 percent in 1994 and declined to 37 
percent in 1997. LM[BOs with transactions volumes over f-25m. accounted for 18 percent 
between 1980 and 1990, declined to 15 percent in 1994 and increased again to 26 percent in 
1996 (Initiative Europe, 1997). 
Financial investors in German LMBOs 
3.1 The role and importance of venture capital firms 
German venture capital firms were introduced in 1987 with the two-fold purpose of 
providing venture capital and a savings vehicle for small savers. Provided that 70 percent of 
their stock is offered to the general public, these firms are tax exempt. In Germany, venture 
capital firms join together in the 'German Venture Capital Association e. V. (BVK)' which 
distinguishes the following major groups: 
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Universal venture capital finns, which constitute the biggest part of the existing venture 
capital firms and preferably invest in already settled and profitable small- to medium- 
sized companies, 
* Venture capital firms which focus on new companies, the second largest group in the 
BVK, 
* State-supported venture capital firms, and 
o Specialised venture capital firms as defined by the law for venture capital firms (UBGG). 
According to the statistics of the BVK (1997) the total volume of 'funds under 
management' amounted to DM 9.8bn in Germany in 1996. According to the statistics of the 
BVK,, the various sources of funds for venture capital firms are as follows: 
Table 9- Sources of German venture capital funds 
Banks 59 percent 
Pension funds 10 percent 
Industry 9 percent 
Insurance 8 percent 
State 7 percent 
Private 4 percent 
Other 3 percent 
(Source: BVK yearbook, 1997) 
17 percent in terms of value and 7 percent in terms of number of the total investment 
portfolio of venture capital firms in Germany are in LMB04LMBI transactions. This is in 
strong contrast to the figures in the UK, where 71 percent of the value and 41 percent of 
the investments involve LMBOs (European Private Equity Survey, 1997). 
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Detailed statistics from the BVK (1997) show the following distribution of investments of 
venture capital in 1996: 
Table 10: Distribution of investments of venture capital in Germany 
In value 
Expansion 60 percent 
N1BO/M[B1 17 percent 
Start up financing 7 percent 
Bridge financing 5 percent 
Turnaround financing 3 percent 
Seed financing 2 percent 
Other 6 percent 
Total 100 percent 
(Source: BVK yearbook, 1997) 
According to research about the attitude of venture capital firms towards LMBO 
transactions conducted by Luippold (1991), 85.7 percent of the companies questioned 
confirmed their support of LMBOs 'without restriction' and 14.3 percent only 'under 
certain circumstances' in 1990. Whereas all venture capital firms could imagine participating 
in a buyout transaction with equity, 79 percent of the sample companies would be prepared 
to undertake a consulting role and 36 percent would feel competent to lead the transaction 
as a sponsor. The venture capital firms in the sample questioned by Luippold provided 
equity and mezzanine financing, but no debt financing. 
LMBO experts (Luippold) expect a further expansion of the German venture capital market 
in the coming years and, therefore, for finance transactions such as LMBOs. According to 
Leopold (1989), the volume of equity investments will increase several times over in the 
next decade and therefore venture capital investment will become one of the most important 
sectors for financial services and innovations in Germany. 
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3.2 The role and importance of venture capital funds 
LMBO funds are equity funds especially created by institutional equity providers to finance 
LMBOs and are funded by industrial investors or wealthy private individuals. According to 
Schwenkedel (1991) the structure of an LMBO fund in Germany is usually as follows- 
Schn-fid (1994) writes in this context that German investment funds are usually in the form 
of a lin-fited partnership (GmbH & Co, KG ) in which investors participate as partners with 
limited liability and the fund administrator's participate as fully liable partners of a limited 
liability company. According to Schmid, the investments per partner are usually limited to 
10 to 20 percent of the fund volume and the fund generally matures in 7 to 10 years. 
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The following are the investment funds established with focus on the German LMBO 
market with the highest investment volume: 
Table 11: Investment funds in Germany with the highest investment volume until 1991 
1992 BC Partners Baring European Capital Partners 
1992 CWB Cap. Partners CWB Capital Partners I 
1992 Schroder Ventures Schroder German Buyouts 1992 
1992 Thomas JC Matzen Thomas JC Matzen 
1993 Halder Holdings Halder Investments III 
1994 BC Partners Baring Capital Partners 
1994 3i 3i Europe Investment Partners 
1994 Advent International Global Private Equity 11 
1994 Apax Partners Apax Europe 11 
1996 Quadriga Capital Management Private Equity Fund 
1996 German Equity Partners 











(Source: Initiative Europe, Buyout Review 1995-1996, Private Equity Monitor 1990) 
According to the above list of investment funds, a large amount of capital was accumulated 
in Germany for LMBO investments in the 1990s, supplied mainly by international equity 
providers and LMBO specialists. LMBO experts argue, however, that the high volume of 
funds and the capital available might put pressure on venture capitalists to invest in arising 
LMBO opportunities (Private Equity Monitor, September 1996). Resulting problems like 
overpricing could well lead to a slow down of the rate in which deals are completed and, as 
a consequence, European markets could risk remaining replete with established investment 
funds. 
3.3 The role and importance of banks 
In Germany, banks have had a close relationship with industry for a long time. This tradition 
of industrial banking emerged in the nineteenth century and has influenced both the 
structure of special credit institutions set up in the twentieth century and the nature of their 
relationship with industry. 
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The main feature of this relationship, which contrasts sharply with UK commercial banks, is 
that German banks are not only providers of credit but may also be shareholders in their 
own right. Furthermore, in splitting external financing into debt and equity, German firms 
seem to rely considerably more on debt and less on equity finance than firms in other 
countries, a fact which diminishes the role of the German stock market. As to debt 
financing, German enterprises are relatively dependent on bank finance, 48 percent of all 
debt was made with credit institutions in 1992 compared to firms in the UK where debt to 
bank institutions amounted to only 32 percent (OECD Germany, 1995). 
Concerning the attitude of German banks towards LMBO transactions, the majority of 
German banks have been reluctant in the past to finance an LMBO transaction. In his study, 
Luippold (1991) researched, among other questions, the attitude of German banks towards 
LMBOs and either witnessed a noticeable lack of interest or obtained no response to the 
questionnaire at all -a fact which could be justified by the lack of activity and therefore 
experience by the respective banks in this sector. However, Luippold (199 1) also found that 
the few institutions, who responded as being active in the LMBO market, confirmed that 
competition on the market was increasing and that they desired increased market share in 
this upcoming market. Those banks showed increasing willingness to provide LMBO 
financing on the basis of future cash-flow rather than on tangible assets. 
The growing interest of banks in Germany to participate in LMBO transactions has to be 
seen in the context of an intensely competitive environment in which the German banking 
industry will have to operate and where banks feel the need to look for new business 
opportunities. Furthermore, initial participation in LMBO transactions will offer banks in 
Germany the following business opportunities over the course of the LMBO life cycle: 
Establishment of a new customer relationships due to new, innovative finance 
instruments with relatively high interest margins 
Private asset management opportunities with respect to the vendor of the company 
* Participation in the exit of the company through flotation 
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According to Luippold's research, German banks are becoming more and more interested in 
providing mezzanine as well as equity financing, either themselves or through their 
subsidiaries. Some institutions indicated that they were even willing to provide secured, 
unsecured and equity financing. However in the majority of the cases, debt providers are not 
equity providers. This is due to section 32a Limited Liability Companies Act which states 
that shareholder loans granted by the shareholders in a situation where prudent businessmen 
would have given additional equity, this loan may become automatically subordinated and 
substitute equity. Therefore, German banks are reluctant to provide debt and equity, as they 
are to transfer this task to one of their subsidiaries which functions as an equity investment 
firm. With respect to the major participants in German LMBO transactions,, Braun (1989) 
listed the following banks as the major participants in German LM[BOs: 
Table 12: Most active debt providers for LMBO's in Germany 






(Source: Braun, 1989) 
In summary, according to Luippold (1991), the following factors will force German banks 
to participate more and more in leveraged financed transactions, especially in the form of 
LMBOs: 
9 Experienced foreign financial institutions aggressively forcing their way 
into the German market 
Growing competition due to innovation, globalisation and deregulation 
Increasing pressure on the margins in traditional credit transactions 
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Y uler the LMB 0 
4.1 Exit possibilities 
Exiting is one of the key issues for investors in order to realise their investment and their 
capital gains. In general, this implies that markets where company shares can be sold have 
to be well-organised, fully functioning and highly receptive. In Germany, exiting is one of 
the key problems for investors due to the relatively inactive stock market in comparison to 
the US and the UK 22 . The following will discuss the existing exit channels in Germany as 
well as their advantages and disadvantages. 
4.1.1 Going public 
In contrast to the UK, where flotation of LMBO companies on the stock exchange was the 
most important exit route, the flotation of German LMBO companies on German stock 
exchanges have been far less common. In general, the level of activity on German stock 
markets varied considerably from that in the UK, especially the number of new listings for 
individual companieS23. 
In Germany, going public, or introducing a company to the stock exchange, has been 
restricted due to the severe admission criteria the respective companies have to fulfill". 
Strict admission criteria and the reluctance of banks to sponsor the going public process and 
to take responsibility for the 'Prospekthaftung', the liability for information given in the 
sales memorandum, made it difficult for small- to medium-sized companies to get a full 
stock exchange listing. Additionally, the high costs of the procedure, the small emission 
volume and the time it took to implement all prevented many small- to medium-sized 
companies from getting an official stock market listing (Luippold, 1992). 
22 In comparison to 664 listed companies in Germany in 1993, there were 1,865 in the UK and 7,313 in the 
us. 
23 in 1994. the number of new company listings in the UK amounted to 256 whereas in Germany they 
amounted to only 3. 
24 For details on admission criteria see hereto section A, V, 1. going public 
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Taking all the above mentioned factors into consideration, it is not astonishing, that going 
public - in sharp contrast to the UK - didn't play a significant role as an exit possibility for 
German LMBOs. Only 7 percent of all exits in 1996 went on the stock market. However, 
the introduction of the 'Geregelte Markt' in 1987 and the 'Neue Markt' in 1997 was 
supposed to encourage the flotation of small- to medium-sized companies and act as a 
catalyst in Germany's inactive equity culture. 
4.1.2 Trade sales 
Another alternative to exit an LMBO investment is the sale of the company to a third party. 
Potentially interested parties could be financial or industrial investors interested in acquiring 
the technological know-how of the LMBO company or adding the products of the target 
company to their existing product range. Industrial investors are the most interesting 
potential buyers for LMBO investors in that they are willing to pay 'strategic' prices (above 
market price) based on the future benefits of the synergy resulting from the merger. 
Divestment through sale to an investor may, however, be rejected by the LMBO managers 
who would loose their newly acquired independence and freedom of decision. Therefore the 
decision to sell the company to an industrial investor might depend upon the attitude of the 
existing management towards the potential buyer (Karsunky, 1992). Trade sales were the 
second common alternative in 1996 with 21 percent of all LMBOs exiting this way. This 
confirms the assumption that the LMBO management team had been able to co-operate 
with the new shareholders or that the purchase price meant significantly attractive rates of 
return on the initial investment. 
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4.1.3 Buy-back 
Another alternative for exiting an LM[BO in Germany is when former owners buy the 
companies back or acquire a majority stake from the existing management. Buy-backs 
represented 65 percent of all exits in 1996. For management to acquire a majority stake 
through the 'the buy-back option', the appropriate evaluation modalities and regulations are 
usually incorporated in the initial LMEBO purchase contract. The future purchase price is 
already agreed among the parties, so management also has the option to look for a second 
financial partner willing to participate in the transaction (Karsunky, 1992). As seen in the 
1996 exit statistics, buy-backs were a very common exit alternative, a total of'26 percent of 
all exits were buy-backs. 
4.1.4 MBO/MBI 
According to BVK statistics, the sale of a company to other financial investors is the least 
common exit alternative for investors. In 1996 this route constituted only 5 percent of all 
registered exits. Statistics from the BVK (1997) on exit alternatives in Germany revealed 
the following: 
Table 13: Exits of German Buyouts in 1996 
Exit DM % number % 
(in million marks) 
Buy back 301 57 163 65 
Trade sales 162 30 52 21 
M[BO/M[BI 17 3 14 5 
Going public 47 9 17 7 
Other 3 1 6 2 
Sum 530 100 252 100 
(Source: BVK yearbook, 1997) 
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4.2. Main impacts of LMBOs on the German economy 
4.2.1 Remarriage of ownership and control 
With respect to the efficiency and Competitiveness of LMBOs,, Wright and Coyne (1985) 
deemed the relationship between ownership and control to be one of the most important 
debates in corporate governance theory. They claim that the remarriage of ownership and 
control through management's equity holding in a company, investments which perhaps 
constitute a substantial portion of managers' personal wealth, will motivate them to 
effectively manage and monitor the company's performance. In her study of 1991, Nemec 
also emphasised the conflict resulting from the separation of ownership and control as well 
as the suboptimal decisions made out of this conflict. Nemec underlines in her study (1991) 
the impact of the remarriage of ownership and control through an LM[BO in overcoming 
this conflict. 
4.2.2 The German 'Mttelstand" 
4.2.2.1 The size of the German 'Mittelstand" 
German small- to medium-sized companies are generally known as 'Mittelstand' and 
accounted for 99.9 percent of all companies in the former West German states in 1994. 
They have always been regarded as one of the strongest potential LMBO sources . To 
emphasise this future potential, the following statistics from 1994 (Statistische Bundesamt) 
rank German companies according to sales volume: 
Sales (in deutschmark) Number of companies (in 000) 
% 
25.000 -I Nfillion 25,140 
81.2 
1 Mllion - 10 Nfillion 430 
16.3 
10 Nfillion -50 Nfillion 50 
1.9 
50 Nfillion - 250 Nfillion 11 
0.5 
Nfittelstand 
over 250 Nfillion 2 0.1 
Total 2,633 
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From the 2,632,000 companies in Germany 
approx. 2,223,000 or 85 percent are partnerships 
approx. 360,000 or 14 percent are limited liability companies 
approx. 21,000 or 0.1 percent are joint-stock companies or companies limited 
by shares, but having one or more general partners 
(Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994) 
4.2.2.2 The role of the German 'Mittelstand' 
According to Albach (1983), the German 'NEttelstand' represents the market economy. In 
his view the importance of small- to medium-sized companies for a market economy is 
based on the following: 
* Small- to medium-sized companies provide a wide range of goods and services, therefore 
they are able to react quickly and flexibly to consumer driven changes. 
o They are in quantitative and qualitative respects important employers. They offer 
qualified jobs in an environment which is known for accountability and team work. 
They are the driving force in the modernisation of the economy, as technical innovations 
can be transformed into marketable products in a very practical, quick and cost-efficient 
way. 
They are very often a spring board for entrepreneurial talent and act as catalyst for 
established market leaders of the respective branches. 
4.2.2.3 The importance of LMBOs for the German 'Mittelstand" 
The above statistics show that the Mittelstand is the backbone of German industry, 
consisting of a large number of small- to medium-sized family-owned companies which are 
often still run by their founders. 
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Due to the fact that a lot of these owner/managers will have to retire from their businesses 
over the coming years 25 and no successor is available within the family, LMBOs have 
played and will play a vital role in finding suitable solutions for succession problems in order 
to keep the German 'Mittelstand" alive. 
5. Perspectives for the German LM[BO market 
In summary, the following key factors will influence the future development of the German 
LUBO-market: 
* The succession problems in the German Nlittelstand will gain importance by the end of 
the decade. According to research by the Institut ffir Mittelstandsforschung, 420,000 
small- to medium-sized companies will have succession problems by the end of this 
decade. 
9 Divestment from national and international parent groups are expected to continue 
playing a central role in the LMBO market due to economic pressures and the continuing 
need for restructuring. 
* The still underdeveloped equity culture in Germany reflected in the low number of IPOs 
and trading levels will slowly change. 
9 The development of the markets in Germany is still insufficient, but the introduction of 
the 'Neue Markt' in 1997 and the continuous development of the existing 8 regional 
stock exchanges will encourage market activity. 
e Buyout funds have an ample supply of equity for LNMO investments. Several 
financial 
investors have provided some significant fund raising for LMBO activities in the 1990s 
26 
25 ý According to the statistics of the Institut fUr Nfittelstandsforschung in Bonn, 420,000 small- to medium- 
sized companies N-, ill have succession problems by the year 2000. 
26 For further details on investment funds see section C, 11,3.2 The role and importance of investment 
funds. 
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Banks have developed more flexibility concerning LMBO financing due to market 
pressure and the ongoing consolidation process in the banking industry. Several banks 
have already established specialist buyout or acquisition finance departments in order to 
provide the very specialised skill required to structure and monitor LMBOs and to 
ensure rapid and high quality service (Wright, Robbie, Chiplin, Spring 1997). 
* The changes in the current tax law, proposed by the German goverment to finance the 
intended corporate tax reform by increasing the capital gains tax may lead to a wave of 
LMBO transactions before tax reform is implemented in 1999 at the latest. 
Due to the above factors, LMBO experts assume there will be an increase in German 
LMBO activity in the coming years. The changing macroeconomic environment will also 
encourage alternative methods of financing, restructuring and divestment, forcing 
companies to reorganise their business activities. As a result, venture capital firms are and 
will receive an unprecedented number of enquiries about possible LMBOs from small- to 
medium-sized family businesses and from leading corporations. However, venture capitalists 
like Andrew Richards of 3i (1996) point out that more details about LMBO transactions 
and their outcomes must be accessible in order to establish 'role models' for industry and 
executives alike. If this were achieved the German market could see 300 to 400 deals a year 
(Richards, 1996). 
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Microeconomic LMBO factors in the UK 
Form and structure Of UK companies 
The legal form of UK companies 
Due to the significant differences between UK and Continental law with respect to the 
structuring of Leveraged Management Buyout transactions, several aspects of UK and 
German corporate law are worth examining in order to fully understand the difference 
between LMBO activity in the UK and Germany. 
In the UK one has to distinguish between the incorporated and the unincorporated firm 27 . 
An incorporated firm means that the firm legally becomes a 'person' or entity, separate from 
its owners and in possession of certain legal rights and duties a person would have. 
An unincorporated firm is viewed by law as a group of owners rather than as a separate 
legal entity and such a firm is known as a sole trader or a partnership. To establish a 
business as a sole tradership or a partnership requires no legal action. The guidelines for 
resolving internal conflict between partners are provided by the Partnership Act of 1890 
(ffigson, 1995). 
Concerning corporate forms, there are two basic systems of legal classification of 
companies under the Companies Act, neither of which is directly concerned with size, but 
both have some bearing on the raising of capital. These are by reference to (1) the liability 
of members and (2) the public/private dichotomy. As to (1) registered companies may be- 
" Companies limited by shares (introduced in 1855) 
" Companies limited by guarantee (introduced in 1862) 
" Unlimited companies 
27 An incorporated firm is called a company in the UK and a corporation in the US although sometimes the 
US word is used in the UK for a particularly large company. 
85 
In the first case, the most common type in practice, each member must contribute to the 
company's assets the amount unpaid on his shares. In the second case, the partners are 
personally liable for the amount which they contributed in the event of insolvency. in the 
final case, each partner's liability is unlimited if the company becomes insolvent, even 
though the company has a legal personality. 
A large firm will almost certainly be incorporated as a limited liability company and is likely 
to be a public company whose shares are listed on the stock exchange. 
A public company is defined as a company limited by shares or limited by guarantee whose 
memorandum states that it is to be a public company and which has complied with the 
provisions for registration with a minimum capital of at least L50.000 
In the UK, the most common form is the company limited by shares. This form will be 
chosen by big corporations and by small- and medium-sized companies. Once again, one has 
to distinguish between 2 forms: 
e Public limited company (plc) where the shareholders are public 
o Private limited company (Ltd. ) where there are only a few shareholders 
The guidelines for companies are provided by the Companies Act of 1985 which 
consolidates the Companies Acts of 1948,1967,1976,1980 and 1981. Concerning the 
distribution of company forms according to the public/private dichotomy, the vast majority 
of companies are private, although only perhaps half of the number registered are actually 
trading. The largest companies are usually also quoted. These are public companies which 
have decided to seek a wider market for their shares by having them quoted on the stock 
market. 
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The distribution of companies in the UK are as f6flows: 
Table 14: Distribution of companies in the UK 
1994 1979 
Private 11,075ý, 483 7101,602 
Public 13,746 163,015 
Public quoted (UK, all markets) 2,264 
I- - -11 
21,431 
kavuluu. lugsull, 1". )) 
Referring to the above statistic it is evident that private companies in the LJK are the most 
frequent company form, the numbers have been increasing and continue to increase since 
1979, whereas the number of public companies is declining. This may be due to the more 
stringent legislation contained in the Companies Act 1985 which lessens the advantage of 
being a public company for UK firms. 
1.2 The equity structure of UK companies 
With respect to different LMBO take-over models 28 it is of vital importance to examine the 
existing potential of 'hidden reserves 29 in the desired target company. This allows 
companies to use this step-up potential of assets and increase their net cash-flow level due 
to a higher depreciation volume. UK companies usually adopted the historic cost 
convention which meant that the assets and liabilities of the company are generally stated at 
original cost subject to depreciation or provisions for diminuition in value (BDO, 1991). 
Karsunky (1992) points out that the Companies Act of 1981 incorporated the 4th European 
Union guidelines allowing UK companies to use the 'market or current cost accounting' 
methods for the evaluation of certain assets instead of the existing 'historical cost 
accounting method'. In that case, by law, any surplus on a revaluation, calculated after 
provision for depreciation and diminution in value, must be transferred to a separate non- 
distributable reserve account shown on the balance sheet. 
2' More details about UK take-over models are described in section D, 1,2.4 asset deal 
29 'Hidden reserves' is the financial term for the difference between current cost and historical cost value of 
assets. 
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According to Kbhler and Rotter (1994) the Companies Act 1985 allows the following 
positions of the balance sheet to be revalued according to 'current costs, or (market value'. 













(K6hler/Rotter, International Accounting Rules, 1994 ) 
Due to the fact that the difference between historical value and current costs or market 
value is capitalised in the position 'revaluation reserve' and that this amount is restricted for 
dividend distribution, the equity of the company increases through each revaluation. Based 
on the effects of the above revaluation method, UK LMIF30 target companies cannot be 
compared to German companies, as, in most cases, their 'hidden reserves' are already 
capitalised in the respective equity position which leads to a considerably higher equity ratio 
than that of German companies. According to the OECD report of 1996 the equity 
structure of UK companies in 1992 was relatively strong with an equity ratio of 
approximately 49 percent in comparison to that of German companies at 18 percent30 
1.3 The liability structure of UK companies 
The statistics available on UK company financing (OECD, Germany 1995) support the 
conclusion that financing is predominantly provided by both internal funding and external 
funding through debt and stock issue 
31 
10 According to the Deutsche Bundesbank Monatsbericht 1995, the equity ratio of German companies 
remained fairly constant, ranging only between 17,8% and 18% from 1991 to 1994. 
31 According to the OECD report of 1995, of the total financing volume of German companies 60% were 
made by internal financing, 25% by debt financing and 15% by equity financing. 
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Due to the fact that external bank financing is relatively unimportant for companies in the 
UK, one has to conclude that securities exchange serves as the primary cash providers for 
British companies. The fOllowing table confirms this assumption by revealing that 36 
percent of total company financing is done through securities. 
Table 16: Financing sources of British non-financial companies. 
Securities 36 percent 
Bank loans 21 percent 
Otherloans 18 percent 
Other liabilities 21 percent 
(Source: Karsunky, 1992) 
This statistics confirm further the assumption that bank finance is not of particularly high 
importance to UK companies due to the fact that they provide only 21 percent of the total 
financing. The influence of banks on LMBO financing is therefore somewhat weaker than in 
other European countries, especially Germany. However, just because bank-lending in the 
UK is virtually insignificant, it would be wrong to assume that banks have a subordinated 
role in the area of LMBO financing. 
.. A%, ccording to Wright, Robbie and 
Chiplin (1997) specialist departments for leveraged 
finance transactions were established in the UK because this type of lending was perceived 
by banks to be different from usual corporate financing and its particular skills and 
requirements. Banks financing LM[BO transactions have often attempted to provide other 
services as well, such as overdraftsY forex, M&A, etc. and, according to the banks 
interviewed in the survey, the ability to provide a full range of services was important in 
order to be completely informed about everything which may have an impact on the lending. 
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2. Business activity of UK LMIBO companies 
The following is an overview of the business activity of LM[BO target companies from 
1990 32 to 1996 in the UK. Only the main industries are fisted here, which account for 
approximately 70 percent of all buyout transactions in the LJK. 
Table 17: Business activity of UK LMIBO companies from 1990-1996 
Business Activity (in %) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 
1. Business services, leasing 21.4 20.3 25.3 27.9 23.3 26.1 
2. Mechanical & instrument engineering 8.8 5.8 6.2 7.2 5.0 10.4 
3. Wholesale distribution 8.0 11.8 7.5 9.0 7.8 9.7 
4. Electric. engineering & office machines 7.6 10.0 7.8 6.7 10.0 7.3 
5. Other manufacturing 4.1 2.9 3.8 4.4 3.8 7.0 
6. Paper, printing and publishing 6.8 6.3 8.0 5.7 7.0 6.0 
7. Retail, distribution and repair 6.6 5.1 6.0 3.6 4.5 3.7 
8. Banking, Insurance and Finance 4.7 6.5 4.2 4.1 2.5 3.9 
9. Other 32.0 31.3 31.2 31.4 36.1 25.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total transactions 488 448 451 387 400 402 
(Source: Data from CMBOR/BZW Private Equity/]E)eloltte Touche & Touche Corporate Finance, Sprmg 1997) 
As seen in table 17, LMBOs are widely spread across industrial sectors. From 1990 to 1996 
LMBOs are preferably found in service sectors like business services (transportation) 
increasing from 21.4 to 26.1 percent, mechanical and instrumental engineering where the 
frequency of LMBOs increased from 8.8 to 10.4 percent followed by wholesale distribution 
increasing from 8.0 to 9.7 percent in 1996. 
32LMBO activity reached its peak in number of transactions in the UK in 1990 and in Germany in 1994. 
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Other areas where LMBOs tend to occur between the period of 1990 and 1996 were 
electrical engineering and office machines declining slightly from 7.6 to 7.3 percent and 
paper, printing and publishing where the share of LMBO companies declined from 6.8 to 
6.0 percent. Additional areas worthy of note are retail, distributions and repair with a share 
of 3.7 percent of all LMBO transactions. 
It is interesting to observe that LMBOs not only occurred in manufacturing industries, 
which banks prefer due to their stable cash-flows and availability of tangible assets, but also 
in service sectors and the manufacture of electronic equipment, profitable market niches 
with future growth potential. 
The evaluation of these statistics support the assumption that the growing trend led away 
from asset-based lending where banks preferred companies in manufacturing industries and 
towards cash-flow oriented lending where also service industries with strong cash-flow 
could be considered valuable LMBO targets. 
3. Ownership, control and decision-making of banks in UK firms 
In contrast to the 'German model' of corporate governance, the Anglo-American model is 
structured such that individual shareholders have little direct influence on management and 
that dissatisfied shareholders can only express their dissatisfaction by selling their equity 
holdings in a firm. The resulting downward pressure on share prices serves as an indirect 
disciplining device for management because it increases the risk of hostile take-overs usually 
resulting in a change of management. As a result of this mechanism, the stock market in the 
UK is seen to be much more central to the Anglo-American model than the German model, 
where companies rely greatly on continuous participation by banks, business partners and 
employees in company management practices, creating greater potential for conflict of 
interest. 
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4. Reasons to sell and acquire the company 
4.1 Reasons for owners to sell 
In a survey of 357 LM[BOs in the 1980s conducted by Bannock in co-operation with 3i 
(1990), respondents were asked to give their assessment of the motives in the decision to 
sell the business. Almost 31 percent ranked 'non-core activity' as the primary motivel 21 
percent 'the need to raise cash' and 17 percent were 'unable/unwilling to continue the 
business'. This evidence is also confirmed by the most common sources for LM[BO activity, 
divestment from national and international groups or succession problems in privately- 
owned companies. 
Table 18: Reasons for owners to sell 
Motives % Ranking 
Non core activity 31 percent I 
To raise cash 21 percent 2 
Unable to continue 17 percent 
Insufficient return on capital 13 percent 4 
Need of capital 11 percent 5 
Business would otherwise fail 4 percent 6 
Too small for top management I percent 7 
Unwanted part of an acquisition I percent 8 
(Source: Bannock, 1990) 
4.2 Reasons for owners to sell to the management 
In addition to the questions why owners decided to sell their businesses, the respondents 
were also asked why they decided to sell to management rather than some external 
buyer. 
As shown in the following table, the motives were also quite varied. 
The majority of 
respondents ranked MBOs as the 'least time consuming alternative' 
followed by the 'most 
attractive sales price' and the 'least disruption to the company'. This signifies that company 
owners had more rational motives for selling to management and were 
less guided by 
emotional reasons like the desire to reward the management 
for their loyalty to the 
company. 
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Table 19: Reasons for vendors selling to the management 
Motives % Priority 
Least time consuming 25.0 percent I 
Most attractive price 21.0 percent 2 
Least disruption to the company 20.8 percent 3 
No other likely buyers 14.2 percent 4 
Desire to reward the management 7.9 percent 5 
Other 7.1 percent 6 
No response 3.8 percent 7 
ýz!, ource: t5annocK, ivvu) 
4.3 Reasons for managers to acquire 
In the above-mentioned survey, Bannock (1990) evaluated among other things why 
managers would consider an LMEBO. The following table will reveal some of the most 
important findings: 
Table 20: Motives for acquiring the business 
Unimportant 
Freedom to manage in own way 1.4 
Important Very No Total 
important response 
23.5 73.1 2.0 100 
Opportunity to create wealth 10.6 53.5 33.6 2.2 100 
Freedom from bureaucracy 29.4 36.1 30.5 3.9 100 
Loyalty to firm/employees 13.7 50.7 32.8 2.8 100 
(Source: Bannock, 1990) 
As can be seen from the above table, the prime motivation for management to acquire a 
company was the 'freedom to manage in their own way'. 'Opportunity to create wealth' 
came next, followed by their 'loyalty to the firm and its employees'. Freedom from 
bureaucracy was also important and ranked third at 36 percent. To sum up, all the 
responses from management, the outstanding motive for acquiring the business they work in 
seemed the wish to have more freedom in managing the company. 
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IV. Microeconomic LMBO factors in Germany 
Form and structure of German companies 
The legal form of German companies 
In Germany one has to distinguish between the 2 company forms sole traderships or 
partnerships and companies/corporations: 
1. The most common partnerships in Germany are general partnerships or limited 
partnerships. 
11. The most common forms of incorporated companies under German law are- 
A. 'Akiengesellschaft (AG)' a joint-stock company governed by the Joint-stock 
Company Act AG (AktG) 
B. 'Gesellschaft nüt beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)", a linüted liability company 
governed by the Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG) 
According to the following turnover statistics of German companies in 1992 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt), joint-stock companies accounted for only about 20 percent of turnover in 
1992 and of the total 2,000 joint stock companies at the end of 1992 only 664 were listed. 
The more than 300,000 corporations, mostly all with limited liability, accounted for more 
than 30 per cent of total turnover with nominal capital stock a third larger than that of the 
joint-stock companies. 
Some of the most well-known German enterprises are organised as limited liability 
companies like Bosch and IBM Germany. With the inclusion of sole traderships, 
partnerships and enterprises with other legal forms, it is clear that joint-stock companies in 
general and listed firms in particular are much less prevalent in Germany than in Anglo- 
American econon-fies. 
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According to Mr. Fahrholz of Dresdner Bank (1991), company stakes are mainly in the 
hands of private persons and therefore take-over transactions are much more complex and 
difficult than in the UK or in the US where many companies are publicly listed" 
Table 21: Turnover tax statistics for 1992 
Company form Number of companies Turnover 
(Legal status) (million DM) 
Sole traderships 13,9263,980 95011744 15.02 percent 
Partnerships 297ý480 13,823lo552 28.82 percent 
Joint-stock companies 2ý164 11,2291 132 19.42 percent 
Limited liability comp. 359ý358 11,9811,331 3 1.3 1 percent 
Other 451.828 343fi58 5.43 percent 
ý Total 2,6317810 673281,444 100.0 percent 
(Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994) 
1.2 The equity structure of German companies 
In evaluating the different LMBO take-over techniqueS34 for German LMBOs, it is vital for 
the success of the transactions that buyers examine the existing potential of any 'hidden 
reserves' in the underlying assets of the target company. In this context it is important to 
emphasise that, in contrast to LJK commercial law, German commercial law has not been 
adopted to the '4th European Union Guidelines' concerning the revaluation of assets so that 
German companies have to practice the conservative method of historical cost accounting. 
Although this accounting method results in a rather low equity ratio it allows for the 
accumulation of 'hidden reserves' which might serve as an asset step-up potential in future 
buyout transactions. 
" In the UK 2.264 companies were publicly listed in comparison to Germany with about 664 in 1994. 
34 See in this context section D, IH, 2.2.2.1, combination model or conversion model 
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In specific German take-over models, assets are written up according to the price paid over 
the book-value and these assets are then depreciated at varying rates depending on their 
class. This step-up depreciation is generally tax-deductible, making it possible to reduce the 
tax liabilities of the target company and increase the available cash-flow volume. However,, 
as a result of companies' preference for debt rather than equity financing when it comes to 
raising capital, some companies appear undercapitalised due, to high debt levels and the fact 
that rapid depreciation was calculated in order to minimise profits and reduce tax liabilities. 
1.3 The liability structure of German companies 
As already cited in the preceding chapter German companies are usually very accustomed to 
operating with high degrees of financial leverage. According to the statistics of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), the average equity capitalisation of German companies 
decreased from 24.8 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1992. 
As can be seen in table 22 published by the OECD (1995), the emphasis of German 
companies seems to be on bank debt financing rather than on equity, partially due to the 
stable macroeconomic environment which has existed in Germany over the past forty years. 
Low inflation, steady growth and relatively low interest rates have provided a solid base for 
German companies to plan their futures confidently and for German banks to grant funds 
for growth (Initiative Europe, 1996). 
Table 22- Share of bank borrowing in German companies 
Share of bank borrowing 






Share of own capital 






(Source: OECD, Uermany, 199: )) 
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The following table presents the liability structure of companies in five countries with the 
ratio of bank debt to credit market debt 35 . The 48 percent found in Germany is considerably 
higher than that of other countries, such as US or the UK with 22 and 32 percent 
respectively. 
Table 23. The liability structure of companies across countries 
Germany USA Japan Italy UK 
Debt to banks/as a share of 48 22 57 42 32 
credit market debt 
(Source: OECD, Germany, 1995) 
2. Business activity of German LM[BO companies 
According to the German LM[BO statistics from 1990 to 1996 published by the Initiative 
Europe and the CM[BOR (1995/1997) and shown in table number 24, LM[BOs have 
occurred in a wide range of industries. However, there is a higher concentration in the area 
of mechanical engineering where the percentage of LM[BOs increased between 1990 and 
1996 from 11.9 to 21.1 percent, in the area of business & other services where LM[BOs 
increased from 5.9 to 14.4 percent. The sector of electrical, electronic & office machinery 
was characterised by a decline in LMBO percentage from 14.7 to 8.8 percent. 
The results rank mechanical engineering and business/office service and leasing companies 
as the main LMBO target companies. This indicates that the growing trend among LMBO 
financiers to finance cash-flow oriented LMBOs in service-oriented industries - already 
mentioned by Hitschler in 1990 - was finally confirmed by the 1994 statistics. 
This 
development also gives managers of companies operating in service sectors which lack 
sufficient tangible assets but which generate strong cash-flows the opportunity to get the 
LMBO financing through bank debt which is then repaid by the cash-flow. 
" Credit market debt signifies total liabilities minus equity and accounts payable to other affiliates 
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However, at the same time, the statistics confirm that production and mechanical 
engineering companies will continue to be considered as appropriate target companies for 
LMBO transactions due to the respectable amounts of tangible assets in their balance sheets 
which can serve as security for the LMBO loan. 
Table 25: Business activity of German LMEBO companies from 1990 to 1996 
ý Business activity (in %) 
Mechanical engineering 
Business & other services & leasing 
Electrical,, electronic & office machinery 
Food 
Chemicals & man-made fibres 
Metal goods 
Timber, furniture 




Leather goods, footwear & clothing 
Paper, printing, publishing 
Banking, insurance, finance 
Metals 
Construction 




1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 
11.9 0.0 13.7 17.9 13.8 21.1 
5.9 14.3 15.7 11.2 13.8 14.4 
14.7 21.4 7.8 6.7 12.1 8.8 
2.9 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.4 8.8 
14.7 14.3 0.0 4.4 3.4 8.8 
2.9 3.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 5.3 
0.0 3.6 0.0 2.2 6.9 3.5 
2.9 7.1 2.0 4.4 3.4 3.5 
17.7 10.7 9.8 4.4 3.4 3.5 
0.0 0.0 3.9 2.2 3.4 3.5 
2.9 0.0 9.8 4.4 3.4 3.5 
0.0 0.0 5.9 2.2 6.9 1.8 
8.8 3.6 9.8 4.4 5.2 1.8 
0.0 3.6 3.9 4.4 5.2 1.8 
2.9 0.0 7.8 4.4 3.4 1.8 
5.9 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.7 1.8 
0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 1.7 1.8 
0.0 10.7 2.0 2.2 5.2 0.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
34 28 51 45 58 62 
I- 
.--.... --I- --- 
17--ý 1 oar% 1007) 
[Source: CM-BUR/BLVVrnvaie r-quitya-miUl 
L LU MIV MILK; %., VILFVII . Ll X 11 MAL Lýý - -, ýýý. ýr-----7-I 
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3. Ownership, control and decision-making of banks in German companies 
The German model of corporate governance exhibits quite different institutional 
characteristics from those in Anglo-American economies. A key aspect in the German 
governance model is the reliance on continuous monitoring of managers by shareholders 
who have long-term relationships with the firm and who participate actively in important 
aspects of the decision-making process of the company. 
In the case of incorporated firms, stockholder influence is exerted through a two-tier 
company board structure. The importance of banks, in their dual role as both lenders and 
important shareholders has often been the source of controversy. According to Annette 
Kessel (1995) the influence of German banks on German companies can be divided into 3 
main areas: 
3.1 The influence of banks through equity holdings 
One possibility for banks to influence the business activity of German companies Is through 
their equity holding in those companies. Specifically, through their voting rights at general 
meetings, banks have considerable influence on various business aspects of the company: 
* With their voting rights, the banks have influence on the appointment of the supervisory 
board members, who in turn choose the Chief Executive Officer of the company. 
* If the bank holds more than 25 percent of the voting rights, it has the possibility to veto 
all decisions of ordinary importance to the company. 
Research of equity holdings of the 10 biggest German banks conducted in 1989 (Die Bank, 
1989) gave evidence to the fact that the number of companies in which 
banks held a 
minimum stake of 25 percent had decreased from 16 in 1979 to 8 
in 1989. This trend has 
continued to date as banks sell off more and more of their industry 
holdings. 
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3.2 The influence of banks through proxy votes 
The term 'proxy' indicates that banks have the right to exercise the voting rights on behalf 
of other shareholders who hold shares in safe custody at the bank. According to a study of 
Peters/Werner (1978), about 50 percent of all shares of domestic issues are in the custody 
of German banks and only 60 to 75 percent of the shareholders are actually present et the 
general meetings to exercise their voting rights. 
According to section 135 of the Joint-stock Company Act (AktG), banks are allowed to 
exercise their proxy voting rights when they are authorised by the shareholders to do so. 
However, banks can only vote in proxy if they have been given general instructions on the 
individual items of the agenda by the shareholders. In 1992, banks and their associated 
investment funds controlled an average of 84 percent of represented votes at annual 
shareholder meetings of large, non majority owned firms where share ownership is widely 
distributed. This implies that banks, through both their own stake as well as their proxy 
votes, have a large influence at the annual shareholder meetings. 
However,, taking into account the large number of German companies with very 
concentrated holdings, where the share of bank proxy votes is considerably lower, the 
overall influence is somewhat less. According to a study of the OECD (Germany, 1995), 
among the 57 of the 110 largest industrial AGs who publish lists of attendance at 
shareholder meetings, banks had a majority voting stake in twenty-four and a blocking 
minority share in a further five companies. Their continued presence at shareholder 
meetings, allow banks to act as an independent outside monitor of corporate decision- 
making. 
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3.3 The influence of banks through the supervisory board 
Larger firms in Germany, incorporated as joint-stock companies and limited liability 
companies with more than 500 employees are required by the Joint-stock Company Act 
(AktG) and the Limited Liability Company's Act (GmbHG) to have a two-tiered board 
structure. The German board structure distinguishes, laid down by law, the strategic role of 
the supervisory board ('Aufsichtsrat') and the day-to-day operations overseen by the board 
of directors ('Vorstand'). 
Two of the most important duties of the supervisory board are to act as a control device for 
the board of directors and to appoint its members. The reasons to appoint bank executives 
to the supervisory board of industrial companies are varied. First of all, as a result of their 
majority stake with their own voting rights and those in proxy. Secondly, a bank executive 
on the supervisory board of a company secures the support of the bank to a certain extent, 
in the event of difficult situations and or to facilitate the application for a loan. 
3.4 The control structure of German companies 
The German model of corporate governance has several institutional characteristics very 
different from those in Anglo-American economies. The main characteristic of the German 
corporate model is its reliance on continuous monitoring of managers by outside 
shareholders. They are very often involved in important aspects of the decision-making 
process and, when dissatisfied, take action to correct management decisions. In German 
incorporated firms, power is applied through the two-tier company board structure in which 
banks often hold significant stakes in the company. The importance of banks, in their dual 
role as both lenders and shareholders has very often been a source of controversy in 
Germany. 
In contrast, the Anglo-American governance model is structured so that shareholders have 
little influence on management decisions. The shareholders can only express their 
dissatisfaction by selling their shares. The resulting pressure on share prices serves as an 
indirect threat to the management because it increases the risk of hostile take-overs and the 
potential change of management. 
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As a result of these differences, the stock market plays a much more central role in the 
Anglo-American model than its German counterpart which relies more heavily on the 
continuous participation of banks which creates a great potential for conflict of interests. 
Conflict of interest can be especially strong due to the following factors- 
* Small- to medium-sized companies are very important for the German industry and have 
an especially close relationship with their 'house-bank". 
* The so-called 'house-bank' system implies a long-term relationship involving the 
exchange of information and continued service. 
e In the relative absence of a strong market for equity issue, bank financing is extremely 
important for small- to medium-sized firms. 
* Banks, through their own voting fights and proxy voting fights, have a strong influence 
on the decision-making process of the respective companies. 
4. Reasons to sell and acquire the company 
4.1 Reasons for owners to sell 
In Matthias Graper's survey (1993), LMBO company owners, either individuals or 
corporations, were asked to give their assessment of the motives for the decision to sell the 
company. The following tables represent the motives of LN1BOs from family-owned 
companies and LMBOs from divestments. 
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4.1.1 LMBOs of family-owned companies 
As shown in table 25 the most important motive for owners of family-owned comparuies to 
consider an LNIBO were 'succession problems'. In this context, Leimbach (1991) writes 
that German family-owned companies in a transition period from second to third post-war 
generation must face the fact that there are no interested or qualified inheritors to take-over 
the family business. The take-over of the company through management was therefore the 
only possibility to continue the company under its current structure. 
As a second motive to sell the business, respondents mentioned the 'need to raise cash' 
C followed by the 'necessity to redefine the companies activities'. 'Slow growth prospects', a 
new-definition of business activities', the 'lack of profitability' and the 'liquidation of the 
company' were cited as further reasons for the decision to sell. 
According to Grdper (1993), the results of this research are an indication that in the course 
of the emerging succession problems of family-owned companies and the subsequent 
LMBOs,. the existing business activities of many companies will have to be redefined. Any 
changes which emerge, however, will be implemented by the new owners/managers. The 
research indicates further that the former owner, as the sole decision-maker in the family- 
owned company, had put off necessary decisions about a new orientation of the company 
and had therefore prevented the realisation of wealth and growth potentials in the company. 
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Table 25: LMBOs of family-owned companies (n=36) 
Reason to sell the company 
Succession problems 
Increased capital needs 
Few growth prospects 
New definition of business activity 







I Liquidation of the company 4.62 6 
(Source: Grdper, 1993) 
4.1.2 LMBOs due to divestments 
In spin-offs of non-core divisions or subsidiaries of national and international groups, the 
motives for the decision of an LMIBO sale were ranked as follows. The prime motive for the 
spin-off was the desire to redefine the core-activities of the group. 
The second most important motive was found to be the lack of profitability of the respective 
divisions and subsidiaries,, an indication that they assumed the spun-off company divisions 
would be more efficient and profitable as an independent, relatively small- or medium-sized 
company. The new owner/managers recognised the wealth and growth potentials in the 
spin-offs which could only be realised if the divisions were managed as independent 
companies free from the constraints of group directives. 
Factors like the retreat of the mother company, the increase of capital needs, the liquidation 
of the company or succession problems were regarded by the vendors questioned as less 
significant motives in their decision to sell group divisions. 
36ACcording to Griper, s evaluation scale, I stands for 'very important' and 5 for 'unimportant'. 
104 
Graper (1993) concluded that national and international groups decided to spin-off of 
divisions or subsidiaries on the basis of a redefinition of their group activities as well as in 
the context of future growth and profitability prospects of certain business activities in the 
group. Controversial discussions about the 'shareholder value' of publicly listed companies 
in Germany has made the term a method for measuring success and has encouraged the 
strategic changes that heavily diversified groups need to return to their core-activities. 
Table 26-. LMBOs due to spin-offi 
Motive 
New-definition of core-activities 
Lack of profitability 
Retreat of the mother company 
Nlinimum growth prospects 
Increase in future capital needs 
Liquidation of the company 







(Source: Grdper, 1993) 
4.2 Reasons for owners to sell to the management 
The sale of a company to management is considered by many vendors as a viable alternative 
to a trade sale and has grown in importance over the last years. Fundamental concerns of 
the vendor like confidentiality, exclusion of sale to competitors and greater discretion in 
disclosing company information during the due diligence process were seen as advantages 
of LMBOs over trade sales. 
In his research of German LMBOs,, Grdper (1993) examined what motivated owners to sell 
to management instead of an external buyer. The results illustrated in the table below show 
that the LMBO transaction proved more efficient due to the management's detailed 
knowledge of the company, and therefore influenced the selection process of a buyer. 
37 See note 36 
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This aspect along with the prospect of the most attractive price were found to be the 
predominant motives for German owners to sell their company to management. Further 
motives are of negligible importance which shows that purely economic factors and not a 
sense of social responsibility to maintain the company play a decisive role in the final LMBO 
decision. 
Table 27-. Motives of vendors for the sale of the company to management 
Motives 
Least time consuming alternative 
Most attractive price 
Fewest problems in the purchase contract 
Reputation of the vendor 
Least disruption to company 
Least publicity 
No other likely buyers 
Reputation of the company 
Experience and qualification of the management 










(Source: Grdper, 1993) 
4.3 Reasons for managers to acquire 
Graper's survey (1993) also comprised the research of the motives for the LMBO 
management to acquire the company they work for. In the past, the entrepreneurial culture 
was less developed than in other European countries due to a number of factors such as 
high remuneration packages, job security, the status of being employed by a major 
corporation and the fact that bankruptcy was regarded as social failure (Initiative Europe, 
1996). German managers therefore tended to be very risk-adverse and reluctant towards 
any opportunity for entrepreneurial activity. 
313 See note 36 
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However, according to the results of Graper's survey, attitudes of German managers appear 
to be changing as the new generation of managers seem prepared to take risks by taking 
over the company they work for. The following table reveals the motives of German 
managers in their decision to participate in a management buyout according to priority- 
Table 28: Motives for managers to acquire 
Motives Evaluation 39 Ranking 
Belief in the success of the company 1.25 1 
ý Freedom to manage their own company 1.97 2 
ý Opportunity to create wealth 2.31 3 
I Personality conflict with new owners 2.78 
I Prospects of gains in a later sale 3.25 5 
I Freedom from group directives 3.61 6 
I Development of their own talents 3.64 7 
I Higher salary 4.69 8 
I Fear of dismissal 4.78 9 
(Source: Graper, 1993) 
Similar to the entrepreneurial motives of management in the UK, the belief in the success of 
the company and the freedom to manage their own company were the dominant motives for 
German managers to participate in an LMBO. Motives like the wish for higher salary or the 
fear of dismissal which could be seen as more money related as well as the more emotional 
motives were ranked less important. These results provide evidence to the fact that German 
managers, who have been reluctant in the past to risk entrepreneurial action (due to their 
well-paid and secured positions) seem to be adopting a more and more venturesome 
attitude. 
39 See note 36 
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V. Summary of macro- and microeconomic LMBO factors 
in the UK and Germany 
1. Summary of macroeconomic LMBO factors in the UK and Germany 
(I + 11) 
1. Economic background and LMBO environment 
During the development of LMBO activity in the UK and Germany, the economic basis 
from which each country acted differed significantly. In the beginning of the buyout wave in 
the 1980's, the UK economy was weakened by a deep recession and the environment for 
LMBO opportunities was favourable due to widespread industrial restructuring and due to 
the fact that LMBOs were seen viable means to save companies from receivership. In late 
1980's when buyout activity started in Germany, the national economy was strong and 
competitive, and companies saw no need for industrial restructuring. Therefore, LMBO 
activity was very slow to develop against this strong macroeconomic background. 
In the LJK, general industrial recovery began in 1982. At that time LMBOs were 
predominantly found in the form of divestment of divisions or subsidiaries from big 
conglomerates rather than in the area of receivership. In Germany from the 1990's on, 
increasing competition and ongoing globalisation with respect to the introduction of the 
Common European Market in 1992 prompted entire industries to restructure so that they 
could remain competitive in this changing economic environment. Furthermore, due to an 
industrial downturn in Germany, industries had to fight against the inefficiency and inflated 
wages that were able to emerge unnoticed during the previous years of economic success. 
In this context, LMBOs were seen as a vital part of the restructuring process and as a way 
to maintain the structure and independence of the important small- to medium-sized 
companies in Germany. 
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Economic recovery in the UK seemed to come to full circle in 1992 after a brief recession 
period at the beginning of the decade. The number of recession related divestment declined 
as a result, whereas succession problems caused an increase in LNMOs from family-owned 
companies. The privatisation wave in 1994 provided an added impulse for the LMBO 
market. In 1995 and 1996 large strategic disinvestments and public sector privatisations 
followed by growth in LMBOs from privately owned sources gave an additional impulse to 
the LMBO market leading to an estimated market value of : E3.6 bn in 1996, the second 
highest after the peak value of : E3.8 bn in 1989. 
In 1993 the impact of recession hit Germany, a development which placed new pressure on 
companies to consider rationalisation of their often very diverse activities. The LM[BO 
market also grew as an increasing number of privately-owned firms faced succession 
problems and increasing competition in an economic environment that had become more 
aggressive. Proprietors appeared to have changed their attitude towards selling their 
companies. In 1995 Germany's economic recovery ended in the last quarter of 1995 and 
recessionary conditions continued throughout 1996. This recessionary economic conditions 
forced national and international corporations to continue their rationalisation measures and 
to spin-off their non-core activities and encouraged elderly owners/managers of family- 
owned businesses to sell the company rather than to struggle through recession. 
2. Description of the LMBO environment 
2.1 Data about LMBOs 
The most reliable and best researched data on LMBO activity in the UK comes from the 
Centre of LMBO Research (CM[BOR) in Nottingham/UK. Data about German LMBOs, on 
the other hand, is very difficult to obtain and a number of deals, especially from family- 
owned companies in the former West German states, continue to be veiled in secrecy. The 
only precise data on LMBOAMBI activity in the 'Neue Bundeslander', the former GDR, 
was obtained through the 'Treuhandanstalt',, the government trust agency, which kept 
detailed records of the transactions they monitored and completed. 
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2.2 Main LMBO sources 
The beginning of recessionary conditions in the UK in 1981 made divestment the main 
source of LNIBOs,, with domestic spin-offs at 59 percent and those of foreign parents at 14 
percent. Receivership was the source of only 12 percent of all LMBO transactions. In 
Germany LMBOs from family-owned firms with succession problems accounted for 38 
percent of the LMBO market from 1980 to 1990, whereas- divestments remained the main 
buyout source representing almost 57 percent all LMBOs. 
In the UK from 1982 on, divestment, especially from UK parents, continued to be the most 
important LMBO source amounting to 59 percent of all transactions, followed by family- 
owned companies at 19.6 percent in 1986. 
Since the 1990's,, LMBOs of family-owned companies have become more and more 
important in Germany, increasing from 11 percent in 1991 to 40 percent In 1994. 
Divestment from national and international groups have remained the primary LMBO 
source at 33 percent and 19 percent respectively in 1994. In 1995 and 1996 domestic 
divestments proved to be an important source of deals reflecting the consequences of 
industrial restructuring. In 1995 domestic divestments accounted for 58 percent of all 
transactions declining to 43 percent in 1996, followed by LMBOs from family-owned 
companies which dropped to only 16 percent in 1995 but increased to 34 percent of all 
transactions in 1996. 
Since econonuc recovery appeared in the UK in 1992, recession related 
divestment of UK 
parent companies declined from 59 percent of all transactions 
in 1986 to 41 percent in 
1994, whereas LMBOs of family-owned companies increased from 20 percent 
in 1986 to 35 
percent in 1994. In 1995 and 1996, large strategic divestments 
have remained the most 
important LMBO source accounting for 50 percent in 1995 and 47 percent in 1996 of all 
LMBO transactions. 
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2.3 Volume of the LMBO market 
LM[BOs in the UK increased steadily in number and value from the beginning in the late 
1970s until 1994. In 1984 there were a total of 240 transactions with a total value of 
L408m, peaking in 1989 at 375 transactions and a volume of f3.8bn. From 1989 on, the 
number of transactions ranged between 380 and 480 and levelled off at 404 transactions in 
1994 with a total transaction value of L2.5bn. Between 1994 and 1996 the number of 
transactions fell to 372 and increased again to 402 transactions in 1996. The total value 
increased continuously from E2.8 bn in 1995 to E3.6 bn in 1996. 
LMBO volume in Germany has much more modest transaction and value figures than in the 
UK. At the beginning of LMBO activity in the late 1980's, transaction numbers ranged 
between 25 and 36. In 1990 there were 36 transactions with a total buyout value of L292m. 
From 1991 on, the number of transactions increased steadily reaching its peak in 1994 at 59 
transaction and a transaction volume of Y, 733m. In 1995 the number of LMBO transactions 
increased to 74 reaching an estimated transaction volume of f-540 m. In 1996 although the 
number of transactions fell to 62 the estimated market value exceeded for the first time the 
f- Ibn barrier reaching F, 1.148 bn. 
3. Financial investors in LMBOs 
3.1 The role and importance of venture capital firms 
The UK plays a dominant role in the European venture capital industry with 45 percent of 
the total venture capital volume in Europe (ECU 26 bn) is administered by the British. The 
main sources for UK venture capital funds are pension funds at 41 percent and insurance 
companies at 15 percent. Venture capital alone from these sources accounts for 66 percent 
of the amount provided for investment. 
The German venture capital industry has gained importance since the end of the 1980's 
when they first recognised the benefits of LM[BO transactions. In contrast to the UK, the 
main sources for venture capital funds are banks at 59 percent and pension funds at 10 
percent representing together 69 percent of the amount provided for investment. 
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3.2 The role and importance of venture capital funds 
In the UK, essential impulses for the LMBO market came through the 'ntroduction of 
venture capital funds in the middle of the 1980's when more funds became available for 
investment in LMBOs. The same is true for Germany, where the first investment funds were 
created in the beginning of the 1990's in order to provide funds for LMBOs by institutional 
equity providers. 
3.3 The role and importance of banks 
The role of banks in the UK with respect to LMBO transactions differs greatly to that of 
their German counterparts. One reason for this is the separation of commercial and 
investment banking in the UK due to the Anglo-American 'Trennbanksystem', making it 
possible for UK banks to develop skills for these specialised finance transactions. In 
Germany, this development has been limited by the still prevailing 'Universalbankensystem', 
universal banking system, in which banks offer a wide range of financial products, making 
specialisation in any specific field less common. However, growing competition among 
German banks and their desire to establish a presence in this new business area has 
motivated banks to establish specialised departments with the skills required to structure 
and monitor LMBOs. 
After the LMBO 
4.1 Exit routes 
Exit routes are an important aspect for investors in realising the return on their investment. 
According to the statistics of the CMBOR (1991), flotation at 47 percent and trade sales at 
43 percent were the main exit routes for UK LMEBOs in 1986. In 1996 trade sales became 
the most attractive exit route at 48 percent of all transactions, followed by flotations at 16 
percent. In Germany, where exiting is one of the key problems for investors - mainly 
because of relatively inactive stock exchange - buy-backs at 65 percent and trade sales at 21 
percent were the predominant exit routes for German investors in 1994. The exit channel 
'going public' accounted for only 7 percent of all exits, a strong contrast to the UK. 
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4.2 Main impact of LMBOs on the economy 
In the UK and in Germany, LMBOs play an important role in the way companies deal with 
the pressures of a highly competitive global economy. Deconcentration and 
deconglomeration have led many national and international corporations to spin-off units or 
subsidiaries which were outside their normal core-activities. In Germany, and also to a 
smaller extent in the UK, growing succession problems of small- to medium-sized 
companies have pressured company owners to look for alternative solutions. Furthermore, 
the LMBO concept has enabled especially small- to medium-sized companies as well as 
divested divisions and subsidiaries to remain intact with a management take-over, that 
would have otherwise faced insolvency. 
5. Perspectives for the LMBO market 
The UK LNIIBO market is the most mature of the European LMBO markets and originated 
out of the need for restructuring during the recession of the early 1980's. The aggressive 
advance of national and international venture capital firms has provided additional capital by 
establishing of venture capital funds. 
Although recession seems to have been overcome in the UK, pressure from global 
competition continues to intensify and therefore corporate restructuring and divestment of 
non-core activities remain important in potential LMIBOs in the UK. This in addition to 
increased activity in corporate mergers and acquisitions, which often lead to the sale of 
companies that do not fit within the new organisation, implies that the sources for LMBOs 
will remain substantial. Furthermore, the growing numbers of LMBOs from family-owned 
companies confirm the assumption that succession problems are becoming more and more 
important in the UK. 
In Germany, the LMBO market has developed much more slowly than LMB participants 
had hoped for, especially in view of the potential LMBO sources of divestment and family- 
owned companies facing succession problems. However, despite its slow 
development, the 




Difficult economic conditions encourage elderly company owners to sell their companies 
rather than struggle through a recession, so family-owned companies will remain a prime 
LMBO source in the future. The divestment of units or subsidiaries also remains a solid 
source of further LMBOs as the impact of recession puts national and international groups 
under pressure to sell underperforming non-core activities. These economic developments 
and factors create a natural environment for LMBOs. 
2. Summary of microeconomic LMBO factors in the UK and Germany 
(M + IV) 
1. Form and structure of companies 
1.1 Equity structure 
In the different LMBO take-over models in the UK and Germany, equity and liability 
structures as well as the potential of hidden reserves in the assets of the target company can 
be vital to the success of LMBO transactions. 
In the LJK, companies are able to use the 'market or current cost accounting method' as an 
alternative to the 'historical cost accounting method' when declaring current value of their 
assets in their balance sheets. This allows them to capitalise the difference between historical 
value and current value in the equity of the company. As a result, the equity ratios of UK 
companies are relatively high, at approximately 49 percent in 1992. In capitalising the 
difference between historical and current values in their balance sheets, UK companies do 
not have any 'hidden reserves' which might be used as step-up potential for assets in an 
LN41BO transaction to increase the depreciation volume and consequently the net cash-flow 
of the company. 
In contrast, German companies disregard the possibility of revaluating their assets for tax 
reasons and practise instead the conservative method of historical cost accounting which 
allows for substantial 'hidden reserves' in the company's balance sheet. The 'hidden 
reserves% however, might be used as step-up potential in an LMBO transaction to increase 
the depreciation volume and lower the tax burden, resulting in a higher volume of 
distributable cash-flow. 
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1.2 Liability structure 
Statistics of LJK company financing support the assumption that financing is predominantly 
achieved through internal funding (60 percent), relying less on external funding (40 
percent). Bank financing is a relatively secondary form of external financing at only 21 
percent, whereas securities at 36 percent serve as the main provider for cash in LYK 
companies. 
German companies on the other hand tend to rely on external funding, bank financing 
comprises 52 percent of total liabilities, rather than on equity financing. This is largely due 
to the stable macroeconomic environment in Germany over the last years. 
2. Business activity of LM[BO companies 
'Examining the period from 1990 to 1996 management buyouts in the UK occurred with the 
most frequency in distribution and service sectors like business services and leasing (from 
21.4 to 26.1 percent), mechanical and instrumental engineering (from 8.8 to 10.4 percent) 
followed by wholesale distribution (from 8.0 to 9.7 percent) and electrical engineering 
(from 7.6 to 7.3 percent ). 
Similar to the results of the UK statistics., the statistics of German buyouts from 1990 to 
1994 (Initiative Europe and CMBOR) reveal that a concentration of buyouts developed in 
the area of mechanical engineering (from 11.9 to 21.1 percent) business & other services 
(from 5.9 to 14.4 percent) and electronical, electronic and office machinery (from 14.7 to 
8.8 percent). 
The statistical results of the business activities in UK and German LMEBO companies 
support the assumption that the growing trend among LM[BO financiers is to finance cash- 
flow oriented LM1130s as well as companies operating in the service industry. This 
development gives managers of companies operating in this sector, who have good, 
predictable cash-flow, the possibility to get financing for an LMBO transaction without 
offering sufficient tangible assets as security for the loan. 
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3. Ownership, control and influence of banks on the decision-making process of companies 
In Germany, banks have an immense potential to influence companies through their own 
voting rights, proxy votes, supervisory board membership and credit granted. In comparison 
to this strong governance structure in Germany, UK banks have far less influence on 
companies than their German counterparts. Furthermore, since UK companies depend much 
less on debt lending in preference to the stock exchange as provider of funds, the influence 
of UK banks on companies is much less dominant than that of German banks. 
Reasons to sell and acquire the company 
4.1 Reasons for owners to sell 
In the UK, the prime reason for owners to sell their company was the decision to return to 
core-activities at 31 percent followed by the need to raise cash at 21 percent. Succession 
problems were not mentioned as major motives for the owners to sell. This answers were 
supported by the statistical evidence that LMBO's resulting from family-owned companies 
only gained importance as an LMBO source in the 1990's and still in 1994 ranked behind 
divestments with only 20 percent of all transactions originating from this source. 
In Germany, in contrast, LMBOs resulting from the sale of family-owned companies due to 
succession problems were the most important motive for owners followed by the need to 
raise cash. In LMBOs resulting from divestment of divisions or subsidiaries, companies 
ranked a redefinition of their core activities and the lack of profitability of certain divisions 
or subsidiaries as their prime motives for divestment. 
4.2 Reasons for owners to sell to the management 
LMBOs were found to be the least time consuming selling alternative by owners in the UK 
and Germany. Their second most favoured motive was the attractive price offered by 
management. 
4.3 Reasons for managers to acquire 
In response to questions about their motives to acquire their businesses, managers in the 
UK and Germany regarded the freedom to manage their own company, the belief in the 
success of the company and the opportunity to create wealth as dominant motives. 
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UK 
11. Economic situation and At the beginning of the 1980's due to 
LIVIBO environment recession LMBO's were a viable means 
to save companies from bankruptcy. 
In the period of economic recovery from 
1982 onwards LMBO's resulted mainly from 
divestments of national and international groups. 
In the short period of recession from 1990- 
1992 LMBO's as a viable means to save 
companies from bankruptcy became 
again more frequent. 
From 1992 economic recovery came to 
its full e)dent and LMBO's resulted mainly 
from divestments and famity-owned companies. 
2. LMSO environment 
2.1 Data about LMBO's The best and most reliable data comes from 
the Centre for Management Buy-out Research. 
2.2 Main LMBO sources In the beginning of the buy-out wave divestments 
and receivership were the main LMBO sources 
From 1982 onwards divestments remained the 
main LMBO source. 
From 1992 onwards next to divestments family- 
owned companies became an important source. 
2.3 Volume of the LMBO market 
3. Financial investors in LMBO's 
3.1 The role and importance of venture 
capital firms 
From 143 transaction in 1981 with a value of 
180 million pounds to 402 transactions with 
a value of 3,6 billion pounds in 1996. 
Pension funds (41 %), Insurances (15%) and 
Banks (10%) are the main investors. 
3.2 The role and importance of Established in the middle of the 1980s 
venture capital funds Increased fund raising in the 1990s 
3.3 The role and importance of banks UK banks are specialists in 
LMBO transactions due to 
separation of retail and 
investment banking. 
4. After the LMBO 
4.1 Exit routes In the middle of the 1980's 
flotation and trade sale 
were the main exit routes. 
In the 1990's the number of 
trade sales exceeded the number 
of flotations. 
4.2 Main impact of LMSO's for the LIVIBOs were a means for 
economy industrial restructuring. 
LIVIBO's kept small and 
medium sized companies 
independent and competitive. 
S. Perspectives for the LMBO market Due to pressure from global 
competition, ongoing industrial 
restructuring and succession 
problems the LMBO market will 
remain active. 
.......... ... - .......... 
Germany 
Almost no LMBO activity In Germany. 
In the late 1980's due to a strong economic 
environment LMBO activý developed only 
slowty. 
From the 1990's onwards increasing com- 
petition and ongoing globalisation lead 
to restructuring of whole industries and 
more LMBO activity. 
The best data is provided by the Centre 
for Management Buy-Out Research. 
From 1980-90 LMBO's from divestments 
and family-owned companies were the most 
common LMBO source. 
From the 1990's onwards family-owned 
companies became the most frequent LMBO 
source. 
From 36 transactions in 1988 with a value 
of 292 million pounds to 62 transaction with a 
value of 1,1 billion pounds in 1996. 
Banks (59%), Pension funds (10%) Industry (9%) 
and Insurances (8%) are the main investors. 
Established in the beginning of the 1990s 
Increased fundraising in the 1990s 
German banks are generalists 
for all kind of finance transactions 
and serve as housebanks and 
consultants for companies. 
Buy-backs and trade sales 
have been the predominant 
forms of e)dt. 
LMBOs were a means for 
industrial restructuring and 
a possibility to keep small and 
medium-sized companies 
independent and competitive. 
Due to pressure from global 
competition, ongoing industrial 
restructuring and succession 
problems the LMBO market will 
continue its growth. 
117 
1. Form and structure of companies 
1.1 Equity structure 
I. Z Liability structure 
Z Business activities of target companies 
3. Ownership, control and influence of 
banks 
4. Reasons to sell and acquire the company 
4.1 Reasons for owners to sell 
4.2 Reasons for owners to sell to the managers 
UK 
UK companies reveal relatively 
high equity ratios due to the 
applied "current cost accounting" 
method. 
External company financing is mainly 
achieved through securities. 
Most LMBOs occured in the area 
of mechanical and instrumental 
engineering and business services 
and leasing and wholesale distribution 
UK banks have less influence due to 
the separation of investment and 
corporate banking in the UK. 
Spin-oft of non-core activities 
of groups resulted in LMBO's. 
Least time consuming alternative 
and most attractive purchase price 
Germany 
German companies reveal relatively 
low equity ratios due to the applied 
"historical cost accounting method". 
External company financing is mainly 
achieved through bank debt. 
Most LMBOs occured in the area of 
mechanical engineering and electr. 
office machinery, chemistry and 
and mech. and instr. engineering. 
German banks have more influence 
on companies due to their combined 
activities in investment and corporate 
banking. 
Spin-offs of non-core activities and succession 
problems resulted in LMBOs. 
Least time consuming alternative and 
most attractive purchase price. 
4.3 Reason for managers to acquire Believe in the success of the company Believe in the success of the company and 
and the opportunity to create wealth were the opportunity to create wealth were the main 
the main reasons to acquire the company. reasons to acquire the company. 
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Development of country-specific LMBO models for the UK and Germanv 
The UK and Germany have established a complex legal and fiscal environment which 
involves different forms and rates of taxation and, in the general context of acquisitions, 
specific regulations about 'financial assistance' (UK) or 'capital maintenance' (Germany). 
Due to this complex fiscal and legal environment it is vital to determine the most 
appropriate take-over structure at the outset in order to optimise the result of the LUSO 
transaction for vendor and purchaser. 
The following section will offer a brief discussion of the legal and taxation issues arising out 
of a leveraged management buyout transaction in the UK and Germany. The focus of this 
section will be on the comparison of take-over models in the UK and Germany explaining 
the principal methods of acquiring a company. These methods of acquiring a commercial 
enterprise are fundamentally different in their legal and tax effects, even if the commercial 
effect may prove similar. The following section will examine only the most important tax 
and legal issues and evaluate the difference between the LMBO techniques in the UK and 
Germany. 
In the following context the below mentioned abbreviations will be used: 
Share deal- Acquisition of the shares of a company 
Asset deal: Acquisition of the assets of a company 
Target: Target company of the LMBO transaction 
Newco: Acquiring company 
1. LMBO models in the UK 
1. Legal framework 
The following section will present the legal aspects of the acquisition of the share capital of 
a company. The company whose shares are to be acquired in the course of a take-over 
action may be a public company, but is more likely to be a private company due to the fact 
that private companies are the most common corporate form in the UK7 . Having 
decided 
the nature of the transaction, the purchaser will have to examine the possibilities of 
financing of his purchase. 
37 out of 1,091,493 companies In the UK, 1,075,483 were pnvate companies in 1992. 
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Since the most common financing form is cash and since only very few purchasers have 
enough cash resources to finance the transaction, they rely on bank credit in the form of a 
revolving credit or a term loan. Whatever form and amount of borrowing required by the 
purchaser to enable him to finance the acquisition of the target, the following issues have to 
be taken into consideration when considering a leveraged buyout of a corporation in the 
UK- 
In the UK, where companies had originally been prohibited from purchasing their own 
shares, it soon became apparent that an equally unacceptable practice was giving 'financial 
assistance' to acquire the company's shares. The classic method here was for a purchaser to 
borrow money from a bank and then to repay the bank out of the company's funds after the 
take-over. The most relevant regulations concerning any form of 'financial assistance' as 
set out in Sections 151 to 158 of the Companies Act 1985 are presented in the following- 
* Section 15 1, (1) Companies Act 1985 
'"ere a person is acquiring or proposing to acquire shares in a company, it is not 
lawfulfor the company or any of its subsidiaries to give financial assistance' directly 
or indirectly for the purpose of that acquisition before or at the same time as the 
acquisition takes place. ' 
9 Section 151, (2) Companies Act 1985 
'"ere a person has acquired shares in a company and any liability has been incurred 
by that or any other person, for the purpose of that acquisition, it is not lawful for the 
company or any of its subsidiaries to give financial assistance' directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of reducing or discharging the liability so incurred. ' 
Therefore, any LM[BO transaction which is proposed to be entered by the target should be 
examined with care in light of the Companies Act 1985 prohibiting 'financial assistance". In 
the course of an LMBO transaction in which the purchaser buys shares of Target and offers 
the assets of the target company as security, or in some other way obtains 'financial 
assistance' from the target company, the buyout parties have to ensure that what they 
propose is permitted by the Companies Act. 
In this context it is also important to emphasise that the 'financial assistance' provisions of 
the 1985 Companies Act only relate to the acquisition of shares (share deal) and are 
therefore of no relevance whatsoever to business transfers (asset deals). 
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1.1 'Financial assistance' 
In order to understand the extent of the above stated restrictions it is necessary to define the 
expression 'financial assistance' as it is set out in Section 152, (1) Companies Act 1985: 
* 'Financial assistance'given by way of gift 
P 'Financial assistance 'given by way of guarantee, security or indemnity 
v 'Financial assistance'given by way of loan 
v Any other financial assistance' given by a company, the net assets of which are 
reduced to a material extent or which has no assets 
1.2 Exceptions to the prohibition of 'financial assistance' 
Transactions which are prohibited by Section 151 Companies Act 1985 might fall within 
one of the exceptions set out in Section 153 (4) of the Companies Act 1985 or may even be 
capable of approval under the 'whitewash' procedure set out in Sections 155-158 (Wine, 
Beswick, Chapter 8,1994). 
1.2.1 Exceptions to the prohibition of 'financial assistance' concerning private 
and public companies 
7 
There are a number of exceptions to the prohibition of giving 'financial assistance . 
According to Section 153 (1-4) Companies Act 1985 the following exceptions apply to 
both public and private companies: 
The company's principal purpose in giving assistance is not for the purpose of any such 
acquisition, or the assistance is for that purpose, but merely an incidental part of some 
larger purpose of the company. 
The 'financial assistance' is given in good faith in the interests of the company. 
The 'financial assistance' constitutes lending money in the ordinary course of the 
company's business. 
The 'financial assistance' is given for the purposes of an employee's share scheme. 
The 'financial assistance' constitutes lending money to employees to acquire shares in the 
company. 
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1.2.2 'Financial assistance' to private companies 
For private companies, which are by the far the most common form in the UK, Sections 
155-158 of the Companies Act 1985 contain exceptions from the prohibition of 'financial 
assistance' called the 'whitewash' procedure (Knight, 1992). The 'whitewash' procedure 
relates to the acquisition of shares in that company, or in that company's holding company, 
provided that the holding company is itself a private company, with no intermediate p1c. in 
the chain of ownership. The most important aspect involved in the so-called 'whitewash' 
procedure is laid out in Section 155 of the Companies Act 1985 which regulates the 
following: 
A private company is allowed to give financial assistance'for the acquisition of its 
own shares if the company has net assets which are not thereby reduced, or, to the 
extent that those assets are thereby reduced, if the financial assistance' is provided 
out of distributable profits. 
However, in order to take advantage of Section 155 Companies Act 1985 a company must 
comply with a number of procedural requirements which have to be fulfilled before a 
transaction including 'financial assistance' can be completed. In summary the most 
important procedural requirements are the following ": 
7-he company must convene an extraordinary general meeting for the passing of a 
special resolution. No special resolution is required where the companies concerned are 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
7-he company directors must give a statutory declaration containing a statement that the 
company will be able to pay its debts as they fall due during the year immediately 
following the date on which the financial assistance' is given. 
ne company's auditors must present a report which has to be in accordance with 
Section 156 (4) of the Companies Act 1985. 
Due to the fact that the Companies Act 1985 imposes a strict timetable for the 'financial 
assistance' sanctioned by the 'whitewash' procedure, the participants must plan the 
transaction carefully if 'financial assistance' is part of the take-over concept. 
38 Additionally, there are several timing requirements within the 'whitewash' procedure which are excluded from this 
list. 
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Structuring the transaction 
One of the initial and most vital decisions for LM[BO transactions relates to the issue 
whether the shares (share deal) or the assets (asset deal) of the company are to be sold. 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to each course of action for vendor 
and purchaser and what benefits one party may of course disadvantage the other. In the 
following, the main taxation issues which arises in the course of the various structuring 
alternatives will be examined. 
2.1 Take-over of the target company by means of shares (share deal) 
A share deal implies that through the acquisition of a company by its shares, the purchaser 
acquires the complete company as a going concern which leaves the business carried on by 
the Target largely unaffected by the acquisition. In the context of an LMBO transaction, the 
establishment and use of a holding company set up by the management team as the 
purchaser (Newco) will facilitate the procedure from a financial, commercial and tax point 
of view. 
The share deal can be completed in two different ways, either without the transfer of the 
assets of the target company or as a two-step model with transfer of assets of the target 
company after the share deal has been completed. The following will present a summary of 
both procedures emphasising advantages and disadvantages of the respective form. 
Share deal without transfer of assets 
The steps in a share deal without transfer of the assets are as follows- 
" Founding of a holding company Newco 
" Purchase of shares in Target by Newco, financed by the LMBO loan and 
" Use of the assets of Target as security for the LMBO loan 
In this model, the holding company borrows money secured by the target company 11 s assets 
(subject to the regulations on 'financial assistance'). When profit is made by the target 
company, a dividend is paid to the parent company (Newco) which will pay the interest 
expense arising out of the LMBO loan. Interest is therefore paid out of Newco and, 
provided that the expenses are surrendered to the subsidiary (Target) by way of group 
relief'9, the cash and the interest expense end up in the correct company. Hence, the interest 
expense incurred by Newco can be used by Target to reduce its taxable profits. 
39 The term 'group relief' will be explained later in 2.2.2 of this section. 
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Advantage- 
The main advantage of this form of acquisition for vendor and purchaser is the relative 
simplicity of the procedure. There is only one asset to be sold and purchased, namely the 
shares of the company compared with an asset deal in which each and every asset is 
transferred. Furthermore, a vendor normally prefers the sale of shares due to the fact that he 
can totally disengage himself from the business being sold 40 . Secondly, a vendor prefers the 
share deal because he receives the take-over price direct from the purchaser. In an asset 
deal, the purchase price is paid to the vendor's company and will only then be distributed to 
the respective shareholders (Wine/Beswick, 1992). 
Disadvantage: 
First, purchasers are sometimes of the opinion that the commercial benefits of a share deal 
may be outweighed by the risks associated with any unknown liabilities he may have 
acquired along with the target. 
Secondly, the 'financial assistance' provisions of the Companies Act 1985 relate only to the 
acquisition of shares and represent therefore a disadvantage of the share deal if the 
purchaser decides to include 'financial assistance' in the transaction. This is the case when 
shares are purchased and the assets of the target company are offered as security for the 
credit, the most common intention of LMBO transactions. 
2.1.2 Share deal with transfer of assets 
The second form of a share deal is a two-step model where the share deal is followed by the 
transfer of the assets of the target company. The required steps in this take-over model are 
as follows: 
" Founding of a holding company Newco 
" Purchase of shares in Target by Newco, financed by the LMBO loan and 
" Transfer of the assets of the target to Newco 
In this context it is important to emphasise that the transfer of the business from the LMBO 
target company to Newco is carried out by the acquisition of assets at net book value. 
(Hardman/Thornton 1986/87) 
40 Except in relation to warranties or tax covenants given on a sale, a vendor NvIll have no continuing liabilities for the 
debts of the business. 
124 
According to Section 343 Of UK tax law (ICTA 1988), all tax losses of Target are 
transferred to the new company which allows the compensation of future profits. However, 
according to Section 768 of ICTA 1988, this requires that within 3 years there is no major 
change in the structure of the shareholders or in the nature of the company business. 
Advantage: 
The main advantage of this take-over form is that, due to the business transfer of the target 
company to Newco, the purchased assets are now incorporated within the Newco and can 
be used to secure the LMBO loan. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that the regulations concerning 'financial assistance' only apply 
to the acquisition of shares, the share deal followed by the transfer of assets offers all the 
advantages of an asset deal with respect to 'financial assistance'. 
Disadvantage: 
The share deal followed by the transfer of assets combines all advantages and disadvantages 
of share and asset deals. Firstly, the share deal promises a relatively simple acquisition 
procedure. This advantage might, however, be outweighed by the risks associated with any 
unknown liabilities which may be acquired along with the target. Secondly, the following 
asset deal requires a complicated transfer procedure due to the fact that each and every 
asset has to be identified and transferred. 
2.2 Tax considerations concerning the share deal 
There are several important aspects the vendor and the purchaser of company have to bear 
in mind when considering the choice between an asset deal and a deal from a tax point of 
view. The following offers a brief discussion of certain taxation issues that arise out of a 
LMBO in the form of a share deal. It does so from the perspective of the management, the 
acquisition vehicle Newco, the target company Target and to a limited extent the vendor. 
2.2.1 Interest relief for the management buyout team 
When a management buyout team is deciding to finance an acquisition with credit, one of 
the most important issues is whether or not it will be entitled to obtain tax relief on the 
interest payable. Section 360 of the Income and corporations taxes act 1988 states that 
interest relief is available for each shareholder holding at least 5 percent in a 'close 
company' or who works for the greater part of his time in the management or conduct of 
the 'close company'. 
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A 'close company' is, according to Section 414 of the Income and corporations taxes act 
1988, a company which is United Kingdom resident and controlled by five or fewer persons 
(or by its directors, however many). In an LmBO transaction in which an investment 
holding company (Newco) is created in order to acquire the shares of the target company, 
this investment holding company is considered 'close' unless it exists wholly or mainly for 
the purpose of carrying on commercial trade. More broadly, only a company which makes 
portfolio investments will be regarded as a 'close' investment holding company (Knight, 
1992). 
The LMBO team is equally entitled to tax relief on the interest if the loan is used to acquire 
interest in an employee-controlled company (Section 361, Income and Corporation Taxes 
Act 1988). The conditions here are that the interest must be on a loan for the purpose of 
making an investment (as opposed to overdraft interest) and the loan should normally be 
with a UK bank. 
2.2.2 Group relief 
It is very important for the LMBO team to obtain relief for their interest payments. 
However, it is equally important for the LMIBO Newco to obtain relief on the interests of an 
LMIBO loan. This can be achieved in different ways. One way is through interest relief for 
companies within a group, so-called 'group relief' as explained in the following. 
AQ 
After the acquisition of the target through Newco, the target company may be a member of 
a group if it has subsidiaries or if it is a subsidiary itself. If the Newco company and the 
LMBO target company maintain their independent company status after the LMIBO 
transaction, they might become a group. Under the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
1988 section 402 group relief applies between companies if one company is a 75 percent 
subsidiary of another or if both are 75 percent subsidiaries of a third. Knight (1992) states in 
this context that if a member of such a group incurs trading losses in an accounting period 
or has certain other amounts eligible for relief from corporate tax of that period, it may 
surrender the amounts to another company within the group where they can be used to 
relieve their own tax liability in the corresponding accounting period. 
However, Newco must either be an investment or a trading company to be eligible for 
interest relief If it is neither, there will be no relief for interest on any debt of the finance 
used for the buyout. Assuming that the investment status is established the interest of the 
LUBO loan is treated as an expense and can be 'group relieved' against the target's profits. 
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2.2.3 Retirement relief for the vendor 
When a company is sold by a share deal,, the purchase price is paid directly to the vendor 
and this involves a tax which is important to consider, namely the capital gains tax on the 
return on the sale of the shares. The vendor can avoid this tax charge if he qualifies for 
4 retirement relief. 
Individuals are eligible for 'retirement relief who have reached the age of 55 (or who have 
retired on grounds of ill health below the age of 55) and who have shares or securities in a 
company. Retirement relief under Section 163 of the Taxation of chargeable gains act 1992 
can be applied if the relevant conditions have been fulfilled over a period of at least one year 
ending with the sale (Wine/B eswick, 1992). 
In a share deal, the relevant conditions are that the company is the individual's 'family 
company' and is either a trading company or the holding company of a trading group. The 
individual must also be a full-time director of the company or of any member of the group. 
A 'family company' is one in which the voting rights are held 
" at least 25 percent by the individual, or 
" more than 50 percent by the individual or a member of his family and at least 5 percent 
by the individual himself 
(Source: K: rdght, 1992) 
The period for which the relevant conditions are fulfilled is called the qualifying period. The 
f IIOWS41. 
maximum relief obtainable when the qualifying period is ten years or more is as 0 
" The first L150,, 000 are tax free, and 
" The return on the next L450,000 is reduced by half 
Retirement relief regulations have become a very complicated tax area in the UK tax law. 
There are strict rules covering the transfer between spouses, for example, as well as 
provisions which allow potential vendors to aggregate earlier business periods to reach the 
maximum tax free amounts. However, these are just a few issues which might arise 
in such 
a transaction, LMBO participants cannot avoid going over the many possibilities and 
working through the exact figures. 
41 The figures 150,000 and 450,000 are reduced when the qualifying period is less than 10 years. The relief is 
calculated in reference to the percentage which the qualifyIn period 
bears to 10 years (Wine/Beswick, Chapter 4, 9 
1992). 
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2.3 Summary concerning the share deal with and without the transfer of assets 
The above facts show clearly that the LMBO-model in the form of a share deal offers 
advantages for the vendor and also, to a limited extent, the purchaser of the target 
company. The main advantage for this take-over form for vendor and purchaser is clearly 
the relative simplicity of the acquisition procedure in comparison to the asset deal. 
2.3.1 Share deal without transfer of assets 
From the vendor's point of view, a share deal is normally preferred due to the fact that he 
can disengage himself from the business and from the liability for the debts of the company. 
From the tax point of view, the share deal offers the possibility of 'retirement relief' for the 
vendor if he fulfils certain conditions 
From the purchaser's point of view, a disadvantage of the share deal might be the 
regulations concerning 'financial assistance' which only relate to the case in which the 
purchaser buys shares and offers the assets of the target company as security. However, 
based on the exceptions to the prohibition of 'financial assistance" contained in Sections 
153 or 155-158 of the Company Act 1985, the target company is allowed to grant financial 
support to the acquiring company if certain conditions are fulfilled. From a tax point of view 
the purchaser might see certain tax advantages in any substantial tax losses of the Target, 
42 which could be used to compensate future profits . Another 
disadvantage may be that the 
acquisition of shares will not provide any step-up potential in the assets of the target so that 
an increase in the depreciation volume and consequently an increase in the cash-flow 
volume can not be expected. 
2.3.2 Share deal with transfer of assets 
From the vendor's point of view, the share deal with transfer of assets offers all the 
advantages already cited above in the context of the share deal without transfer of assets. A 
main disadvantage for vendor and purchaser here is the relatively complicated take-over 
procedure involving the relatively uncomplicated acquisition of shares followed by the more 
complex acquisition of assets. 
42 Although the acquisition of shares in the target may not affect the target's trade, the target's business may change. If 
the old trade has been discontinued, any losses incurred in the old trade are not available to carry forward. 
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From the purchaser's point of view, the main advantage in this take-over form is the 
transfer of the assets of the target company to Newco which can then be used as security 
for the LMIBO loan. A second advantage for the purchaser is that, based on the transfer of 
the assets to Newco, a potential step-up volume in Target's assets can be used in order to 
increase the depreciation volume and consequently the cash-flow volume of the target. This 
disadvantage is, however, n-ýitigated by the fact that UK companies, unlike German 
companies, do not possess 'hidden reserves' due to the asset revaluation method applied by 
UK companies 43 . Therefore, the utilisation of an asset step-up technique when 
Target's 
assets are transferred to Newco does not have the same effect in the UK as it does in 
Germany. 
2.4 Take-over of the target company by means of the assets (asset deal) 
In an acquisition of a business or asset deal, the purchaser acquires a collection of tangible 
and intangible assets which are directly incorporated into the purchaser's balance sheet. The 
purchaser can select those assets and liabilities which he wishes to take on and, by excluding 
unwanted assets and liabilities, avoid the risks associated with unknown liabilities or 
contracts he cannot fulfil (Beswick, Wine, 1992). From management's point of view, unless 
there are tax adjusted trading losses in the target company which can be transferred in a 
share deal, a purchase of assets will generally be the best action with regard to taxation. 
In an LMBO transaction, the steps involved in an asset deal are as follows: 
Founding of a holding company Newco, and 
Purchase of the assets of the Target. 
Advantage: 
In an LMBO transaction, the purchaser requires debt to pay for the acquisition. An asset 
deal enables the purchaser to use the assets acquired as security for the sum borrowed. By 
contrast, utilising their own assets to secure the loan in order to acquire shares 
is generally 
prohibited by Section 151 of the Companies Act, except in the provisions 
for legal 'financial 
assistance' in the same section. 




Due to the fact that an asset deal involves the transfer of a business in which each and evei-N, 
asset is identified and transferred, this is obviously a relatively complicated acquisition 
procedure in comparison to the share deal in which only one asset is transferred. 
2.5 Tax considerations for the vendor and the purchaser concerning the asset deal 
2.5.1 Tax considerations for the vendor 
A vendor may sell an asset at a price which is above or below its tax written-down value. 
(Higson, 1995). The vendor might suffer 'balancing fees' as tax authorities in the UK are 
able to charge companies the difference between the book net value and the purchase price 
when assets of the target company are sold above the written-down value. Considering this 
fact, the vendor will attempt to keep the value of these assets down so that no balancing 
fees arise (Wine/Beswick, 1992). 
2.5.2 Tax considerations for the purchaser 
The purchaser, on the other hand, will try to maximise the value of these assets so that 
depreciation (capital allowance) can be increased and consequently tax liabilities reduced 
and the available cash-flow volume increased. This is an essential consideration in planning 
an LMBO transaction, as additional cash-flow can be used to repay the LMBO loan. 
3. Summary concerning LMBO-models in the UK 
As set out in the previous section, there are various important points to bear in mind when it 
comes to the choice between a share deal or an asset deal from a commercial and a tax point 
of view. The structuring of an LMBO transaction by means of a share deal offers 
advantages for the purchaser and the vendor of the target company. Due to the regulations 
in the Sections 153-158 Companies Act 1985 which defines the exceptions to the 'financial 
assistance' regulations, the essential goals of the LMBO are- 
" the utilisation of the assets of the target company as security for the LMBO loan, and 
" the utilisation of the cash-flow of the target company in order to repay interest and the 
LMBO loan. 
In this context, it is worthwhile to note, that even if the status of Newco and Target as 
independent companies is maintained (no merger or liquidation), tax advantages can still be 
realised with the group relief regulations cited in Section 402 of the Income and 
corporations taxes act 1988 which allow the compensation of Target's profits through 
Newco's losses. 
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From the purchaser's point of view, certain tax disadvantages may exist in a share deal. 
Among the most important is the inability to realise asset step-up potential. However, this 
disadvantage is mitigated by the fact that assets of LJK companies are mostly recorded at 
market value without the supplementary step-up potential. 
From the vendor's point of view, the LMBO transaction as a share deal has the most 
advantages. The most important among them is the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 
which enables the owner of a family business to get valuable relief from the capital gains tax 
when he or she reaches 'retirement age' or is forced to retire by ill health. 
In the UK, an LMBO is typically structured as a share deal due to the fact that management 
buyouts have originated in the past and still often originate from peripheral, non-core 
businesses of groups which tend to be separate subsidiaries 44 . Here, the clear goal of the 
vendor is to sell the subsidiary as a whole rather than to sell the assets of the subsidiary and 
to be left with an empty shell. 
H. LMBO models in Germany 
According to recent experience with LMIBO transactions in Germany, some of the 
previously described LMBO techniques applied in the UK can be transferred and adapted to 
the German legal and tax regulations. As in the UK, the main characteristics of a German 
LMBO transaction is the goal to transfer LMBO debt to the target company, secured by 
Target's assets, and to use the cash-flow of the target company in order to repay interest 
and the LMBO loan. As in the UK, there are two major acquisition models. the purchase of 
shares and the purchase of assets. The examination of these two forms of acquisition - 
limited to the take-over of corporations - will be the focus of the following sections. 
1. Legal framework 
In Germany, a special LMBO technique has been developed to combine all possible tax and 
legal advantages for the vendors, purchasers and financiers of an LMBO transaction while 
at the same time circumventing any potential legal and tax problems that may arise. 
Holzapfel/P61lath (1994) point out how necessary it is to use LMBO models which avoid 
the legal regulations concerning the 'capitalisation and maintenance of share capital'. This 
arises from following goals: 
" See also Section C, 1., 2.3, Main Sources for UK LMBOs. 
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9 To utilise the assets of the target company as security for the LMBO loan, and 
To utilise the cash-flow of the target company in order to repay interest and the LMBO 
loan. 
These regulations are similar to those in the UK concerning the prohibition of 'financial 
assistance' and will be examined in the following with respect to joint-stock companies and 
the limited liability companies, the most common company form in Germany 45 . 
1.1 Regulations concerning the maintenance of share capital 
1.1.1. Maintenance of the share capital of the joint-stock company 
The Joint-stock Company Act adheres to the fundamental principle that the registered 
capital of the joint-stock company, a minimum of DM 100,000, must be both paid in and 
maintained. The first principle is designed to ensure that the amount of capital paid in by the 
shareholders is not reduced while the company is founded nor immediately thereafter by 
agreements between shareholders and the company or among the corporate founders. The 
requirement to maintain the share capital is designed to ensure that the assets of a 
corporation remain intact and are not reduced by distributions at the expense of the 
corporation or its creditors, unless permitted by law. As a consequence, only profits may be 
distributed as dividends to shareholders. 
According to Section 57 of the Joint-stock Company Act the regulations concerning 
(maintenance of capital' for joint-stock companies are as follows- 
Contributions may not be repaid to shareholders. The payment of the purchase price in 
the case of a permitted acquisition of company shares will not be deemed to constitute a 
repayment of contributions. 
* Interest may neither be promised nor paid to shareholders. 
Furthermore, Section 71a of the Joint-stock Company Act is of utmost importance in 
LMBO transactions when the target company is a joint-stock company, as it prohibits 
giving 'financial assistance' directly (loan) or indirectly (security) to a third party in order to 
acquire its own shares. 
A legal transaction which has the goal to grant an advance, a loan or a security 
through the company to a thirdperson in order to acquire the shares of this company 
is invalid 
45 See also Section C7 IV., 1.1, The Legal Structure of German Companies. Out of 2.3 million companies in 
Germany, 
264,000 Nvere limited liability companies in 1992. 
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1.1.2 Maintenance of the share capital of the Limited Liability Company 
To found a limited liability company under German law, the company must have a minimum 
nominal capital of DM 50,000. In order to maintain the share capital of the limited liability 
company, the Limited Liability Companies Act 1985 contains a number of provisions 
designed to ensure that share capital, once provided, is maintained. According to Section 30 
Limited Liability Companies Act, the regulations concerning 'maintenance of share capital' 
for limited liability companies are as follows: 
Ae company is not allowed to repay share contributions to the shareholders. Any 
payment to shareholders that reduces the net assets of the company below the stated 
amount of share capital is deemed a repayment of share capital. 
" Ae company is not allowed to acquire, or take as security, its own shares if it reduces 
the net assets of the company below the stated share capital. 
" The company is not permitted to redeem shares if this reduces the company's net assets 
below the registered share capital. 
" 777e company is not permitted to make loans to its managing directors or to other key 
officers and employees except on the basis of net assets which exceed the company's 
share capital. 
After reviewing the above sections in the Limited Liability Companies Act, the question 
arises whether, aside from a direct repayment of contributed capital to a shareholder, capital 
maintenance rules might also apply in the case of upstream and cross-stream loans or of 
guarantees between affiliated companies. This often applies when the LMBO acquisition is 
financed by loans secured by guarantees or collateral provided by the target company (Oho, 
Behrens,, Schneider, 1995). 
According to Lutter/Wahlers (1989), it might represent a violation of the regulations on the 
maintenance of share capital if the LMBO company grants the security for the purchase of 
its own shares. In this context there is a dispute whether granting security itself or only 
paying out the secured amount represents a violation. Generally, Lutter/Wahlers assume 
that security granted an the LMEBO company for the purchase of its own shares might in 
some cases be regarded as a violation of Sections 30 and 31 of the Limited Liability 
Companies Act and therefore prohibited by law. 
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However, the regulations concerning the maintenance of share capital contalned 'n the 
Limited Liability Companies Act 1985 are less strict than those in the Joint-stock Company 
Act. Whereas the Joint-stock Company Act contains regulations concerning the 
maintenance of share capital that categorically prohibits the distribution of share capital to 
shareholders, the regulations in the Limited Liability Companies Act 1985 allow the 
distribution of share capital on the condition that the nominal capital is not diminished. 
Structuring the transaction 
One of the most important aspects which parties of an LMBO transaction have to consider 
is the question whether the proposed transaction involves the purchase of the company's 
assets or only the shares. Each method has advantages and disadvantages; it should not be 
overlooked that in many cases the advantage to the purchaser or the seller is at the same 
time a drawback for the other party. Thus, frequently, negotiations regarding the method of 
acquisition turn out to be the more controversial aspects of an acquisition process. 
2.1 Take-over of the target company by means of shares (share deal) 
In a German share deal, the ownership of the company is acquired by assignment of interest 
and the transfer of the title to the shares rather than through transferral of individual assets 
and liabilities (Feick/Bender, 1994). The share deal can be completed in two different ways, 
either without the transfer of assets of the target company or as a two-step model with the 
transfer of assets of the target company after the share deal has been completed. The 
following will present a summary of both procedures emphasising the advantages and 
disadvantages of each form. 
Share deal without the transfer of assets 
The steps of a share deal without transfer of assets of the target company are as follows: 
Foundation of a holding company (Newco) in the form of a limited liability company, and 
Purchase of the shares of the target company through Newco. 
With respect to using the shares of the target company as security for the LN1BO loan, the 
share deal represents the most uncomplicated model. In a share deal, Newco acquires the 
shares of the target company and uses them as security for the LMBO loan. In this case, 
however, the institutions financing the deal will insist on other forms of security due to the 
subordination of shares in case of insolvency of the target company. In most cases they will 
insist on the assets of the target company as security for the LMIBO loan. Depending on the 
legal form of the target company this poses several legal problems based on the regulations 
of 'maintenance of share capital' discussed at the beginning of this section. 
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Advantage: 
The principal advantage of the acquisition of shares in a company is the relative simplicity of 
the transaction. In contrast to the sales of assets,, no transfer of the title to the individual 
company assets is necessary. The purchaser becomes the owner of the company including 
all assets and liabilities. From the vendor's viewpoint, the main attraction of a share deal is 
that all of the companies liabilities are transferred together with the shares. Another 
advantage can be seen in the fact that shares of the company can be used as security for the 
LMBO loan without considering the regulations for the 'maintenance of share capital'. 
Disadvantage: 
In an asset deal, certain assets and liabilities are selected for purchase by the buyer, whereas 
one crucial disadvantage of a share deal is that the company is transferred together with all 
undisclosed problems and contingent liabilities. More importantly, however, the assets of 
the target company cannot be used as security for the LMBO loan due to the regulations 
concerning the 'maintenance of share capital'. 
2.1.1.1 Merger of Target with Newco 
Upon completion of the share deal, a merger of Target and Newco takes place and all assets 
and liabilities of the target company are transferred by means of a 'universal succession 46 to 
Newco. This gives Newco the possibility to use Target's assets as security for the LNMO 
loan without the problems arising out of the 'maintenance of share capital' regulations. The 
merger can only be completed, however, if 75 percent of Target's present owners of capital 
agree and the creditors suffer no damage. The shareholders of the target company receive 
shares of the acquiring company as compensation. 
However, according to Section 348 of the Joint-stock Company Act, the merger of Target 
and Newco implied the transfer of Target's assets at book value. This had the disadvantage 
that any potential step-up volume in the assets of the target company could not be realised 
or used to increase the depreciation volume, reduce the taxable income and consequently 
increase the cash-flow (Holzapfe"61lath, 1994). However, according to the new 
Reorganisation Law (1995) the Target company is now allowed to transfer its assets at 
market value, which makes it possible to realise the existing step-up volume and 
consequently to increase Target's cash-flow potential. 
47 
46 'Universal succession' means that all assets and liabilities are transferred in one legal transaction opposed to the 
otherwise necessary individual transfer of each asset and liability. 
47 Section 24 of the new Reorganisation Law allows the transfer of Target's assets at values above book value. 
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2.1.1.2 Continuation of the Target as independent company 
Another alternative after the acquisition of Target's shares is that Newco and Target remain 
independent companies. The condition is, however, that a controlling and surrender of 
profit agreement according to Section 291 of Joint-stock Company Act has to be made 
which allows Newco to exercise full control over the company and therefore obliges Target 
to surrender their profits to Newco. This alternative makes it possible for Newco to 
compensate interest expenses from the LMBO loan with the profits of the Target. However, 
the problem of using Target's assets as security for the LMBO debt remains unresolved. 
2.1.2 Take-over of the target company by means of a share deal 
with transfer of assets (combination model) 
The strategy commonly applied in Germany up until the end of 1994 in order to fulfil the 
interests of both vendor and purchaser was the 'combination model' which means a share 
deal followed by an 'internal' asset deal. This procedure is structured as follows (Picot, 
1995): 
* The Newco is founded in the form of a Limited Liability Company due to the favourable 
tax regulations in Section 17 of the Income Tax law with respect to a later sale of the 
shares through the LMBO team. 
The purchaser acquires the shares of the German target company through the newly 
founded Newco. 
* Newco acquires the active business - including all assets and liabilities - from the target 
company (internal asset deal). Due to the fact that the assets are purchased at 'market 
value' the step-up potential of Target's assets are revealed and utilised to increase 
Target's depreciation volume, reduce the taxable income and increase the cash-flow. 
After purchasing the assets and liabilities from the target company, Newco can use 
Target's cash-flow for the payment of interest and debt as well as for security on the 
LMBO loan. 
The capital gains generated by the target company, i. e. the difference between the book 
value and market value of the sold assets,, are transferred as a dividend to Newco. 
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In order to avoid full taxation of this profit, Newco writes down the acquisition costs of 
Target's shares in an amount corresponding to the dividend income received (Bruse, 
1991). The write-down is based on the following factors: 
A. Newco's participation in Target is purchased at market value based on Target's 
equity value after the distribution of profits. 
Newco's participation in Target increases with the transfer of dividends from 
Target to Newco. 
C. Newco has the right to depreciate the value of their participation based on 
Target's equity value after the distribution of profits (Section 6 (1 ) Income Tax 
Act). 
Advantage: 
When a vendor sells shares, he is entitled to favourable tax treatment described in the 
following Section 2.2.11. As for the purchaser, due to the fact that the purchase price for 
the internal asset deal is allocated to depreciable assets, the step-up potential of Target's 
assets can be realised and used to increase the depreciation volume, reduce the taxable 
income and increase the net cash-flow volume of the target company. Secondly, due to the 
transfer of Target's assets to Newco, the assets can be used to secure Newco's LMBO 
loan. 
Disadvantage: 
As the assets of the business of the target company are not transferred in one legal 
transaction but individually, a complicated legal procedure concerning the transfer of each 
and every asset and liability ensues (Oho, Behrens, Schneider). 
The following example of the balance sheets of a purchasing Newco GmbH and a target 
company should help to illustrate the previously presented steps and mechanisms of the 
acquisition based on the 'combination model'. 
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2.1.2.1 An example calculation of the 'combination model" 
Step I and 2: Acquisition of the Target through a share deal 
The Newco GmbH acquires the shares of the target company for 450. For the sake of 









Step 3: Transfer of assets 
Newco acquires the assets of the target company at market value in the amount of 450. 
Target receives cash in the amount of 450. Target has to pay 45% corporation tax and 15% 
trade tax (resulting from the difference of the book value and the market value of the assets) 
in the amount of 162 (capital gains = 450 - 50 = 400 ). 
Newco Target 
Participation 450 Cash 450 Equity 50 
Assets 450 Profit 400 
Payment of corporation (102) and 
trade (60) tax Target 





Step 4: Distribution of profits 
Profits, after deduction of the taxes resulting from the capital gains, are transferred by 





Receiv. (dividend) 238* 
Receiv. (corp. tax) 102 
Distributable profit 238 
3/7 refund tax +102 
340 
Cash 50 Equity 50 
Step 5: Extraordinary write-down of Newco's participation in the Target in 
the amount of the distributed dividend (340) 
In order to avoid full taxation of the dividends transferred by Target, Newco writes down 






Rec. (dividend) 23 8 
Rec. (corp-tax) 102 
Target 
Cash 50 Equity 50 
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2.1.2.2 An example tax calculation for the 'Combination model" 
1) Vendor (Step 1, share deal) 
1/2of income tax rate 
According to Section 17 of the Income Tax Act, the vendor, as a natural person, may claim 
for corporate gain relief on the proceeds of the sale of a participation up to 25 percent. The 
proceeds of the sale of a participation over 25 percent are taxable at half of the applicable 
income tax rate. 
2) Target (Step 2, transfer of assets and taxation of prorit) 
-153 corporation tax (45% on 340) 
+ 51 reduction corp. tax rate due to distribution of profits (15/45 of 153) 
- 102 corporation tax 
60 trade tax on profit (15% on 400) 
3) Newco (Step 3, transfer of assets and depreciation of profit) 
-153 payable corporation tax 45% of 340 (= 238 distributable income 
+ 102 refund corp. tax 
+ 153 depreciation (45% on 340) 
+ 102 refundable corporation tax 3/7 of 23 8 
=+ 102 corporation tax 
+ 51 trade tax reduction (15% of 340) 
Total tax charge from step 1-3: 
Corporation tax -102 (step 2) + 102 (step 3) 0 
Trade tax - 60 (step 2) + 51 (step 3) 9 
As seen in the above calculations, the combination model combines advantages for the 
vendor in the form of the share deal and the purchaser in the form of an internal asset deal 
as a result of the extraordinary write-down which allows for compensation of corporate tax 
expenses. Koenen/Gohr point out that, as trade tax expenses can not be fully compensated 
in the combination model, the 'conversion model' (described later in section 2.4) was 
introduced in early 1995 to enable a take-over without any tax disadvantages. 
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The vendor of a company usually prefers a share deal whereas the buyer prefers an asset 
deal in which they can select each individual asset of the corporation for purchase and take- 
over the liabilities separately. 
2.2 Tax considerations for the share deal and the 'combination model') 
2.2.1 Tax considerations for the vendor 
The individual vendor's goal is to minirnise the tax burden resulting from the sale of a 
company. Under German tax law, the capital gains resulting from the sale of shares of a 
company are treated more favourably than capital gains derived from individual assets (Oho, 
Behrens, Schneider, 1995). 
2.2.1.1 Vendor as individual 
According to section 17 of the Income Tax Act, capital gains derived from the sale of 
shares are tax free, provided the vendor is an individual,, the shares do not belong to a 
business and the vendor has not held more than 25 percent of the share capital of the 
company five years prior to the sale. If the vendor has held more than 25 percent of the 
share capital in the five years prior, capital gains of up to DM 3 OM48 per year are subject to 
a preferential tax rate at half of the average income tax rate (Section 34 Income Tax Act). 
In addition, there may be tax free allowances of up to DM 20,000, but the maximum 
allowance is only granted if the vendor sells all of the shares of the company and the capital 
gains do not exceed DM 80,000 (Section 17 (3) Income Tax Act). 
2.2.1.2 Vendor as corporation 
The profit resulting from the sale of the target through a corporation is subject to the full 
corporate tax. 
2.2.2 Tax considerations for the purchaser 
The purchaser of a company will attempt to allocate part of the purchase price to tangible 
and intangible assets in order to increase depreciation volume and create tax deductible 
expenses. Holzapfel and P61lath (1994) write that in a share deal the purchaser has 
considerable tax disadvantages due to the fact that the asset depreciation volume of the 
acquired company is limited to the book value, whereas the asset deal enables the transfer of 
assets at market value and therefore allows for significant asset step-up potential. 
48 This amount has been reduced to DM 15m in the context of the so-called 
"Law for the continuation of the coporation tax law reform". 
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2.3. Summary concerning the share deal and the 'combination model') 
In a share deal without the transfer of assets, the above facts show very clearly that the 
purchase of shares is preferred by the vendor of the target company but is generally avoided 
by the purchaser for the following reasons: 
The use of assets as security for the transaction is limited by various legal restrictions. 
The use of the cash-flow of the target company for repayment of interest and debt are 
regarded as 'hidden distribution of dividends' in tax legislation and would therefore be 
subject to corporation tax. 
9A share deal prevents the realisation of 'hidden reserves' and therefore an increase of the 
depreciation and cash-flow volume. 
The LMBO model combining a share deal and an asset deal clearly unites all advantages 
which arises from pure asset or pure share deals for the vendor and the purchaser. In 
summary, the following advantages are achieved with the combination model- 
Through a share deal, the vendor as an individual can use all of the tax advantages 
granted through Sections 17 and 34 of the Income Tax Act. 
Through an asset deal, the purchaser can record the assets purchased at market value 
generating a higher depreciation volume which leads to reduced taxable income and 
higher cash-flow. 
* Through an asset deal, the purchaser can use the assets of the target company as security 
for the LMBO loan and use the cash-flow of the target company to repay interest and 
debt. 
* Through the transfer of Target's dividends to Newco, which increases Newco's 
participation in Target, Newco can write-down the acquisition costs and thus 
compensate the profits arising from Target"s dividend transfer to Newco. 
According to recent experience with LMBO transactions in Germany, the key factor for the 
success of a leveraged transaction lies in the possibility to use the step-up potential of 
Target's assets for tax efficient depreciation and to use the resulting increase in cash-flow 
for reinvestments, repayments and as a cushion for other risks inherent in the transaction. 
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The legal risks involved in the 'combination model' have been reduced by two decisions of 
the German Supreme Tax Court. The first overruled a 1990 decision of the regional tax 
court in Miinster which deemed the 'combination model' illegal. A decision in July 1993 
found once again in favour of the parties which applied the 'combination model' in an 
acquisition (Oho, Behrens, Schneider, 1995). 
However, when trade taxes cannot be totally compensated , the 'combination model' does 
not offer the most favourable conditions for a tax effective acquisition. Under the new 
Reorganisation Civil and Tax Law, which came into effect at the beginning of 1995, new 
take-over models have become possible. Target either becomes a member of a partnership, 
but conserves its identity, or is fully merged into a partnership. These alternatives provide 
even more tax advantages than the 'combination model' which, however, can still be 
applied. The following section will describe the changes implemented in the new 
Reorganisation Law and will illustrate the 'conversion model' with an example take-over in 
which the target company is converted into a partnership. 
2.4 Take-over of the target company by means of the 'conversion model" 
According to the changes in the Reorganisation Law stated in Section 190 the conversion of 
a company from corporation to partnership is possible without any transfer of assets. The 
prerequisites are that 75 percent of the shareholders agree to the conversion into a limited 
partnership (KG) and 100 percent of the shareholders agree to the conversion into other 
forms of partnership. 
R6dder/H6tzel (1995) write in this context that in addition to the conversion from 
corporýtion to partnership, Section 2 of the new Reorganisation Law (UmwStG) also 
allows the merger of corporations and partnerships through incorporation or through 
founding a new partnership. The assets of an existing corporation are then transferred into 
an existing or newly founded partnership. According to Sections 43 and 50 of the 
Reorganisation Law, the merger is only possible if 100 percent of the shareholders of the 
partnership and 75 percent of the voting shareholders of the corporation are in agreement 
with the transaction. 
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2.4.1 Old "Reorganisation Law" before changes 
The former Reorganisation Law permitted the conversion of a corporation to a partnership 
only on the basis of a transfer of assets at 'market value' which implied that 'hidden 
reserves' had to be revealed and were subject to income tax at the rate of the partners in the 
partnership. According to R6dder/Schaumburg (1995), this structure has long been 
criticised by tax experts for preventing the conversion from corporations to partnerships 
with heavy taxation of the profits resulting from the asset transfer. 
2.4.2 New "Reorganisation law" after changes (1995) 
Blumers/Beinert (1995) see advantages in the new 'conversion model' in that the 
conversion from corporation to partnership can be executed without revealing the 'hidden 
reserves' during the transfer. Here, the net book value of assets of the corporation remains 
while the corporation is converted into a partnership. In the context of an LNMO, the steps 
of the 'conversion-model' are as follows (Oho, Behrens, Schneider): 
9 Management acquires the shares of the target company through a purchaser limited 
liability company which buys a 100 percent stake in the target. The purchaser limited 
liability company acquires the shares at market value. 
The target company is converted into a limited partnership (GmbH & Co. KG) in which 
a newly created limited liability company becomes the partner with full responsibility and 
the purchaser limited liability company becomes the partner without responsibility. The 
assets and liabilities are transferred at net book value. 
The tax effects hereby are as follows: 
* The transfer from corporation to partnership is completed at net book value (Fischer, 
1995) 
Due to the fact that the purchase price of the shares of the corporation exceeds the 
historical book value of the assets and liabilities of the target company, the partner can 
claim a loss from the transfer of shares (Section 4 Reorganisation Law). 
No corporate income tax is payable although there is a step-up of the book values of the 
assets of the target company which increases the depreciation volume, reduces the 
taxable income and consequently increases the available cash-flow of the partnership. 
(Sagasser/Bula, 1995). 
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2.4.3 An example tax calculation of the 'Conversion model" 
Corporation A is converted into partnership B. The balance sheet of A is as 
follows at the date of the transfer: 
Assets 500 Equity 200 
Reserves EK 50 100 
EK 45 50 
EK 01 50 
EK 04 100 
500 
It is assumed that the target company has 'hidden reserves" with respect to 
the assets capitalised as follows: 
Assets: 250 
Goodwill- 109 
Corporation tax which is refunded once the dividend is distributed: 
(50/50 x 100,45/55 x 50) = 141 
500 
Therefore, the market value of the corporation is 1000 in comparison to the 
net book value of 500. 
Taxation: 
Net book value of shares: 500 
I Market value of shares 1.000 
Loss resulting from the transfer before tax refund 1.500 
Refund of corporation tax +141 
Loss resulting from the transfer after tax refund 1.359 
Income tax for partner of the partnership 0 
Corporation tax refund for partners in the partnership 1 141 
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The newly created partnership has the following balance sheet after the transaction- 
Assets 859 Equity 859 
(= 500 + 359) 
859 859 
2.5 Summary concerning the 'conversion model' 
In summary, R6dder (1995) acknowledges the following advantages with respect to the 
changes in the Reorganisation Law and the arising possibilities for an acquisition with the 
4 conversion model': 
The take-over of the target company by means of a share deal brings tax advantages for 
the seller of the Target (as an individual) as laid out in Sections 17 and 34 of the Income 
Tax Act. 
The following conversion from corporation to partnership allows the continuation of the 
net book value of Target's assets. The step-up potential of the Target's assets can still be 
realised which leads to an increased depreciation volume, reduced tax liabilities and an 
increased net cash-flow. 
Due to the fact that no profits are realised, no trade tax has to be paid by the corporation 
or equity holders in the partnership. Since no trade tax has to be paid this represents a 
real advantage over the previously described 'combination model' in which trade tax 
expenses are not completely compensated. 
Taking all the above facts into consideration, the changes in the Reorganisation Law have 
improved the legal and tax framework dramatically for classic restructuring (especially 
restructuring corporations) and corporate take-overs. The previously described structure in 
the form of a share deal followed by the conversion of the target company into a partnership 
clearly offers more advantages for seller and buyer than the 'combination model'. 
However, Blumers/Marquardt (1994) point out that the conversion from corporation to 
partnership might incorporate certain risks and disadvantages for the corporate buyer in 
some respects. The newly created partnership could, for example, be tied into a pure 
corporation structure or certain tax privileges may only be available corporations, such as 
group relief if corporations form a fiscal unity for corporation and trade tax purposes. 
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2.6 Changes in the tax law in 1997 
2.6.1 Changes in context of the acquisition of a company 
The so-called "Law for the continuation of the corporation tax reform" brought through its 
changes considerable disadvantages for buyers of a company who acquired shares from an 
individual as vendor owning up to 25 percent of the company. Due to the fact that these 
vendors could profit from their capital gains tax free based on section 17 of the Income Tax 
Act the government decided that the acquired company should not profit from additional 
tax advantages through a higher step-up volume of its acquired assets which would have led 
to a higher depreciation volume and therefore to a reduced tax burden. Therefore, 
according to the newly introduced section 50c of the Income Tax Act buyers who acquired 
company shares from individuals holding up to 25 percent of the shares could were not 
allowed to step-up the acquired assets according to their purchase price. 
2.6.2 Consequences of the changes in the tax law 
Due to the fact that the changes in the taw law relate to both take-over models - to 
combination model and to conversion model - the described advantages of this models 
could not longer be maintained if the buyer acquired company shares from individuals who 
fell under the regulations of section 17 of the Income Tax Law. Since, historically, owners 
of small to medium sized companies in Germany structured their shareholdings in that way 
that they could profit from the regulations of section 17 of the Income Tax Law many 
LMBO transactions from family-owned company had to be completed without the help of 
comfortable tax advantages which led in the past to considerable tax savings for the LMBO 
target company. 
2.7 Take-over of the target company by means of an asset deal 
In a sale of assets, the ownership of each individual asset has to be transferred to the 
purchaser. By excluding unwanted assets and liabilities from the acquisition, the purchaser 
has the great advantage of avoiding the risks associated with unknown contracts or 
liabilities he can not identify at the time of the acquisition (Wine/Beswick, chapter 2,1992). 
in the context of an LMBO transaction, the steps for an asset deal are the 
following: 
Foundation of the holding company Newco, and 
Purchase of the assets of the target company. 
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The most natural and uncomplicated way to use the assets of the target company as security 
for Newco's LMBO loan is to structure the acquisition as an asset deal. In this LMEBO 
model, the assets of the Target are incorporated into the balance sheet of Newco and can 
therefore be used as security. 
Advantage: 
In an asset deal, the parties are free to determine which assets and liabilities are to be 
transferred to the purchaser. Thus, one of the key advantages of an asset deal is the ability 
to select among the assets and liabilities they wish to transfer. Another very important 
advantage of an asset deal is that the purchaser is liable only for those obligations of the 
target company he assumes outright (Feick/Bender, Chapter 27,1994). Furthermore, the 
purchaser of Target's business takes the assets at market value and can therefore realise the 
step-up potential in the assets in order to increase the depreciation volume, reduce the tax 
liabilities and increase the cash-flow volume of the target company. In this way, the 
purchaser seeks to utilise the surplus cash-flow generated by the target company to service 
the obligations of the LM[BO loan and allocates the assets as collateral for the lenders of 
funds in the acquisition. 
Disadvantage: 
As the assets are not transferred by assignment of interests or transfer of title like in a share 
deal, 
- the asset 
deal is much more complex. Each individual asset must be transferred 
separately. Further, for the vendor to be released from those liabilities which are transferred 
to the purchaser, the consent of each individual creditor is required. 
2.7.1 Liquidation of the Target with liquidation resolution 
According to Holzapfel/P61lath (1994), the most effective way to use the target company's 
assets to finance an LMBO debt is the liquidation of the target company followed by the 
purchase of the assets by Newco. In this way, Target's business is purchased by Newco by 
means of an asset deal out of the liquidation process. 
2.7.2 Liquidation of the Target without liquidation resolution 
Holzapfel/P61lath (1994) state further, that a similar procedure can be applied without prior 
resolution, provided that 75 percent of Target's shareholders agree. However, 
due to the 
legal complications of this procedure, a sale of the company without prior liquidation is 
hardly ever done in Germany. 
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2.8 Tax considerations concerning an asset deal 
2.8.1 Tax considerations for the vendor 
For the vendor as an individual, Sections 16 and 34 of the Income Tax Act can be applied 
to the asset deal, granting the vendor a 50 percent reduction in income tax for the proceeds 
of the sale of its assets (or even shares in a partnership). The vendor in the form of a 
corporation cannot use Section 34 of the Income Tax Act as it applies only to individuals. 
(Hensel and Merz, 1992). 
2.8.2. Tax considerations for the purchaser 
It is the purchaser's goal to allocate part of the purchase price to the purchase of tangible 
and intangible assets in order to increase depreciation and consequently the number of 
deductible expenses. To achieve this goal, the individual assets must be purchased from the 
target company. Shares of a company may only be written off if the company suffers a 
lasting decrease in value. 
2.9 Summary concerning the asset deal 
In contrast to the advantages for the vendor in a share-deal, the asset deal presents legal and 
tax advantages for the purchaser. Therefore, in order to reach an acceptable compromise for 
vendor and purchaser in an LMBO deal, the 'combination' and 'conversion models' have 
been developed to offer legal and tax advantages for both sides. 
149 
IV. Summary concerning LMBO models in Germany 
The previously described take-over models offer advantages and disadvantages which the 
respective parties have to take into consideration in an LMBO transaction. In conclusion, it 
can be said that the vendor normally prefers the share deal from a commercial and a tax 
point of view. From the commercial point of view, the share deal allows the vendor to 
disengage himself totally from the business and to assume no liability for the debts of the 
business. From a tax point of view, the share deal entitles the vendor, as an individual, to 
favourable tax conditions as laid out in Sections 17 and 34 of the Income Tax Act. 
The purchaser, on the other hand, prefers the asset deal, because he has the possibility of 
purchasing selected assets at 'market value', therefore realising the step-up potential of the 
target's assets which leads to an increase of the depreciation volume, a reduction in the 
taxable income and an increase in cash-flow volume. Furthermore, due to the fact that 
target's assets are incorporated into the purchaser's balance sheet, the target's assets can be 
used to secure the LMBO loan. 
In combining the share deal with an internal asset deal (combination model) or with the 
conversion of the corporation into a partnership (conversion model), the main goals of both 
the vendor and the purchaser can be reached. For the vendor, this means minin-ýising the tax 
burden resulting from the sale of the business. For the purchaser, this means allocating part 
of the purchase price to the acquisition of tangible and intangible assets to increase the 
depreciation volume, reduce the taxable income and increase the net cash-flow. 
Despite all the above-mentioned factors, it is not possible to cover all the taxation issues 
which may arise for vendor and purchaser or to treat the issues which are covered in great 
depth in this section. In any event, the take-over parties must always seek specific 
professional advice in order to take full advantage of the existing take-over models for the 
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E. The impact of the LMBO concept on the post-buyout performance of 
companies and the evaluation of post-buyout performance of German 
LMBO companies under difficult economic conditions 
Introduction 
In the past several years leveraged management buyouts have continuously increased in 
importance in the UK and have also become an important part of industrial restructuring in 
Continental Europe. Examining the first transactions in the US over time, researchers like 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), Marais et al (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 
found that in the typical LMBO, investors are willing to pay pre-buyout shareholders a 
considerable premium above the existing market price of the company in order to complete 
the transaction. 
Further studies about the effects of L(M)BOs completed mainly in the US documented the 
impact of L(M)BOs in several aspects such as ownership and capital structure by Jensen 
(1989), corporate tax liabilities by Lowenstein (1989), employment and operating efficiency 
by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and profitability by Bull (1987/88) and Kaplan (1989) in 
order to explain the underlying reasons for the increase in wealth after completion of the 
take-over. 
The evidence from these studies - which will be presented in detail in chapter III of this 
section - prove that L(M)BOs improve their operating performance after the 
buyout 
transaction. Several hypotheses on the reasons for the increase in wealth have been 
researched such as reduced agency costs and new managerial incentives by Jensen (1986, 
1989), wealth transfer from public bondholders and employees to the investor group by 
Schipper and Smith (1989) and Shleifer and Summers (1988), information held by managers 
that is not known to public shareholders by Kaplan (1989) and tax advantages by 
Lowenstein (1989). The relevance of these hypotheses as well as the evidence found to 
confirm or reject them will be presented in part 11 of this section. 
The following empirical research will examine whether the findings showing improvement in 
operational performance are confirmed by German LMBO companies in times of economic 
recession. The section is structured as follows: 
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The first section will introduce the issue of post-buyout performance changes and the 
increase in wealth recognised in LMBO companies. 
Section two establishes the theoretical basis for the research by presenting a review of 
existing theories. 
Sections three to six present previous empirical research concerning post-buyout 
performance in the US, the LTK and Germany and compares post-buyout performance of 
UK and German LMIBO companies. 
Section seven surnmarises the existing evidence about post-buyout performance. 
Section eight presents the empirical research of this study, outlining the reasons and goals 
and steps of this research, presenting the results and conclusions as well as 
recommendations for further research in the area of LMBOs. 
Section nine completes and reinforces the findings of the empirical research with detailed 
case studies based on interviews conducted with owners/managers and financial investors of 
the LMBO companies examined in the empirical research. 
Section ten presents an overall impression of the interviews. 
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Theoretical basis of the research 
Since the first L(M)BO wave in the beginning of the late 1970s in the US7 there has been 
extensive debate as to the reasons for the increase in wealth of L(M)BO companies after a 
buyout. Several theories have been developed in the context of this debate. Wright, Dial and 
Hoskins (1997) state in this context that a number of theoretical aspects and theories help 
explain the generation of buyout transactions among which the most important will be 
presented in the following: 
1. Review of existing theories concerning wealth increases of LMIBO companies 
1.1 Tax hypothesis 
One explanation for the success of leveraged management buyouts is the tax argument 
presented in studies by Lowenstein (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989). From their 
perspective, the most visible and the most easily quantified source of this success are the tax 
savings or tax shelters which are not novel, but with their combined effect a major portion 
of the take-over price in a leveraged management buy-transaction can be financed out of tax 
generated cash-flow. According to Lowenstein and Lehn and Poulsen, there are two 
different tax generated funds used to finance LMBO transactions. 
The first type covers the debt tax shields created by the LMBO transaction that are created 
by the increased interest deductions as a result of the debt financing. The second type is a 
non debt related tax shield resulting from a step-up of the assets of the target company. 
Since the purchase price greatly exceeds the vendor's net book value, the difference can be 
used to create step-up volume and to increase the depreciation level of the target company. 
As a result of these tax shields, the purchaser of the firm can use the available cash-flow to 
service the LMBO loan. However, Lowenstein argues that the tax issues associated with 
leveraged management buyouts have to be seen in proper perspective. The tax savings are 
correlated in these transactions, and as their evidence suggests, going private transactions 
are not exclusively a function of tax considerations. 
1.2 'Take-over defence' hypothesis 
in the defence theory set out in a study by Nfichel and Shaked (1986), the basic assumption 
is that LM[BOs are a defensive strategy against hostile take-overs by outside parties. By 
buying the company, existing managers protect themselves from potential redundancy after 
a hostile take-over. Accordingly, one would expect firms that are likely to be the subject of 
an LMEBO to have hostile take-over bids made prior to the buyout. 
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The reasons companies become the target of a hostile take-over is not addressed in the 
study by Nfichel and Shaked (1986). The possibility of poor company performance is 
mentioned prior to the take-over bid but the authors do not really offer a theory for why and 
when a take-over candidate would use a leveraged management buyout transaction rather 
than some other type of defence (Kieschnik, 1995). 
1.3 'Defective managerial compensation' hypothesis 
Another theory about LMBOs is presented by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) in 
their study of going private transactions. Supplementary to their reduced 'agency cost' 
hypothesis, they argue in their 'defective managerial compensation' hypothesis that 
managers in public corporations are not always able to receive a proportionate share of the 
gains resulting from investment decisions. By taking over the firm, management can 
therefore create compensation contracts which are directly related to the firm's 
performance. However, this argument fails in view of the fact that many LM[BOs make their 
exit on the stock market and return to the capital markets after some years. If a public 
corporation makes adequate compensation difficult, the question remains why managers 
would wish to return to capital markets. 
1.4 'Bondholder expropriation' hypothesis 
Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989) proposed the hypothesis that gains for shareholders in 
the form of the premiums paid in a leveraged buyout transaction are partially due to the 
transfer of wealth from bondholders of the target company to shareholders. Under this 
assumption, one should see bondholders suffer a loss of wealth when the transaction is 
completed. However, Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989) examined the transfer of wealth 
from bondholders in a sample of 103 LMBOs between 1974 and 1985 and found it to be 
minimal on average, so that his 'bondholder expropriation' hypothesis could not be 
sustained. 
1.5 'Employee wealth transfer' hypothesis 
Shleifer and Summers (1988) suggest that the increase in wealth after a leveraged buyout 
transactions is based on the fact that wealth is transferred away from the employees to the 
investors by lay-offs or wage reductions. This 'employee wealth transfer' hypothesis 
suggests that the operating income improves at the expense of employees. However, 
according to Kaplan (1989), who tested this hypothesis in LMBO companies, the results are 
not consistent with the notion that large number of employees are laid off after a buyout. 
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1.6 'Information advantage' or 'asymmetric information' hypothesis 
The 'information advantage' or 'asymmetric information' hypothesis asserts that managers 
wish to obtain control of the firm, because they believe, based on superior information, that 
the firm is significantly undervalued by external investors. This hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that information is asymmetrical between managers and public shareholders. 
In a study by Kaplan in 1989, this hypothesis was tested on several indirect pieces of 
evidence. First he examined the 'informed' pre-buyout shareholders who sold their shares 
in the buyout companies and did not re-invest in the post-buyout company. Second, he 
compared the number of proposed buyouts to that of take-overs by external bidders. Third, 
pre-buyout financial projections were measured against the final post-buyout results. None 
of the results obtained supported the existence of either an undervalued company or a 
distinct information advantage of the managers. 
In the following, two of the most important hypotheses in the context of LMBO 
transactions will be presented: the 'agency cost' and 'debt bonding' hypotheses. These 
theories examine how governance changes in combination with leveraged financing affects 
the post-buyout performance of LMBO companies. 
1.7 'Agency cost' hypothesis 
Economists and scholars have long recognised the potential of conflict of interest between 
managerial incentives and stockholder interests in publicly traded companies. The 'agency 
cost' theory based on such conflicts has long been a major subject of economic literature. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) first researched these conflicts, analysing the control problems 
within a company. Going private transactions in the form of LX1BOs can alleviate conflicts 
by concentrating control and ownership in the management or providing an outside monitor 
resulting from the burden of debt. The following chapters will present the main aspects in 
Jensen's agency cost theory. 
1.7.1 Free cash-flow and the conflict between managers and owners 
Jensen (1989) suggests that going private transactions in the form of LMBOs mitigate a 
special type of agency problem in firms with low growth prospects and a substantial amount 
of free cash-flow. Low growth prospects suggests that the firm operates in quite a mature 
market and has few opportunities to reinvest cash-flow in the business. 
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With respect to agency costs, the free cash-flow problematic arises when there is excess 
cash-flow after funding all of the projects with a positive net present value when discounted 
at the relevant cost of capital. Jensen (1989) argues that this free cash-flow should be paid 
out to shareholders in order to maximise shareholder value. But the difficulty is to motivate 
managers to distribute excess cash-flow to shareholders rather than invest it in the projects 
with negative net present value. 
In 1988, Jensen writes further that the reluctance of managers to pay out dividends to 
shareholders is due to the fact that this distribution of cash would reduce the resources 
controlled by the managers, thereby reducing their power and potentially subjecting them to 
being monitored by capital markets as often occurs when a firm needs new capital. 
Furthermore, a growth in the company's assets increases management's power by 
increasing the resources under their control and the level of their compensation which is 
positively related to growth. 
In 1989 Lehn and Poulsen (1989) investigated the source of shareholder gains (the average 
value of the premium in the examined firms was 36.1 percent) in 263 going private 
transactions from 1980 until 1987, researching among other issues the free cash-flow 
hypothesis proposed by Jensen. 
According to Lehn and Poulsen (1989), the free cash-flow hypothesis suggests that the 
portion of a firm's assets in free cash-flow should relate directly to the likelihood of a firm 
going private, and at the same time keeping the firm's growth prospects constant. For each 
firm in both the going private sample and the control sample, Lehn and Poulsen calculated 
undistributed cash-flow for the year immediately preceding the buyout. They discovered 
significant differences in undistributed cash-flow and growth rate across the two samples 
which support Jensen's assertion that targets of going private transactions are characterised 
by significant undistributed cash-flow and relatively low growth rates. 
The results in Lehn and Poulsen's research confirm the free cash-flow hypothesis with 
respect to the source of shareholder wealth in going private transactions. By comparing 
firms that went private with a control sample, they found the likelihood of going private to 
be directly related to the growth rate in sales. Furthermore, they found premiums paid to 
shareholders in going private transactions to be positively and significantly related to 
undistributed cash-flow. 
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1.7.2 The role of debt in motivating organisational efficiency 
The second factor in Jensen's agency cost theory is the role of debt in encouraging 
organisational efficiency. In his study of 1986, Jensen states that debt creation effectively 
binds managers to their promise to distribute future cash-flows to the shareholders. By 
issuing debt instead of stock, the promise of a pay out of future cash-flow is more binding 
than a simple dividend increase. This gives debtors the right to take the firm into bankruptcy 
if they do not keep their promise to service their debt requirements. Thus, so Jensen argues, 
debt reduces the 'agency cost' of free cash-flow by reducing the cash-flow that can be spent 
at the discretion of management. 
In a study of 25 LM[BOs between 1971 and 1983 Bull (1988) found anecdotal evidence 
from managers/owners of LM[BOs for Jensen's theory on debt as a controlling device in 
leveraged buyout transactions. According to his interviews with LM[BO managers/owners, 
debt reduction was a dominant common goal. I-Egh debt service requirements eliminated the 
possibility of free cash-flow and therefore eliminated another possible cause of the agency 
cost of free cash-flow. 
In his study about the development of LBO companies between 1980 and 1987, Yago 
(1991) found evidence that LBO companies could improve return on equity after the 
buyout. In this study, evidence suggests that in most industries where debt and restructuring 
were intensive, the increase in productivity was considerable. Concerning the change in the 
sales volume of LBO companies, Yago (1991) provided evidence that for firms that had 
issued high yield securities in 1983, the average annual sales growth after issue (1983-1986) 
was almost twice the rate before (1980-1983). In his conclusion, Yago (1991) suggests that 
debt had a positive impact on corporate performance across a wide range of performance 
variables. 
Thompson, Wright and Robbie examine in their research of 1992 whether the high level of 
debt in LMBOs increases the incentive for management to improve performance. In their 
research of LMIBOs between 1984 and 1989, Thompson, Wright and Robbie (1992) 
examined among other issues the 'debt-bonding' hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) which suggests 
that the need to service debt obligations motivates management. In order to prove this 
hypothesis, the debt/equity ratio at the time of the deal was measured. 
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In the results of the study the debt/equity ratio was positive and significant in explaining 
excess returns to equity investors, and negative and generally insignificant in the excess 
return to total capital equations. This results were entirely consistent with the theory of the 
favourable impact of leverage on investor returns for successful companies, but it gave no 
support for the effect of incentive on performance proposed in the hypothesis. Therefore, 
the results could not confirm the 'debt-bonding' hypothesis that debt per se has a positive 
impact on the performance of leveraged management buyouts. 
1.7.3 Summary concerning the agency cost hypothesis 
According to Jensen, each company represents a network of agency relationships, in which 
principals as shareholders delegate certain management tasks to one or several agents. The 
conflicts resulting from this relationship - based on the potentially asymmetric information 
between agent and principal - can lead to suboptimal decisions and eventually a decrease in 
the company's value. To help resolve the agency cost problem and increase the firm's value, 
the LMBO concept relies on the following key components: 
Participation of management in the equity of the company, and 
I-Egher leverage on the company. 
First, through the participation of management in the equity of the company, ownership has 
been found to increase management's incentives to ensure that efficiency increases. As a 
result, the value of the company increases and consequently also the value of management's 
equity. 
Second, the high amount of debt required to complete LMBO deals reduces the agency cost 
of free cash-flow by binding managers to the use of available cash-flow in fulfilling the debt 
requirements and therefore reducing the cash-flow available for management to spend at 
their discretion. 
159 
M. An overview of Previous Empirical Research in the US concerning post 
buyout performance measure 
There have been a number of empirical studies of leveraged (management) buyouts and the 
increase in wealth which has made these transactions successful in recent years. In this 
study, not all of the research will be presented, rather only that which provides evidence 
about post-buyout performance in the area of financial performance, productivity and 
strategy. 
1. Research concerning stockholder premiums 
During the past years of L(M)BO activity in the US and the UK, an increasing number of 
leveraged management buyouts have taken place and shareholders have received substantial 
gains in the form of premiums on these transactions. The source of stockholder gains in 
American going private transactions were researched by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice 
(1984), Marais et al. (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and evidence suggests that 
shareholders receive a bid premium at least as high as in conventional tender offers. 
In 1984 De Angelo, De Angelo and Rice examined the effect of going-private proposals on 
public stockholder wealth of seventy-two firms over the period of 1973 to 1980. According 
to De Angelo, De Angelo and Rice in many going private transactions the current managers 
of the company had already the majority control of the public corporation and obtained the 
complete equity in the course of the going private transaction. The resulting managerial 
conflicts of interest based on management's position as agent for public shareholders and as 
purchasers of shares were assumed to result in an unfair treatment of public shareholders. 
The gain-sharing hypothesis proposed by De Angelo, De Angelo and Rice predicted 
positive wealth changes for public shareholders based on the assumption that ownership 
structure changes could generate productive gains. The results of the tests confirmed that 
the two days surrounding the initial proposal to go private, the wealth of public 
shareholders increased by an average of 22.27 percent. In contrast, stockholder wealth 
decreased an average of 8.88 percent at withdrawal of going private proposals. In their 
conclusion De Angelo, De Angelo and Rice state that the similarity of stockholder gains 
observed in going-private and interfirm or tender offer suggests that going-private 
transactions did not result in the exploitation of minority stockholders. 
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In 1986 Marais, Schipper and Smith investigated the effect of the going private buyouts of 
290 public corporations on the value of the existing senior securities. In the 68-day period 
preceding the appearance of the buyout announcement, common stock, convertible debt 
and convertible preferred stock experienced positive price reactions documented by returns 
averaging 9 percent, 3 percent and 12 percent. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) measured the average premium paid in going private transactions 
from 20 trading days immediately preceding the going private announcement to the final 
trading price of the firm's common equity. According to their results, the average value of 
premium for the 257 sample firms amounted to 36,1 percent. 
These results are further confirmed by the research of Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) who 
examined the shareholder wealth effects associated with asset sales to corporate insiders. 
IFEte and Vetsuypens found evidence that in the two-day period around the divisional 
buyout announcements, parent company shareholders experience statistically significant 
returns of 0,55 percent on average. According to the authors these results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that LMEBOs of divisions represent an efficient reallocation of corporate 
resources to higher valued uses and allow parent company shareholders to share in the 
potential benefit of this change in ownership. 
As proven in the previously described research, pre-buyout investors also profit from the 
substantial wealth gains associated with leveraged buyout transactions. LMBO hypotheses 
suggest that the primary source of these gains is the new value created through significant 
improvements in operating performance. The following section will present some of the 
most important research examining these improvements in US, UK and German LMBO 
companies. 
2. Research concerning operating performance improvements 
In 1987/1988 Bull compared management performance of 25 companies before and after 
leveraged buyouts. In his study, average performance for the two years before a leveraged 
buyout is compared to average performance for the two years after the buyout by means of 
seven accounting variables. Comparisons are made of pre- and post-buyout performance for 
the same entity as well as of company performance and industry performance. As a result of 
this research, Bull found evidence that financial performance after the buyout is superior to 
performance before the buyout. 
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The evidence in his research also confirms the assumption that management changes its 
focus from minin-fising the variability in the reported profits to maximising cash-flow. This 
conclusion is based on the changes in earnings/beginning equity and cash-flow/sales which 
illustrate the change in management focus. The increase in the average return on equity, 
according to Bull, is partly due to leverage and partly to better management. The sharp 
increase in the variability of earnings is considered as a result of leverage as well as 
opportunistic behaviour. 
Income tax savings are not suggested by Bull to be the driving force behind leveraged 
buyouts. The significance of the change in the ratios of ebit to beginning assets, sales to 
beginning assets and operating profit to sales provided strong evidence that improvement in 
efficiency and profitability are important reasons for leveraged buyouts because they are 
business related, not tax generated gains (Bull, 1988). According to Bull the reason for the 
improvement in performance could not identified with certainty, but based on the anecdotal 
evidence by the interviewed managers/owners, debt reduction provided a dominant goal, 
eliminating free cash-flow and therefore eliminating an agency cost problem. Furthermore, 
the entrepreneurial aspect seemed to provide an overall explanation. Entrepreneurs were 
alert to opportunities that would benefit them and acted to create wealth for the company 
and an improvement in their equity position. 
In 1988/89, Kaplan presented his research on the changes in operating results of 48 sample 
LMBOs of public companies completed between 1980 and 1986. FEs analysis focuses on 
the change in three cash-flow variables: operating income before depreciation, capital 
expenditure and net operating cash-flow. These variables were all measured before taxes to 
limit the analysis to changes based on managerial and operational decisions, not on taxes or 
financial decisions. Each cash-flow variable was measured in three different ways - as a 
fraction of total assets and as a fraction of annual sales. In the three years after the buyout, 
the 48 sample companies experienced an increase in operating income and net cash-flow 
and a reduction in capital expenditure. Operating income, measured net of industry changes, 
is essentially unchanged in the first two post-buyout years and 24 percent higher in the third 
year. Changes in the ratios of operating income to assets and to sales exceeded those of the 
industry average by approximately 20 percent in the first three buyout years (Kaplan, 1989). 
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Furthermore, Kaplan found evidence that the median net cash-flow in the first three post- 
buyout years was significantly larger than in the pre-buyout years. Similarly the LMBO 
company's increase in net cash-flow to assets and to sales exceed that of their industry by 
approximately 50 percent. The evidence presented, according to Kaplan, confirms the 
hypothesis that LMIBO companies experience post-buyout improvements and an increase in 
value, which seemed to be generated by improved incentive rather than transfer of wealth or 
management's superior information. 
In 1990, Smith reinforced Kaplan's findings in an examination of 58 LMEBOs between 1977 
and 1986. She defines operating cash-flow as profits before interest, taxes and depreciation 
plus changes in working capital. Her results show that the operating cash-flow per 
employee and the operating cash-flow per book value of assets increase on average after an 
LMIBO,, both in absolute terms and in relation to non-LM[BOs in the same industry. One 
source of improved cash-flow appears to be better management of working capital, 
however, Smith does not find any evidence that the post-buyout cash-flow improvements 
are based on cutbacks in areas like research and development or advertising. The 
improvements in operating cash-flow are correlated with the buyout induced changes in 
debt ratio and management ownership and are consistent with the view that these 
organisational changes play an important role in improving performance (Palepu, 1990). 
In 1990, Singh researched company performance in 55 LMBOs between 1980 and 1987. In 
Singh's study, operating performance is measured by operating income to sales and growth 
rate in sales. He also examined operating ratios such as numbers of days receivables and 
inventory sales to assess the nature of the firm's performance versus the industry standards 
of the same period. The evidence suggests that there are significant differences in the key 
operating indicators of firms which go private and their industry counterparts. Inventory 
management and accounts receivable are significantly more favourable in LMBO companies 
than the industry average. Improvements in operating indicators occur over a short period 
and suggest that managers make radical changes in the operations of the firm to achieve 
these goals. Furthermore Singh examined the increase in total revenues of the private firms 
when compared with the industry average (Singh, 1990). The evidence suggests that LMBO 
companies grow faster in revenues than the industry average, and that they operate more 
efficiently in terms of inventory management, accounts receivable and operating income. 
Singh's findings suggest an increase in performance after the LMBO, which may be 
attributable to the changed equity structure of the firm. 
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3. Research concerning productivity improvements 
In 1990, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) investigated the effects of leveraged buyouts 
between 1981 and 1986 on productivity and the related variables using an extensive 
database including over 12.000 manufacturing plants. The results of the analysis reveals that 
LBOs that occurred during 1983 and 1986 had a strong positive effect on total productivity 
in the first three post-buyout years. Plant productivity increased from 2 percent above the 
industry mean in the three pre-buyout years to 8,3 percent in the first three post-buyout 
years. The LBOs that occurred in 1981 and 1982 did not have a significant effect on 
productivity in any post-buyout year. According to Lichtenberg and Siegel, the analysis 
reveals that productivity is significantly higher in the first three years after the buyout than it 
was before the buyout, but they emphasise that they cannot prove that the LBO was the 
cause of the improvement. However, the fact that the productivity increase is accompanied 
by other changes like the reduction in the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar worker, which 
might have been caused by the LBO, raises doubt about the assumption that productivity 
would have increased without an LBO. 
4. Research concerning changes in strategy and performance 
In 1995, Phan and 1-1ill published a study on the effects of leveraged buyouts on goals, 
strategy, structure and performance. In their research, they used a survey to collect data on 
a sample of 214 firms that underwent buyouts between 1986 and 1989. In the summary and 
conclusion of their results,, Phan and Flill revealed in the first place that in addition to the 
increase in debt,, LBOs are associated with an increase in management holdings. Second, the 
changes in governance that occurs with an LBO does affect the goals, strategy and structure 
of a company. Efficiency receives more and growth less emphasis. Diversified scope and 
hierarchical complexity diminish and decentralisation increases. Third, these changes in 
goals, strategy and structure provide for greater efficiency as demonstrated by the increase 
in productivity and profitability. Fourth, management holdings seem to have a greater 
impact on the goals, strategy and structure than is the case with debt. On the basis of these 
results the authors could not reject either the 'free cash-flow' or the 'agency cost' theory 
that leveraged buyouts lead to an increase in enterprise efficiency. 
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IV. An overview of previous empirical research concerning post-buyout 
performance of LMBO companies in the UK 
Systematic evidence concerning performance changes of LMBO companies outside the US 
was and still is very limited in scale and scope. Since 1986 most of the research concerning 
the development of the UK LMBO market was carried out by the Centre for Management 
Buyout Research (CMBOR). In the following section only those surveys will be presented 
which evaluated the post-buyout performance of LMBOs in the UK up to date. 
I. Research on the short term performance changes 
In this first study about the development of UK LMBOs in 1985,, Wright and Coyne 
examined LM[BOs from their beginning in the 1970s until 1983. The results of Wright and 
Coyne's research were obtained through responses to questionnaires sent to LMBO 
companies which underwent LMBO transactions during this time and focused mainly on the 
profitability and liquidity after the buyout. The evidence of the research revealed that profit 
and sales performance of the LM1130s two years after the buyout displayed either substantial 
or slight growth for half of the companies, while fluctuating growth occurred in twenty-five 
to thirty percent. Up to 25 percent of the examined sample showed a decline in growth and 
a negligible percentage of companies showed no change after the buyout. Evidence suggests 
further that the performance in sales is better than in profits for the sample companies, as a 
result of reduced profit margins. For the LMBOs less than two years old, performance 
results were more varied. Fifty percent of these companies performed better than expected, 
and a substantial portion, 38 percent, performed worse than expected. In these companies 
performance in sales is also better than in profits, indicating again reduced profit margins. 
Concerning the factors affecting the changes in wealth, Wright and Coyne (1985) note that 
some factors have a beneficial effect on profits, while others have the reverse effect. Among 
the most influential factors, industrial and market factors are cited as helpful in improving 
profits in 20 percent of the cases, but also contributed to a decline in profits in 13 percent of 
the companies. Furthermore, the evidence suggested that LMBO managers were able to 
control overhead costs and increase productivity, whereas there is also support for the 
assumption that profit margins were squeezed. 
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When the cash-flow and liquidity situation of the sample companies were researched Wright 
and Coyne (1985) found that 46.9 percent of the sample companies did not experience 
cash-flow problems. The 53.1 percent of the companies which experienced cash-flow 
problems were split between 21.6 percent who had cash-flow problems before the buyout, 
13.5 percent who had cash-flow problems only after the buyout and 18 percent who had 
liquidity problems before and after the buyout. With respect to post-buyout cash-flow 
problems, Wright and Coyne (1985) found evidence that the principal cause of post-buyout 
liquidity problems was not achieving the expected profit margins. The other important cause 
was debtor-related, based firstly on debtors using their market power to delay payment and 
secondly on the inefficient debtor control systems by the LMBO companies. In their 
conclusion, Wright and Coyne point out that at the period of the study (1985) it was still 
too early to make a firm conclusion about the performance of LMBOs. The evidence 
presenting the success range of LM[BOs went from highly successful to barely surviving. 
The authors also pointed out that the economic recession put a strong constraint on the 
improvement in performance of LMIBO companies, but that also the burden caused by the 
financial debt might not have been helpful in this respect. 
In 1989, Thompson, Wright and Robbie continued the research of Wright and Coyne and 
presented the results of post-buyout performance of LMBO from 1983 to 1985. Concerning 
sales figures, the majority of the sample companies were not only better than before the 
buyout (37 percent were substantially better and 24 percent were slightly better) but they 
also exceeded the business projections presented before the buyout (26 percent were 
substantially better and 20 percent were slightly better). In terms of operating profit, the 
majority of the sample LMBO companies performed better than before the buyout (56 
percent substantially better and 13 percent slightly better) and also exceeded the projections 
presented to finance institutions to secure the financing (39 percent performed substantially 
better and 13 percent performed slightly better). In their conclusion, Thompson, Wright and 
Robbie (1989) confirmed the assumption that the success of LMBOs can be attributed to 
the concept of uniting ownership with control. They conclude further that the effects of 
managerial equity ownership were reinforced by the use of debt in the capital structure of 
the newly bought firm increasing the positive impact on the post-buyout performance of the 
company. 
166 
In their study of UK LMBOs in 1990 (which was continued in 1992), Wright, Thompson 
and Robbie examined 31 UK LMBOs between 1982 and 1987 that were later floated on the 
stock market between 1984 and 1989. Their findings gave strong support to the view that 
ownership incentives are crucial in explaining the performance improvements in LM[BOs. As 
an example, they found out that a 10 percent increase in management equity ownership 
would increase the excess return to total capital by approximately 25 percent. This evidence 
is further confirmed by the fact that the increase in value of the LMBO companies between 
LMIBO and flotation was directly related to management's percentage of equity ownership. 
It was also recognised that the divisional managers' inside information could affect the 
extent of their participation in the LMBO i. e. the better the potential of the company is 
perceived by management, the more the management team commit themselves. 
In 1997 Kevin Amess researched the effects of UK management buyouts on firm-level 
performance examining 99 management buyout companies from 1984 to 1994. The 
evidence found suggested that there were two types of buyout firms: Firstly, there were 
firms where buyouts acted as "shock-therapy" and many changes that took place had a one 
time effect inducing one-time improvements of value-added of up to 9 percent. Secondly, 
there were firms where buyouts caused large negative shift effects in value - however there 
were improvements in labour productivity of 17 percent and capital productivity of 3 
percent. For these firms a buyout did not have short term effects but created a superior 
organisational structure as there were fundamental changes in the technical relationship 
between labour and capital as a result of managers adopting new working practices that 
have a longer term effect on productivity. 
Completing the evidence found concerning the short term (up to three years) performance 
of LMBOs s in the UK, the following studies were undertaken focusing on the longer term 
(up to five years) post-buyout performance of LMBOs. 
2.2 Research on the long-term performance changes 
The study of the Warwick Business School of 1989 examined the longer term performance 
(from four years up to seven years) of UK LMBOs across a range of industrial sectors. 
With respect to sales volume, the results found that an increasing portion of companies 
experienced improved sales volume in the fourth to seventh years after the buyout - 
both 
when compared to the previous financial performance of the company itself and the average 
growth in industry sales. Conversely, the proportion of companies showing improvements 
in 
profitability fell over the long term. 
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According to the authors, this development can be explained by the fact that in the short 
term perspective, the majority of management teams appear to concentrate on improving 
the profitability of the business by adopting cost-reduction measuresY whereas in the longer 
term perspective further cost cutting measures have an increasingly marginal effect on the 
profit and in order to enlarge profits, high growth businesses look to increase their sales 
volume. On the basis of their results, the authors conclude that the overall longer term 
performance of the sample LMBO companies is worse than their short term performance 
and worse than the industry sector in which they are active, since the majority of companies 
fail to improve their ROCE ratio between the fourth and the seventh year after the buyout. 
Moreover, the proportion of companies showing improvement in the profit margin between 
the fourth and sixth year is little different from the industry average and in the seventh year 
is considerably worse. This findings reversed the results obtained for the LMBO company 
performance in the short to medium term suggesting that the LMBO is an effective 
motivational instrument for the short to medium term but not for the longer term 
A paper of Wright, Wilson and Robbie (1997) researched also the longer term effects of 
management buyouts on 158 buyout companies completed between 1983 and 1985. Here 
post buyout performance was examined for up to six years after the transaction. In the early 
years of the buyout the authors identified no significant differences in the return on total 
assets ratio. Here the assumption was confirmed that although actions were undertaken in 
order to lead to improved performance after the buyout it may take some time before this 
would exceed the average performance for the sector. In the years 3 to 5 years after the 
buyout evidence was found that buyouts on average performed better than comparable 
companies in the same industry both in the return on total assets and profit to employee 
ratios. In the sixth year after the buyout the difference of performance of buyout to non- 
buyout companies became significant. 
Fewer significant differences were apparent in respect of short term liquidity ratios. Buyout 
and non buyout companies displayed acceptable liquidity levels and there were suggestions 
that buyout companies in their first two buyout years had lower liquidity ratios than non 
buyout companies, however from year 5 on buyout companies exceeded non buyout 
companies with respect of liquidity levels. The authors assumed that this pattern was 
consistent with the impact of tighter working capital control systems. 
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V. An overview of previous empirical research concerning post buyout 
performance of LMBO companies in Germany 
The research on the post-buyout performance of German LM[BO companies and therefore 
the availability of data is very limited due to the fact that a significant number of deals in 
Germany are shrouded in secrecy. However, on the basis of available data and empirical 
research of LMBO participants with sufficient data about the transactions they participated 
in, the following research has been completed on the short term post-buyout performance of 
LMBO companies in Germany. 
In 1992, Martin Forst (1992) examined small to medium sized companies which were target 
of LMBOALMBI transactions until 1991. Forst distinguishes here between LN11BO/LNIBIs 
from family-owned companies and from divestment of national and international groups. He 
found the sales development of the LN11BO companies researched to be as follows: 
LMBOs from family-owned companies: 
* 54.2 percent of the sample companies exceeded 5 percent annual sales growth 
* 50 percent of the sample companies exceeded 5 percent return on sales growth 
LMBOs from spin-offs: 
57.1 percent of the sample companies exceeded 5 percent sales growth 
64.3 percent of the sample companies exceeded 5 percent return on sales growth 
To sum up the evidence found by Forst's research, despite the differences in the motives, 
the company structure and equity structure of family-owned and spin-off companies, the 
average post-buyout development of LMBO companies from these two different sources is 
relatively similar. 
The study of Matthias Graper from 1993 researches 36 LN1BOs from 1986 until 1989. 
Graper examined sales volume and profit before taxes of the LNIBO sample companies 3 
years after the buyout in comparison to their pre-buyout performance. He also 
distinguishes 
between family-owned and divestment LN11BOs in his examination of post-buyout 
performance. In family-owned LMBOs, the pre-buyout years sales growth averaged 
9.7 
percent, while average sales growth for the three post-buyout years reached 19.6 percent. 
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Compared to the sales growth of companies operating in the same industry, evidence 
suggests that the sales growth of LM[BOs increased disproportionately to that in the 
respective industry. In the pre-buyout years, the average growth rate of profit before sales 
reached 10.2 percent, while average post-buyout growth rates for three consecutive years 
reached 31.5 percent. In divestment LMBOs,, the pre-buyout years' sales growth averaged 
4.7 percent, while average sales growth for the three post-buyout years reached 8.75 
percent. Profit before sales in the pre-buyout years grew 12.8 percent compared to the 
average post-buyout growth rate of 35.5 percent. Based on the empirical evidence, Grdper 
concludes that LMEBOs are to be regarded as positive for the further development of the 
company and that the LMEBO structure leads to a more efficient use of the existing assets of 
the company. 
In 1994, Vest researched LMBOs from divestment of national and international groups in 
Germany until 1991. With respect to the performance measure of these companies after the 
buyout, Vest examined post-buyout sales growth and liquidity development of LMBOs 
resulting from going concerns (15 cases) and turnarounds (I I cases). The evidence showed 
an average post-buyout sales growth of 59.6 percent for going concern LMBOs, and an 
average post-buyout sales growth of LMBOs resulting from turnarounds of 20.4 percent. 
According to Vest's research, the main effects on post-buyout sales came from 
restructuring measures implemented by the management and resulting, among other things, 
in a reduction of the existing work force. With respect to the development of the liquidity 
situation of the sample companies, LMBOs from going concerns and turnarounds 
experienced a significant increase of cash-flow in the first year and only slight increases in 
the following years. 
LMBOs resulting from going concerns revealed a significant increase in the operating cash- 
flow in the first year after the buyout due to extraordinary depreciation following the 
transaction. The increase in cash-flow resulting from an increase in sales performance was 
insignificant due to an equally high increase in expenses. LMBOs resulting from 
turnarounds experienced significant increases in operating cash-flow in the first year after 
the buyout due to cost reductions especially in the area of salaries and wages. 
In the context of the comparison of LMBO activity in the LTK and German the following 
section will present a comparison of the results on short-term post-buyout performance in 
the UK and Germany. 
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VI. Comparison of short-term post-buyout performance of UK and German 
LMBO companies 
The results on post-buyout performance of UK LMBOs presented in section IV of this part 
revealed that over 50 percent of the sample LMBO companies experienced significant 
improvements in profitability in terms of sales volume and pre-tax profit after the buyout. 
According to research of Wright and Coyne (1985), the most notable items with beneficial 
effect on profitability were industrial market factors which helped to improve results in 20 
percent of the cases, but which had the reverse effect in 13.5 percent of the cases. The 
ability of LMBO managers to control overhead costs and increase productivity was very 
apparent in the research; there was also support that profit margins were squeezed in a 
number of cases. 
The results of the research of German LMIBOs presented in section V also provided 
evidence that a majority of the sample LMIBO companies showed significant improvements 
in profitability in terms of sales volume and pre-tax profits after the buyout. In order to 
improve profitability, restructuring and reorganisation measures were implemented by the 
new managers/owners. Forst (1992) found evidence that especially in LMBOs resulting 
from divestment the respective managers/owners were highly motivated and introduced new 
measures to increase the return on sales ratio of the respective companies. 
The research on the development of liquidity of UK LMBOs by Wright and Coyne in 1985 
revealed that of the LMBO companies experiencing liquidity problems only 13.5 percent 
had problems after the buyout, whereas 46.9 percent showed no cash problems after the 
buyout. Research on post-buyout development with respect to liquidity in German LMBO 
companies provided evidence that all the companies examined experienced a significant 
increase in liquidity in the first year after the buyout due to the extraordinary effects of the 
LNMO structure. In the following years, the liquidity improved less significantly than 
before. 
Summarising the evidence found by UK and German research, it is evident that the majority 
of LJK and German LMIBO companies experience a significant increase in profitability after 
the buyout. The most notable items with beneficial effect on the post-buyout profitability 
were the restructuring and reorganisation measures of the highly motivated 
management/owners as well as the ability to control overhead costs after the buyout. The 
majority of LJK and German LMBO companies were also found to have increased their 
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VH. Summary concerning the existing evidence about post-buyout performance of 
LMBO companies 
All the evidence found, especially by US, UK and German researchers, with respect to the 
impact of L(M)BO transactions on post-buyout value and performance seem to point to the 
following two factors to explain the improvement in efficiency and profitability after the 
LM[BO transaction. First, the reduction in income taxes outlined in the tax hypothesis of 
Lowenstein in 1985. In certain LMBO take-over models, depreciation and asset bases may 
increase and interest deductions may increase. In this context Lowenstein points out that 
one should not confuse the large financial gains (to shareholders) with real gains. To a large 
extent, they were tax generated. However, Schipper and Smith (1986) argue that 
considerable variability in the premiums paid to shareholders in leveraged buyouts cannot be 
explained by tax savings alone. 
Another source of improved operating results are the reduced agency costs associated with 
conflicts between managers and shareholders over the availability of free cash-flow. Free 
cash-flow should be paid out to shareholders to maximise shareholder valueP but managers 
prefer to retain control. Their participation in the equity of the target company increases 
management's efforts to invest in positive net present value projects or to pay out dividends 
to shareholders instead on wasting it on the inefficiency in the organisation. Therefore, the 
'free cash-flow' hypothesis predicts improvements in performance following a leveraged 
management buyout due to management's stake in the target company and a reinforced 
incentive to increase company value. 
Another factor in Jensen's 'agency cost' theory is the role of debt in encouraging 
organisational efficiency. In his research of 1986, Jensen states that the debt creation 
effectively binds managers to their promise to pay out future cash-flows. By issuing debt 
instead of stock. ) management's promise of a pay out of 
future cash-flow is more binding 
than a simple dividend increase. This gives debtors the right to take the firm into bankruptcy 
if they do not maintain their promise to service their debt obligations. Thus, the agency cost 
of free cash-flow is alleviated by reducing the cash-flow available for managers to spend. 
The 'debt bonding' theory predicts improvements in performance following a leveraged 
management buyout because of the control that debt exercises over agency costs. 
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Due to the above findings of researchers in the US,, UK and Germany, it follows that the 
(agency cost' theory (free cash-flow and debt bonding) is of significant importance with 
respect to improvements in performance of management induced leveraged buyouts. The 
following section will present the results of the empirical study concerning post-buyout 
performance of German LMBO companies under difficult economic conditions and will 
evaluate agency cost theory in light of the specific business environment in Germany. 
VM. Examination of post-buyout performance of German LMBO companies 
under difficult economic conditions from 1991-1994 
In Germany, small- to medium-sized companies with sales of up to DM I 00m and a staff of 
up to 500 employees form the important 'Nfittelstand' which represents the majority of all 
German companies. In these 'Mittelstand' companies, the owners are still at the centre of all 
corporate activities. Therefore, they are very reluctant to delegate managerial decisions to 
managers in the second ranks and prefer to lead their company in a rather authoritarian way. 
If the owners are then forced to delegate some of their management tasks to managers due 
to expansion of the company, a conflict of interest emerges between the owners and the 
management as their agents. Therefore, in companies whose hierarchical structures still 
require the strict separation of ownership and management, a classic case of principal vs. 
agent conflict can arise resulting in increased agency costs. After management takes over 
the company, this conflict is resolved by uniting management and ownership in the new 
owner/managers and providing them with increased motivation (M &A Review, 1996). The 
advantage of eliminating principal/agent conflicts also plays an important role when a 
subsidiary is divested from a national or international group as an LMBO. Unprofitable 
subsidiaries are very often the result of inefficient group regulations preventing the 
subsidiary's management from reacting quickly to the demands of the market. With regard 
to investment decisions, owners and managers will always be confronted with different 
opinions based on their conflicting interests. 
The following research will examine the effect of the elimination of principal/agent conflicts 
combined with the impact of debt in leveraged management buyouts on the performance of 
LNI[BO companies in a sound economic environment and whether these effects hold true in 
times of economic recession (from 1991 onwards). 
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Research 
I. Steps of the Research 
The following research has been divided as follows: Chapter 2 presents the reasons and 
goals of the research. Chapter 3 describes the research design including the tests employed 
to measure changes in performance, the variables used to compare performance and the 
statistical framework establishing that the findings are reasonable. Chapter 4 describes the 
results of the study, offers overall conclusions and gives recommendations for further 
research. 
2. Reason and goal of the research 
Empirical evidence outside the US and the UK about the intent and nature of LMBO 
transactions and especially about the performance of LMBO companies is limited in scale 
and scope. This is especially true for the transactions in Continental Europe. The following 
research analyses LMBO company performance in Germany, focusing on the post-buyout 
performance of LMBO companies under the difficult economic conditions between 1991 
and 1994. 
According to Palepu (1990), much of the public debate about leveraged finance transactions 
comes from the fear that the high level of leverage reduces the firm's ability to survive and 
compete in difficult economic situations. Palepu (1990) describes further the argument that 
the potential financial distress created by leveraged transactions could lead to lay-offs and a 
reduction of the going concern value of the firm. Although there is evidence on significant 
improvements in performance following a leveraged management buyout, this evidence is 
not sufficient to judge LMBO performance in economic downturns. Therefore, in order to 
fully understand effect of LMBOs on performance, the research here on recessionary 
LMIBOs seeks to complete the existing evidence. 
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3. Data and research Design 
3.1 Tests concerning the post buyout performance of LMBO companies in Germany 
under difficult economic conditions 
This study compares the average performance of 30 LMBO companies from one year 
before the buyout and two years after the buyout. The year of buyout serves as a point of 
reference for the pre- and post-buyout performance. 
The first set of tests measures the difference in the operating variables in the first two years 
after the buyout (years +1, +2) compared to the last year before the buyout (year -1). 
Adjustments to the accounting data used to calculate the performance variables are 
necessary due to the fact that new values are assigned to assets when the purchase price is 
allocated among the transferred assets. Comparability is achieved by adjusting post-buyout 
amortisation policies to conform to those used in the pre-buyout period. 
The second set of tests examines the significance of changes in post-buyout performance 
compared to the changes in the respective industry in order to detern-fine whether LMBO 
companies outperform their industry rivals. 
3.2 The LMBO data base 
The financial information needed for a study of LMBO performance is not publicly 
available, therefore the financial data was obtained form various institutional investors with 
the assurance that the sample companies would not able to be identified in the published 
descriptions or findings. The various institutions offered a sample of 30 companies that 
were involved in LMIBOs between 1990 and 1994. In addition to data provided by 
institutional investors, questionnaires were sent out to 100 companies that underwent 
LMBOs transactions in the period under examination. In accordance with the German 
tendency to secrecy in such issues, many LMIBO companies refused to give out unpublished 
financial data and response to the questionnaire was therefore poor. 
3.3 Industrial distribution of sample LMBOs 
Tables I and 2 show that the sectors represented tend to be mature and not involved in high 
tech industry. Such industries are less likely to have strong growth prospects but tend to 
generate high and stable cash-flow. As described by Jensen (1986), these industries are 
expected to have strong agency cost problems because of the prevalence free cash-flow. 
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3.4 Performance measure/variables 
The objective of this study is to measure the influence of the LXMO structure on the 
financial performance of German LMBO companies with respect to pre- and post-buyout 
performance as well as to compare post-buyout performance to the corresponding industry 
performance. The period under examination falls between 1991 and 1994. Here, the analysis 
focuses on the following variables: 
Net Sales 
Net sales is an important indicator of overall volume growth and competitive 
performance. 
9 Operating income 
Operating income is the key operational performance indicator of a corporation. 
Operating income (before extraordinary depreciation) equals net sales less cost of goods 
sold and selling, general and administrative expenses after depreciation, and amortisation. 
Operating cash-flow 
Operating cash-flow is the key indicator for the corporation's ability to generate cash. 
Operating cash-flow equals operating income before depreciation. Operating cash-flow 
measures the cash generated by the company before interest and taxes. 
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All variables are measured before taxes, extraordinary depreciation and interest expenses 
due to the fact that specific LMBO take-over models have a large effect on taxes , interests 
and depreciation. Managerial operating decisions, not taxes or financial decisions, affect the 
variables measured in this research. 
3.5 Hypotheses 
This research will present the following hypotheses on the post-buyout development of 
firms undergoing leveraged management buyout transactions in difficult economic 
situations. Jensen's 'agency cost' and 'debt bonding' hypotheses described in chapter 2.7 
suggests an improvement in operating results in the post-buyout years as well as better 
performance in the post-buyout years compared to the industry average. 
The hypotheses that there is no difference between the average values for the two members 
of the pair in the population are as follows: 
HI: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
sales after the buyout as before the buyout. 
or 
Sales before (year -1) = Sales after (year +1) 
Sales before (year -1) = Sales after (year +2) 
Sales before (year -1) = Average sales after (year +1 +2/2) 
H2: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same level of sales 
growth rates as their respective industry rivals. 
or 
Average sales growth rate after (+1+2/2) = Industry average sales growth rate 
H3 -. Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating income after the buyout as before the buyout. 
or 
Operating income before (year - 1) = Operating income after (year + 1) 
Operating income before (year -1) = Operating income after (year +2) 
Operating income before (year -1) = Average operating income after (year +1+2/2) 
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H4: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating income growth after the buyout as their industry rivals. 
or 
Average op. income after (+1+2/2) = Industry average op. income growth rate 
H5 Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating cash-flow after the buyout as before the buyout. 
or 
Op. cash-flow before (year - 1) = Op. Cash-flow after (year + 1) 
Op. cash-flow before (year -1) = Op. cash-flow after (year +2) 
Op. cash-flow before (year - 1) = Average op. cash-flow after (year + 1+2/2) 
H6: Firms undergoing leveraged management buyouts will have the same levels of 
operating cash-flow growth after the buyout as their industry rivals. 
or 
Average op. CF growth rate after (+1+2/2) = Average op. CF growth rate industry 
3.6 Statistical framework 
In order to test the hypotheses about the performance changes of leveraged management 
buyouts it is necessary to choose an appropriate statistical framework. Statistical testing for 
this part of the analysis is used to reject or accept the null hypothesis that the post-buyout 
value of a particular operational indicator, such as sales turnover, operating income and 
operating cash-flow in comparison to pre-buyout values and industry adjusted values is 
significantly different from zero. The statistical tests for this segment of the paper are 
univariate paired t-tests and the one-way anova test. 
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Empirical results and interpretations 
4.1 Results 
4.1.1 Performance of the mean operating variables 
The following table presents the development in sales performance for the 30 sample 
LMBO companies one year prior to and two years after the buyout. In the pre-buyout year 
(-I), the average sales performance declined to 96.7 percent whereas post-buyout sales 
performance reached 107.5 percent for the first year and 113.3 percent for the second year 
after the buyout. The average post-buyout sales growth was 110.4 percent. Operating 
income was at 91.0 percent the year prior to the buyout (4), at 85.1 percent the first year 
after the buyout (+I) and in creased to 101.9 percent the second post-buyout year. The 
average post-buyout operating income level was 93.5 percent. The mean operating cash- 
flow performance one year before the buyout (4) reached 93.3 percent compared to the 
first and second buyout years (+1, +2) with operating cash-flow levels of 104.5 percent and 
133.5 percent respectively. The average post-buyout operating cash-flow level reached 119 
percent. 
Table 30: Development of 1)re- to t)ost-buvout Derformance 
Year -1 0 +1 +2 Average 
(in percent) 
Sales 96.7 100 107.5 113.3 110.4 
Operating income 91.9 100 85.1 101.9 93.5 
Operating cash-flow 93.3 100 104.5 133.5 119.0 
Table 30 shows that sales performance in the post-buyout years +1 and +2 with respect to 
buyout year 0 increased by 7.5 percent and 13.3 percent, whereas pre-buyout sales 
performance declined by 3.3 percent. The average post-buyout sales performance increased 
by 10.4 percent . 
Operating income shows a decline in the last pre-buyout year (4) of - 8.1 
percent as well as in the first post-buyout year (+I) of -14.9 percent. In the second post- 
buyout year, operating income increased by 1.9 percent. The average operating income for 
the two post-buyout years declined by - 6.5 percent. Operating cash-flow one year before 
the buyout (-1) declined by - 6.7 percent. In the two years after the buyout (+1. +2), growth 
rates ranged from + 4.5 percent in the first year and +33.5 percent in the second year. The 
average post-buyout growth rate was 19.0 percent. 
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Table 3 1: Development of performance gro 
Year -1 to 01 too 
rates in the pre- and post-buyout yc 
2 to 0 -1/average 1+2 
(in percent) 
Sales -3.3 7.5 13.3 10.4 
Operating income -8.1 -14.9 
Operating cash-flow -6.7 -4.5 
-6.5 
+33.5 +19.0 
Table 32 presents one series of the univariate paired two-tail t-tests used to determine the 
significance of change in the variables sales, operating income and operating cash-flow 
before and after the buyout. Statistical testing for this part of the analysis is to reject or 
accept the null hypothesis that the post-buyout performance equals the pre-buyout 
performance. 
Sales one year before the buyout (-I) and one year after the buyout (+I) show a significant 
difference with a probability of p=0.030 and a highly significant difference to the second 
year after the buyout (+2) with a probability of p=0.0 11. The difference in sales from one 
year before (-I) to the average of the two years after the buyout is highly significant with a 
probability of = 0.014. 
The difference in operating income between the last year before the buyout (-1) and the first 
year after the buyout (+I) as well as between the last year before the buyout (-I) and the 
second year after the buyout is insignificant at probability levels of p=0.581 and p=0.359, 
respectively. The difference of operating income between the year before the buyout (-I) 
and the average post-buyout years (+1+2/2) is highly insignificant at a probability level of p 
= 0.858. 
The difference of operating cash-flow in the pre-buyout year -I and the post-buyout year +1 
and +2 is insignificant at probability levels of p=0.597 and 0.110, respectively. The 
difference between pre-buyout year -1 and the average post-buyout years +1+2/2 is 
insignificant at a probability level of p=0.247. 
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Table 32: Paired samples t-test: Comparison of the pre and post-buyout mean results of the 
30 sample companies 
Variable t-value 2-tail probability 
Sales I (pair= -1/1) 2.282 0.030 
Sales 2 (pair = -1/2) 2.726 0.011 
Sales 3 (pair = -1/average) 2.605 0.014 
Operating income (pair = -1/1) -0.559 0.581 
Operating income (pair =- 1/2) 0.931 0.359 
Operating income (pair = -1/+1+2/2) 0.181 0.858 
Operating cash-flow 1(-1/1) 0.534 0.597 
Operating cash-flow 2 (-1/2) 1.649 0.110 
Operating cash-flow 3 (-1/+1+2 average) 1.182 0.247 
Table 33 presents the average post-buyout sales growth rate of the LNMO sample at 10.4 
percent in comparison to the average decline in sales of the respective industries amounting 
to - 0.056 percent. The average post-buyout operating income of the LMBO sample 
declined by -6.5 percent in comparison to the average decline in operating income for the 
respective industries at - 0.0610 percent. The average post-buyout operating cash-flow 
growth rate of the LMBO sample is 19.0 percent compared to the average decline in 
operating cash-flow of the respective industry at -0.320 percent . 
Table 33-. Comarison of averan vost-buvout arowth rates to the industrv a 
Average post LMBO sales growth +10.4% 
Average industry sales growth -0.056% 
Average post LMIBO op. income growth rate -6.500% 
Average op. income industry growth rate -0.610% 
Average post LMIBO operating cash-flow growth rate +19.00% 
Average industry operating cash-flow growth rate -0.320% 
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Table 34 presents the result of the one sample t-test with respect to post-buyout sales, 
operating income and operating cash-flow growth rates and the average industry growth 
rates. The results show that the difference between LMIBO sales growth rate and the 
industry sales growth rate is significant at a probability level of p=0.029. The difference 
between LMBO income growth rate and the industry average income growth rate is highly 
insignificant at a probability level of p=0.663. It also shows the result with respect to 
LMBO operating cash-flow growth and the industry average. The difference here is 
insignificant at a probability level of p=0.316. 
Table 34 : One sample t-test: Average post-buyout sales growth rate to the industry average 
(Mean) t-value 2-tail probability 
LM[BO sales growth / Industry average 2.317 0.029 
LMBO op. income growth / Ind. average -0.441 0.663 
LMBO op. cash-flow growth / Ind. average 1.020 0.316 
4.1.2 One-way anova analysis of variance 
One-way anova tests are used to determine significance. Tests using the three variables 
sales, operating income and operating cash-flow as shown in table reflect the major findings 
of the study obtained by the t-test. The changes in performance are significant here as well 
for the sales variable at a probability level of 0.0 11. Furthermore, the findings on operating 
income in pre- to post-buyout years was confirmed insignificant at a probability level of 
0.918. The changes of operating cash-flow in the pre- to post-buyout years are insignificant 
at a probability level of 0.993. 
Table 35: Results of one-way analysis of variance - significance of changes of pre- to post 
buyout performance of 30 leveraged buyout companies 
Variables F Significance 
Sales 6.986 0.011 
Operating income 0.468 0.918 
Operating cash-flow 0.119 0.993 
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Based on the test results described above, the following hypotheses can be rejected or not 
rejected: 
HI: Sales before (year -1) Sales after (year +1) rejected 
Sales before (year -1) Sales after (year +2) rejected 
Sales before (year -1) Average sales after (year +1+2/2) rejected 
H2: Average Sales growth-rate after (+1+2/2) = Average growth-rate industry rejected 
H3: Operating income before (year -1) Operating income after (+I) not rejected 
Operating income before (year -1) Operating income after (+2) not rejected 
Operating income before (year -1) Av. operating income after not rejected 
H4 : Av. LMBO op. income growth-rate after = Av. 0p. income industry not rejected 
H5: Operating CF before (year - 1) Operating CF after (+ 1) not rejected 
Operating CF before (year -1) Operating CF after (+2) not rejected 
Operating CF before (year -1) Av. operating CF after not rejected 
H6: Av. LMBO op. CF growth-rate after = Av. 0p. CF industry not rejected 
4.2 Interpretation of the results 
4.2.1 Sales 
4.2.1.1 Results of the LMBO sample companies 
Taking the average sales performance of LMBO companies under examination, sales and 
sales growth are considerably higher in the post-buyout years +1 and +2 and in the average 
post-buyout years +1+2/2 than in the pre-buyout year -1. In comparison to the industry 
average sales growth, the average post-buyout sales growth of the LMBO sample 
companies exceed that of their respective industry rivals considerably. On the assumption 
that LMIBO businesses seek to grow in volume, sales improvement indicates financial 
success on first sight. 
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4.2.2.2 Statistical results 
Results of the t-tests in chapter 4.1 show a significant increase in sales volume and sales 
growth for the post-buyout years +1 and +2 and for the average post-buyout years +1+2/2 
over the pre-buyout year -1. Sales increase in the sample companies and are higher than 
other companies in the same industries. The reasons for this difference appear to be the 
result of all the hypothetical factors in the 'agency cost' and 'debt bonding' theories for 
improvement in performance. 
4.2.2 Operating income 
4.2.2.1 Results of the LMBO sample companies 
Examining the average operating income performance of LMIBO companies, operating 
income and operating income growth in the first buyout year +1 is considerably below those 
of the pre-buyout year -1. In the second post-buyout year operating income and operating 
income growth slightly exceed those of the pre-buyout year. However, the average post- 
buyout operating income performance remains below that of the pre-buyout year -1. In 
comparison to the industry average operating income growth, the LMBO average post- 
buyout operating income growth is below that of the respective industry average. The 
reason for this result might be due to atypical accounting measures like increased provision 
for lay-offs, settlements or restructuring which have to be implemented in the first years 
after the buyout combined with the fact that improved volume was achieved on the basis of 
declining operating margins. 
4.2.2.2 Statistical results 
The results of the t-tests in chapter 4.2 indicate that there is no significant difference 
between operating income and operating income growth for the post-buyout years +1, +2 
and the average of the post-buyout years +1+2/2 over the pre-buyout year -1. Therefore, 
the hypothesis that LMBOs result in a better operating income after the buyout can not be 
sustained. With regard to the comparison of post-buyout performance to average industry 
performance, the hypothesis that LXMOs outperform their respective industry rivals can 
also not be sustained. 
4.2.3 Operating cash-flow 
4.2.3.1 Results of the LMBO sample companies 
The results for operating cash-flow suggest that the leveraged management buyout 
companies generate higher operating cash-flows after the buyout and that they generate 
higher operating cash-flows than their respective industry rivals. 
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Operating cash-flow and operating cash-flow growth in the sample 30 LMBO companies in 
the first year after the buyout are slightly higher than before the buyout and are considerably 
higher in the second year after the buyout. Following the increase in sales performance after 
the buyout, LMBO sample companies could not maintain this growth rate due to the 
increased operating costs which slightly mitigated the success of sales growth. However, in 
the second year after the buyout the combination of increased sales volume and the effect of 
cost cutting measures which were implemented after the buyout showed their full impact in 
a significantly higher cash-flow volume. In comparison to the industry average operating 
cash-flow growth, the LMIBO average post-buyout operating cash-flow growth exceeded 
that of the respective industries. 
4.2.3.2 Statistical results 
The results of the t-tests in chapter 4.3 suggest that there is no significant difference 
between operating cash-flow and operating cash-flow growth for the post-buyout years +1 
and +2 and the average of post-buyout years +1+2/2 over the pre-buyout year -1. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that leveraged management buyouts lead to better operating cash- 
flows after the buyout in economically difficult times can not be sustained. 
4.3 Conclusion 
4.3.1 Results of the LMBO sample companies 
This study presents evidence on the post-buyout operating performance of 30 leveraged 
management buyouts completed between 1990 and 1994. After the buyout, these 30 
companies experienced a considerable increase in sales and operating cash-flow which - 
according to anecdotal evidence presented in section IX - were due to considerable cost 
cutting and rationalisation measures combined with the expansion of their sales activities. 
They also exceeded their industry rivals in sales and operating cash-flow rates. Operational 
income, in contrast, declined in the first year after the buyout and increased only slightly in 
the second year after the buyout. Possible reasons for this may be the increase in operating 
expenses following the sales-growth and the additional provisions necessary for 
restructuring measures in the first year after the buyout. This reasoning is supported by the 
fact that the post-buyout operational cash-flow exceeded the pre-buyout operational cash- 
flow considerably indicating that the decline in post-buyout operating income must result 
from atypical non-cash related restructuring measures after the buyout. 
186 
Comparing the general improvement of post-buyout operating performance to pre-buyout 
operating performance of LMBO sample companies and putting this into relation to the 
general operating performance of the industry average, the improvement has to be 
interpreted as partly due to better management and to leverage according to Jensen's 
'agency cost' theory. According to anecdotal evidence which will be presented in the 
following section, the entrepreneurial aspect also played a decisive role where 
owners/managers observed and tried to exploit opportunities for gain. Although existing 
evidence of earlier research also suggest that income tax savings do play a role in the 
success of leveraged management buyouts the chosen variables in this research reflect 
strong post-buyout performance without tax effects. Sales and operating cash-flows are 
factors for operating performance and their increase reflect real gains and not tax generated 
gains. 
The reason for the improvement in performance in LMBO companies was already described 
in sections 11 and III (theoretical basis and review of existing research) of this part. Agency 
cost reduction, debt bonding and the entrepreneurial aspect seem to provide an overall 
explanation. Managers/owners are alert to opportunities that arise and react in a manner 
that will create wealth for their respective companies. Interviews with owners/managers of 
several of the examined LMBO companies provided further anecdotal evidence that besides 
the entrepreneurial aspect the goal of debt reduction provided a strong incentive for the 
owners/managers and the investors to improve performance and high debt service 
requirements eliminated the discussion about the use of free cash-flows, one source of 
agency cost problems cited by Jensen (1986). The results concerning post LMBO 
performance of the LMBO sample companies confirms the results of former studies by 
Forst, Graeper and Vest suggesting that an LMBO is an efficient motivational tool to 
improve the company's operational performance after the buyout. 
4.3.2 Statistical results 
Despite the positive results of the LMBO sample companies, statistical evidence cannot 
provide sufficient evidence for the general assumption that post-buyout performance is 
better than pre-buyout performance for all LMBOs in times of economic recession. With the 
exception of sales performance which shows significant difference between the pre- and the 
post-buyout levels the difference in operating income and operating cash-flow is not 
statistically significant in order to reject the hypothesis that post-buyout performance 
exceeds pre-buyout performance for all LMBOs in economically difficult times. 
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4.4 Limitations of the research 
It was recognised that the research by the way employed to select the LMBO data, did not 
necessarily represent the general post-buyout performance of LMIBO companies under 
difficult economic conditions. A bias could have been introduced from the relative numbers 
of companies in the sample from particular industry sectors being out of proportion to their 
occurrence in reality. 
However the greatest limitation to the research was due to the German habit of secrecy 
which prevented the LMIBO sample companies to reveal company data about the 
operational performance of the LMBO company. Only through the assistance and the 
support of private equity investors who were willing to provide to a limited extent company 
data on an anonymous basis could this research be completed. The research of LMBO 
company performance in Germany is generally further hindered due to the fact that former 
company owners - mostly owners of small to medium sized companies - include a clause in 
the sales contract which prevents investors and financiers to publish the LMIBO transaction 
itself or reveal details of the financing. This development is based on the status of many 
owners/managers of small to medium sized companies in Germany to whom the status of 
being a local employer is as important as the financial rewards of the ownership and to 
whom the idea of selling in general is hard to accept. 
Here much more work has to be done in order to make LMBO transactions more known to 
the German public - especially among the German NEttelstand - which might lead to more 
positive publicity for LMBOs in Germany and to more transparency of the LMBO market 
according to the role model in the UK. 
4.5 Recommendations for further research 
4.5.1 Long-term performance of LMIBOs in Germany 
Existing academic research documents impressive performance improvements after the 
LMBO in comparison to the pre-buyout performance under favourable economic conditions 
in Germany. Further research is needed in order to examine whether the LMBO structure is 
a beneficial organisational form in the long ten-n or if it only provides short term 
improvement in performance due to short term restructuring measures. Therefore further 
research is needed in order to evaluate the long-term performance (4-7 years) of LMBO 
companies in Germany. 
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4.5.2 Reasons for LMBO company failures in Germany 
Much of the reluctance about LNIIBO transactions come from the fear that the high leverage 
levels of LMBOs reduce the firm's ability to survive in a growing competitive economic 
environment. Research is therefore needed to examine the factors leading to the bankruptcy 
of LMBO companies and to whether the LN1BO structure itself or the changing economic 
environment was responsible for collapse of the company. 
4.5.3 Why do LMBO companies in Germany go public after the LMBO ? 
Based on the evidence on the short term performance of LM[BOs are regarded as an optimal 
organisational form suggesting that the LMIBO structure significantly improves post-buyout 
operational performance. Therefore, if the LM[BO structure is beneficial in terms of 
performance research is needed to examine the question why LM[BO companies go public 
after the LMBO transaction. The research should focus on the following questions: 
9 Why do some German LMBO companies go public after the buyout and others not? 
Is the performance increase sustainable after the German LMBO company 
has gone public? 
The following section will present anecdotal evidence form interviews with 
owners/managers of several of the researched LMBO companies. Due to the fact that 
LMBO transactions in Germany are surrounded by the wish for secrecy and confidentiality 
from the side of the vendors and very often also from the financial investors, it was very 
difficult in the context of the empirical research to obtain a complete set of company data 
for the examined LMBO sample companies. The following interviews had therefore the goal 
to give additional background for the motives and incentives for the LMBO transaction and 
to obtain complementary information with respect to the operational development of the 
LMBO company. 
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Ix. Case studies 
1. Wallace & Thieman, 1989/1990 
1.1 Company background 
Wallace & Thiernan was founded in 1923 in Belleville, New Jersey by Charles Wallace and 
Martin Thiernan. Wallace & Thiernan was formed to manufacture chlorination equipment 
for the disinfection of drinking water. The company remained a privately held corporation 
until 1969 when it was acquired by the Philadelphia based Pennwalt Corporation, a publicly 
held company traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Wallace & Thiernan grew during that period of time to become the world-wide leading 
manufacturer and distributor of water and wastewater process treatment equipment. It had 
manufacturing facilities located in the US2 England, Germany and Austria, Mexico, Brazil 
and Canada. In 1989, the company employed 1.688 employees of which 909 were employed 
by the US subsidiary, 425 by the UK subsidiary, 235 by the German subsidiary and 119 at 
other locations. 
1.2 Company owners before the buyout 
Before the buyout Wallace & Thiernan was owned 100% by the US corporation Pennwalt 
Inc. 
1.3 Market position of the company 
Wallace & Thiernan was a market leader for chlorination devices for the disinfection of 
drinking water. Before the LMIBO the company held 35 percent market share in the US, 80 
percent in the UK and 65 percent in Germany. 
1.3.1 Market position in the US 
Since 1954 Wallace & Thiernan was under supervision by the US Anti-Trust Commission. 
As a consequence, the company was not able to expand their activities on the market to 
increase market share as management would have wished. However, after deliberation with 
their lawyers, management was convinced that the company would be released from the 
strict conditions of the Anti-Trust Commission. Total or even partial liberation from these 
conditions would have increased Wallace & Thieman's potential on the US market. 
Wallace & Thiernan's management also expected that their dosage systems which replaced 
traditional chlorodioxide systems would experience an increase in demand in the future. 
Wallace and Thiernan had observed a similar development in their German operations. 
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Orders from the communities for disinfection systems of drinking and waste water increased 
the company's market share from 32 percent to 35 percent between 1983 and 1985. Due to 
amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1986, management expected an increase in 
the orders for water treatment facilities and consequently predicted a5 percent increase in 
market share in this area. Market share in the industrial sector was estimated to increase 
from 12 to 15 percent. 
1.3.2 Market position in the UK 
In the treatment of drinking water, the UK management set W& T's market share in the 
UK at approximately 80 percent. Although their activities in waste water treatment was 
insignificant at that time, management projected that this market segment would increase in 
importance in the time to come. 
1.3.3 Market position in Germany 
55 percent of Wallace & Thiernan's sales in Germany originated on the domestic market, 
while 45 percent were derived on the export market. According to German management, 
their market share stood at approximately 65 percent in the treatment of water and waste 
water and controlled approximately 45 percent of the market for precision measuring 
instruments. 
1.4 Marketing concept and sales 
1.4.1 Wallace & Thiernan US 
In the US2 Wallace & Thiernan used a national network of distributors in addition to their 
own sales organisation which accounted for 52 percent of turnover. Their internal sales 
organisation worked with 8 regional and 13 sector-specific offices. As a whole, Wallace & 
Thiernan worked with three different distribution networks. 
-* The first distribution network included twenty-five partners for the water and waste 
water business. Mainly smaller chlorination instruments and dosage pumps were sold 
through this network. 
* The second distribution network of thirty partners was responsible for the measuring 
instruments product line. These products operated on a growing market and accounted 
for 10 percent of their total turnover. 
e The third distribution network handled the sale of precision instruments. Wallace & 
Thiemen had 15 agents in this area. This product line represented 9 percent of total 
turnover. 
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Wallace & Thieman's main target market was the water and waste water treatment facilities. 
In this target market sales to the public sector amounted to 61 percent and those to 
industrial clients to 15 percent. 
The export markets Australia, Canada, Mexico and Brazil were handled by subsidiaries of 
Wallace & Thiernan US. 
1.4.2 Wallace & Thieman UK 
For over sixty years Wallace & Thieman had their own representatives in the UK and they 
sold essentially the same products as in the US. The domestic market was exclusively 
handled by Wallace & Thiernan employees and their key targets were suppliers of drinking 
water and electricity. 
The export markets Scandinavia, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Russia and the Middle East were 
handled by Wallace & Thiernan LJK. 
1.4.3 Wallace & Thiernan Germany 
Wallace & Thiernan Germany operated their own sales organisation in Germany with the 
exception of Berlin. An additional agent was responsible for the Berlin and Former East 
German markets. 
Germany's export markets were handled by further agents and consisted of the countries of 
the European Community (excluding Spain and Portugal), Austria and Switzerland, as well 
as the Comecon countries (excluding Poland and Russia). 
1.5 Performance of Wallace & Thiernan before the LMBO 
Wallace & Thiernan grew modestly in the years prior to the buyout. While the sales volume 
in the US subsidiary remained stable during the pre-buyout years, the UK and German 
divisions experienced a significant increase in sales, the Canadian, Brazilian, Mexican and 
Australian subsidiaries' sales were relatively flat. Before the buyout the group achieved an 
average sales growth of 5 percent and EBIT developed between -44% and +85% as 
presented in the following table. 
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The following figures represent the EBIT-performance for the Wallace & Thieman 
operations before the buyout: 
in $m 1985 1986 1987 1988 
us 0311 -1,2 -1311 -3ý5 
UK 11,5 llo7 1,8 11.7 
Germany 127 2,4 41,0 3_15 
Others 079 1310 23o5 273 
Total 4). 2 31,9 7,2 41.0 
1.6 Management of Wallace & Thiernan 
1.6.1 Management in Germany 
Mr. Detlev Christ, the company chairman, led the German Wallace & Thiernen operations 
for 20 years. Middle management was responsible for the areas of finance, accounting, 
order processing and production and development. The average age of the management 
staff at the time of the buyout was around 45. 
1.6.2 Management in the US 
Wallace & Thiernan's US operations were led by Mr. Chet Ross, who held both the title of 
vice president and general manager. Mr. Ross had taken charge of Wallace & Thiernan US 
in the Spring of 1988 after Pennwalt decided to replace the existing management team. The 
other vice presidents of engineering and production averaged about 41 to 45 years of age 
and had acquired considerable experience in the company. 
1.6.3 Management in the UK 
Mr. Frank Smith presided Wallace & Thieman's UK operations as managing director and 
had held this position for two years. In the years before Mr. Smith had already managed 
another Pennwalt UK division. A total of five directors reported to Mr. Smith in the areas 
of marketing, engineering, administration, production and finance. The age of the middle 
management staff ranged from 45 to 61 years of age. 
1.7 The LMBO 
In the middle of the 1980s, the managing director of Wallace & Thieman's German 
operations, Mr. Detlev Christ, was the first to recognise the group as an ideal target for an 
LTVIBO transaction with its strong operational performance and its ability to generate a 
strong cash-flow. This line of thought was reinforced by rumours about Pennwalt's strategic 
deliberations to return to its core business and to divest all non-core activities - among those 
the activities of Wallace and Thiernan. 
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Encouraged by the divestment deliberations of the Pennwalt management Mr. Christ 
approached Pennwalt's chairman with the proposal that W&T be taken over in a leveraged 
management buyout transaction. In the meantime, Pennwalt had decided to divest the 
subsidiary as a part of a comprehensive defensive plan to fend off a hostile takeover bid for 
100 percent of Pennwalt by the LBO group Centaur Partners. As a reaction to this in the 
fall of 1988, Mr. Christ proposed an LMBO transaction to Deutsche 
BeteiligungsgeselIschaft mbH (DBG) which was supposed to be the equity investor in this 
transaction. Concurrently the head of Wallace & Thieman's US subsidiary had 
independently approached Allsop Venture Partners to participate in the LMBO of the 
Wallace & Thiernan group. 
However, instead of competing for the LMBO for Wallace & Thiernan the two groups 
agreed that they would submit a joint bid to Goldman Sachs, the investment bankers 
representing Pennwalt's interests. The German LMBO team with DBG as equity investors 
decided that the transaction should be let out of Wallace & Thiernan's US headquarters and 
brought in DBG's US joint venture partners, Harvest Ventures. 
Due to the fact that also the UK subsidiary played an important role in the Wallace & 
Thiernan group the deal was further syndicated to ECI Ventures to London in order to 
provide additional capability to help evaluate and monitor the UK operation. An agreement 
was reached between the management, its financial sponsors and Pennwalt to buy Wallace 
& Thiernan in 1989, which was prior to Pennwalt's agreement to be acquired by a third 
party, Societe Nationale Elf Acquitaine of France. 
1.8 The LMBO team 
The LMBO- team of Wallace & Thiernan consisted of the following persons: 
The general manager of the German subsidiary: Mr. Detlev Christ 
The vice president and general manager of the US subsidiary Mr. Chet Ross. 
1.9 The structure of the LNMO 
From the beginning the investment group realised that they would have to think about 
accounting and tax issues in a world-wide context in structuring the transaction. Therefore, 
from the beginning they retained an international accounting firm, Coopers & Lybrandt, 
which co-ordinated those issues out of its New York office. Harvest and Allsop decided to 
finance the transaction with about $5m each in equity (including preferred stock) and $50m 
in debt. 
194 
The LMEBO team overfunded the deal to provide working capital and a "cushion" for 
growth and contingencies for the target company. Standard Chartered Bank of the UK 
provided the senior debt in dollars,, Deutsche marks and pounds sterling. 
Purchase price: $44m 
Working capital: $16m 
The equity/debt structure of the LMBO was as follows: 
Equity (10 million dollars): 
3.. 0 million dollars Common Stock 
5,2 nfillion dollars Preferred Stock 
1,8 million dollars Convertible Preferred Stock 
The distribution of equity (10 million dollars) of the transaction among the LMBO- 
participants was as follows: 
Management Allsop Harvest ECI DGB Total 
(in million dollars) 
Common Stock 01,300 13.350 OA50 0; 
1450 
011450 32000 
Preferred Stock 21,600 07867 07867 050867 57200 
Conv. pref Stock 01,900 0,300 01,300 07300 13,800 
Total 07300 41,850 1>617 1>617 1 .7 617 107000 
Furthermore,. the management obtained a stock option which could have been exercised 
within five years of the transaction (after execution of the stock option and the convertible 
preferred stock the management could have retained 25 percent equity). 
Debt (50 million dollars) 
Standard Chartered Bank of the UK provided the senior debt in dollars, Deutsche marks 
and pound sterling. The construction of the collateral required by Standard Chartered Bank 
was unusually complicated, requiring cross-collateral guarantees on the three currency 
borrowing in the form of mortgages and other securities from the operations in Australia, 
Canada, Mexico and Brazil. It also required cross-collateral guarantees between the US, 
German and UK units. 
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The multi-currency loan made the deal very vulnerable to foreign exchange risks. The 
investment group therefore planned to hedge the exchange risk after closing. However, in 
the week prior to the closing, the dollar soared, making the acquisition abut $2m more 
expensive in Deutsche marks and pounds at the closing. 
The investors had considered hedging prior to the closing but it would have cost the deal 
$500.000 up-front additional costs. The group chose not to hedge up-front partly because 
the transaction costs already exceeded $4m of which only a part were due at closing. At the 
initial phase the investment group had to risk $2,5m up-front for the legal, accounting and 
valuation expenses. 
1.10 Value creation through the LMBO 
The investors Harvest Ventures and Allsop saw several ways to create value within the 
business. About half of the division's USD 11 Om in annual sales came from the US, while 
Germany and the UK generated about USD 20m in revenue each. The balance came about 
equally from Australia, Canada, Mexico and Brazil. Although Wallace and Thiernan was 
profitable overall, its US division wasn't. But the investors knew that a new general 
manager, whom they had since recruited, could turn it around. Although having a six-month 
backlog of orders, the division's sales were healthy. According to Mr. Maddox, general 
partner of Allsop, it was a logistical and manufacturing problem. 
In summary, the turnaround concept of Wallace & Thiernan US comprised the following 
measures- 
9 Reduction of staff 
9 Reinforcement of the management 
" Improvement of the production planning 
" Improvement of the controlling systems 
The investors also knew that Wallace & Thiernan, with sales representatives world-wide, 
was well-positioned to take advantage of the large and developing market for water- 
treatment facilities outside the US. In order to turn around the loss making operations in the 
US, the newly recruited general manager focused on transferring the best practices of the 
highly profitable German operation to the US, implementing efficient manufacturing 
techniques and installing a just-in-time manufacturing system. 
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1.11 Performance of the company after the LMBO 
At the time of the LMBO the non-US operations were producing profits of about $7 million 
annually. Whereas the US operation was incurring losses of $5 million annually. Over a two 
year period, sales on a world-wide basis grew from $110 million to $121 million and 
operating profits outside the US grew from $7 million to $13 million, while operating 
profits in the US were $4 million contrasted to the operating losses of $4 million prior to 
the LMBO. These operating earnings produced considerable cash flow which provided for 
substantial debt reduction. 
The development and the value creation of the Wallace & Thiernan group can be best 
illustrated by the following figures- 
(in 000 USD) 1989 1990 1991 
Sales 71.368 121.443 135.223 
EBIT 6.337 13.804 15.804 
Income/Loss 1.954 6.507 7.021 
1.12 Exit 
As the result of the improvement of operating earnings on the world-wide basis to 13 
million dollars after two years of ownership, the company was approached by North West 
Water Plc. of the UK, a major customer of Wallace & Thiernan, with an offer to buy the 
company for 130 million dollars. The company accepted this pre-empted offer and was sold 
approximately two and one-half years after the date of the original acquisition resulting in 




2.1 Company background 
The Georgsmarienhiitte was founded in 1856 south of Osnabruck among the coal and iron 
core mines of this region. The company was named after the last ruler of the Hannover 
kingdom, King Georg, and his wife, Queen Maria. In 1923 the company lost its status as 
independent company and was acquired by the Kloeckner group. From 1988 to 1991 the 
company was conducted by Mr. Rirgen GroBmann, one of the youngest board members of 
the mother company, the Kloeckner group. 
2.2 Company owners before the buyout 
Before the buyout the company was owned to 100% by the German corporation Kloeckner 
AG. 
2.3 The products of the company 
Georgsmarienhiitte produces high-quality steel. The most important sales market for the 
company is Germany at 90 percent of all sales. Their customers include the automobile 
industry, forges, and the manufacturers of machines, pipes and screw. 
2.4 Performance of the company before the LMBO 
The sales performance of the former Kloeckner subsidiary Georgsmarienhiitte had to 
experience a slight decline in the two years prior to the buyout due to the difficult economic 
environment in the area of steel production in Germany. New products and a transfer to 
new technologies were necessary in order to keep the company competitive in a declining 
economic environment which suffered from the reduction of state subsidies. However, 
although sales volume declined only marginally in this period before the buyout, the 
operating profit declined significantly due to disproportionate expenses for wages and 
salaries as well as the high intercompany compensation costs the mother company charged 
to its subsidiary. 
The performance of the company before the buyout in percent in relation to the buyout year 
(100%) was as follows: 
in 000 DM 1991/92 1992/93 
Sales 133% 100% 
EBIT 128% 100% 
Income/Loss -102% -100% 
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2.5 The LMBO team 
The LMBO team of Georgsmarienhiitte GmbH consisted of the following persons- 
" Dr. GroBmann, former board member of Kloeckner Werke AG, 75 percent 
" Druecker & Co. GmbH,, Financial consulting company, Frankfurt, 25 percent 
The purchase price of the company was only symbolic in the amount of DM 2 due to the 
overindebtness of the company at the time of the purchase. The financing for the 
restructuring and the necessary investments were made by the Nordische Landesbank. 
2.6 The LMBO 
Since several years the parent company of the Georgsmarienhýitte, Kloeckner Werke AG, 
experienced heavy losses due to the difficult situation in the German steel industry which 
forced them finally to enter into composition proceedings in 1993. One of the first measures 
which the heavy indebted Kloeckner group had to undertake was to divest its heavy loss- 
making subsidiary Georgsmarienhiitte which at that time was managed by one of 
Kloeckner's youngest board members, Dr. Rirgen GroBmann. 
GroBmann was described as one of those young managers, which succeeded in making a 
fast and successful career without losing touch to the ground. GroBmann, who made his 
high-school exam with best grades, accomplished a masters in steel manufacturing and 
business administration followed by an MBA in the US and a PhD, climbed the career latter 
from assistant of a board member to board member himself in only eleven years. However, 
although GroBmann made a successful career he always remained a , steel-man" who loved 
steel as a material itself and who always regarded the steel industry as a branch with future - 
which was in strong contrast to the opinion of his colleagues at Kloeckner AG. The workers 
of the Georgsmarienhiitte felt the engagement of Dr. GroBmann and had already 
experienced his enthusiasm between 1989 and 1991 when he was the managing directors of 
the company mandated by the KJoeckner AG. 
Dr. GroBmann always regarded the turnover of the company as feasible and the employees 
of the Georgsmarienhiitte supported the idea that the company should be sold to him. 
Although the Georgsmarienhiitte had produced heavy losses and experienced enormous 
liquidity problems due to excessive debt burdens he knew the employees, the production 
facilities, the products and the strengths and weaknesses of the company. In this context he 
had often questioned the added value that the Kloeckner group had provided. 
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The subsidiary, which had suffered from oversized and outdated technology for quite some 
time, had been prevented from implementing the necessary reorganisation of its business by 
its parent company, Kloeckner AG, and was therefore quite close to bankruptcy. For that 
reason Dr. GroBmann felt encouraged to put the company on a stand-alone basis - however 
the take-over was not feasible as long as the debts of the company were still higher than the 
yearly turnover. 
The composition proceedings of Kloeckner AG and GeorgsmarienMitte changed everything. 
If the negotiations were successful,, Georgsmarienhiitte would be forgiven the major part of 
its debt. Gradually, the initial planning phase became a concrete plan. In 1992 Dr. 
GroBmann took the opportunity of a board meeting to announce his wish to take over the 
company to his colleagues and to resign from the Kloeckner group. With this GroBmann 
permanently severed ties with the Kloeckner group. Dr. GroBmann left behind a contract 
that was still valid for another three years and the social benefits inherent in such a position 
in an internationally operating group. In the place of this security Dr. GroBmann would 
receive 40 percent of his former salary and was forced to agree not to distribute the 
company's profits for a period of five years. At that stage Dr. GroBmann was aware of the 
difficulties he would have returning to industry in the event of the failure of the 
"Georgsmarienhiitte project". 
Dr. GroBmann was very confident that he would not have to rely on a return to industry. 
The bankers who supported him seemed to share his view. In 1994 Dr. Rirgen Grof3mann, 
the company's former managing director, and Drueker & Co. GmbH, Frankfurt, an equity 
provider specialised in project financing, completed the leveraged management buyout 
transaction and named the new company Georgsmarienhiitte GmbH. The banks financed 
DM 100m for a state-of-the-art electronic steel oven which would serve to make 
Georgsmarienhiitte GmbH the nation's cheapest manufacturer of ready-made products. 
The workers at Georgsmarienhiitte stood firmly behind their new shareholder. Dr. 
GroBmann was very adamant from the start, however, that the company would have to go 
through some hard times and would only survive if everyone avoided hiding behind excuses 
and made a concerted effort to become the best. The workers agreed and started working 
for their common goal. 
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2.7 Value creation after the LM[BO 
According to Dr. GroBmann the turnaround of the company would succeed due to his 
comprehensive understanding of the product and his certainty that there were hidden 
reserves which the parent company had not been able to discover and exploit. Dr. 
GroBmann also recognised the importance of a confident vision for the company's future 
and ample understanding of "human nature". In this context it was one of his company 
policy to principally ask other members of the board for their opinion about certain issues 
before stating his own opinion. Dr. GroBmann held a democratic leadership style in high 
esteem and had no intentions of being the sole decision-maker in a patriarchally led company 
organisation. 
2.8 Performance after the LMBO 
One year after the buyout, in the financial year 1994/95, the company had sales of DM 
486m, which represented 118 percent of the sales in the year of the buyout and 13 3 percent 
of sales one year before the buyout. Due to increased motivation among the management 
and being free from former group directives, the sales volume in the second and third year 
after the buyout increased to 163 percent and 138 percent, respectively, a considerable 
increase in comparison to the years before the buyout. Georgsmarienhiitte's operating 
profits and year-end results declined slightly in the first post-buyout year due to 
restructuring measures which had to be undertaken, however operating cash-flow showed 
significant improvement after the LMBO, although the company was not able to profit from 
the step-up potential of assets. 
This was mainly due to the spin-off from the parent company Kloeckner in the following 
respects: 
* Avoidance of high group costs charged by Kloeckner 
9 Possibility to make necessary investments in order to stay competitive 
* Transfer into a new product area 
9 Reduction of unnecessary work force 
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in summary, the development of the performance of the Georgsmarienhiitte after the buyout 
in relation to the buyout year 1992 was as follows: 
in 000 DM 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
Sales 118% 163% 138% 
EBIT 91% 109% 81% 
Income4Loss -5o% 58% 14% 
In order to complement their existing product range and production facilities, 
Georgsmarienhiitte acquired the Austrian company Stahl Judenburg GmbH after the 
buyout. Stahl Judenburg had a turnover of DM 64m and a staff of 380. They specialised in 
the production of smaller units which allowed Georgsmarienhiitte to supply the market with 
a complete range of products. Later, in 1997, they also acquired Gr6ditzer Stahlwerke and 
Walzwerk Burg GmbH as a 100 percent subsidiary. The latter was located in Saxony 
Anhalt, a state of the former East Germany. 
Despite his success, however, Dr. GroBmann remained cautious about the future of the 
German steel industry and consequently the continuing success of the Georgsmarienhiitte. 
The German steel capacity was still too large and this also concerned Georgsmarienhiitte 
GmbH area of operation. Additionally, competition from importers was increasing, 
especially from the GUS states, where logistic and qualitative problems were gradually 
con-ling under control. According to the CFO of Georgsmarienhiitte, Mr. Robben, 
Georgsmarienhiitte not only experienced problems due to the economic downturn but also 
based on structural difficulties. 
In order to survive in these difficult economic times, one of Georgsmarienhiitte's main goals 
remained the reduction of the remaining debt. However, for Dr. GroBmann the most 
important victory after the buyout has been his rapport with his employees. In the past he 
could never be sure if his ideas would be put into practice due to his dependence on the 
parent company, Kloeckner AG. Today the management of the Georgsmarienhiitte can 
realise plans they feel are profitable for the company and this is Dr. GroBmann's idea of 
Jreedom for creativity and own ideas " that company management should have. 
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X GmbH 
(as agreed with the management, the name of the company will remain undisclosed) 
3.1 Company background 
The company X was founded in 1945 as a consolidation of several parts of the company 
XY in Bavaria. In 1948 the newly created company X started developing hydraulic 
products, which are still the basis of their product line today. In 1955, company X was 
taken over by the shareholders of the A group. From that time on,, the company diversified 
its activities in the following areas. The company, now called X GmbH, enlarged its product 
range to include re-railing equipment for railway vehicles of all types in 1962, and products 
for rescue technology in 1972. In 1981, the X GmbH was incorporated into the A group as 
a division. Nine years later, the factory moved to the new premises where the company is 
still located today. 
3.2 Company owners before the buyout 
Before the buyout the company was owned to 100% by the German corporation A-group. 
3.3 The products of the company 
The product line of the company consists of three major areas- 
Rescue equipment for road, rail and air accidents 
e Hydraulic tools used in factories, workshops and manufacturing to lift and move heavy 
loads,, and 
Rerailing equipment for all types of rail vehicles in order to set vehicles upright which have 
been overturned or derailed. Such equipment is especially useful in the event of accidents on 
single-line railway tracks or in locations difficult to access, e. g. tunnels. 
3.4 The LMBO 
In the beginning of the 1990s the parent company of the X-GmbH, the A-group experienced 
heavy losses also based on a general downturn in German economy at this period. A 
restructuring of the existing activities was necessary and the management of the A-group 
decided to concentrate in the future on its strength and core activities. The group began the 
process of restructuring its operations, which involved divesting several group divisions 
which didn't belong to its core activities. The X GmbH was considered one of the non-core 
activities of the group and its management was informed in the fall of 1992 that the A-group 
was actively seeking a buyer for the division. 
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The general manager of the X-GmbH recognised the situation and convinced other 
managers of the company to consider a take-over of the company through a leveraged 
management buyout together with a potential equity investor. In the meantime, the sales 
process was underway at the parent company. Several buyers went through the due 
diligence process in order to evaluate the company assets and performance. However, this 
proved very time consuming and complicated due to the fact that the company had been 
fully integrated in the group's records and had no separate audit records. 
After the due diligence process and a conscientious selection process, 3i was able to make 
the best choice for the company. 3i saw the growth potential of the division and felt that it 
could be best achieved under the charge of the existing management. Several banks were 
consulted for the financing of the buyout, including regional banks, which 3i felt should be 
included in the search. In 1993 management and 3i took over and renamed the company. 
3.5 The LMBO participants 
The participants of the LMBO financing with respect to equity and debt were as follows: 
Purchase price: DM 30,, Om 
Equity: DM 5,, Om 
Silent participation: DM 2,8m 
Debt: DM 27,2m 
Equity: 
3i minority stake 
Management 15 percent 
Silent participation DM 2,8m. 
Debt DM 273.2m 
IKB N/A. 
Dresdner Bank N/A. 
Deutsche Bank N/A. 
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3.6 Performance of the company before the LMBO 
(In accordance with present owners the company figures will not be revealed) 
For equity providers and bankers it was problematic to measure the performance of the 
target company, as its results were historically always included in A-group's financial 
statement. However according to the figures available at this time it was evident that the 
division was underperforming significantly with year-end results barely above break-even. 
However, the investors who examined the potential of the company on the basis of these 
figures recognised that a major source of profitability problems in the division was the high 
transfer costs charged by the A-group. The company was also subject to group directives 
which prevented them from reacting quickly and flexibly to the challenges imposed by the 
market. 
3.7 Performance of the company after the LMBO 
Net sales for the first year after the buyout increased significantly through an important 
large-scale order. Operating profit and operating cash-flow showed positive effects from 
this order. The rationalisation measures further increased X's results,, as did the lack of 
transfer costs to the parent company which had diminished the operating result in previous 
years. In the second year after the buyout, no such order could be repeated so that sales, 
operating profit and operating cash-flow decreased in comparison to the year before. 
Additional provisions which had been allocated to further restructuring after the LMIBO 
also contributed to the decline in the operating income from the previous year. Resuming, 
the general manager of the X-GmbH underlines that the LMIBO had the following impact on 
the positive development of the company performance- 
Independence 
In the past, the company was dependent on all strategic decisions coming from the parent 
company, the A-group. 
Cost savings 
The A-group had charged the company enormous fees for administration and consulting. 
Restructuring. Several unproductive units could be closed and the level of inventory could 
be independently be determined and administered by the company. 
3.8 Exit through the acquisition of the company 
only two years after the LMBO in 1995, the X GmbH was sold to the American B-group 
for $35m which signified for the equity investors that they had realised considerable capital 
gains due to their initial investment of DM 30m. 
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4. Wesumat, 1994 
4.1 Company background 
For over 30 years, Wesumat has been developing solutions for commercial carwashes, and 
what started out as a small business had become a corporation with international operations. 
The founder of the company, Mr. Weigele, an engineer and inventor presented in 1962 the 
first fully automated brush carwash system in the world, which back then was still 
manufactured under licence. Seven years later, the company began to manufacture its own 
carwash and train washing systems. The 210 metre-long washing facilities for the high- 
speed ICE train in Hamburg and Munich were also produced by Wesumat. 
In 1973, the company owner Mr. Weigele divided the company into a marketing company 
in Dfisseldorf and a production company in Augsburg. In 1985 the Wesumat marketing 
company took over the Augsburg production company and the former owner, Mr. Weigele 
was bought out mainly by French shareholders and also the managing director, Mr. Decker 
acquired 5 percent of the company. When the marketing company took over the production 
in Augsburg, annual sales totalled DM 9.4m in 1984; in the following year, this figure was 
raised to DM 15m. 1986 was the year in which the soft-wash roll-over systems achieved 
their decisive market breakthrough setting new standards with new soft-wash technology. 
Subsidiaries were established in Belgium and France and in 1988 in Great Britain. In 1989, 
Wesumat's turnover exceeds the DM 50m figure for the first time. 
4.2 Company owners before the buyout 
Before the buyout the company was owned to 
9 95% by French investors 
o 5% by Mr. Decker 
4.3 The products of the company 
In 1986 the development of the softwash system and the launch of the first twin portal 
system, which opened up a new dimension in carwashes for service stations, brought 
resounding product success. A further highlight, the 9609 carwash system hit the market in 
1988. In 1994, Wesumat proved its innovative strength again with the launch of the 
Wesumat scan wash, a system that cleans vehicles contact-free with only chemicals and 
high-pressure water. 
206 
4.4 The structure of the company 
As part of the LMBO transaction in 1994, Wesumat Holding was founded with a share 
capital of DM 11.6m. It was organised in two operating companies. Wesumat 
Fahrzeugwaschanlagen GmbH continued the firm's original business, the production and 
marketing of carwash systems, With the formation of Wesumat Car Wash Marketing 
GmbH, the company entered the operational side of the business. Carwash systems were 
installed and maintained on behalf of petroleum companies. Wesumat also assumed the on- 
site business management of the systems as well as training for the operators. This form of 
business became very successful as the highly personnel-intensive operation of a carwash is 
normally outsourced. 
Wesumat Holding GmbH now has subsidiaries in eight European countries (Sweden, 
Norway, Belgium, Finland, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Austria), joint ventures 
in Hungary, Denmark and Poland and is represented in 35 countries world-wide. In the 
headquarters in Augsburg, there are 350 employees engaged in production, sales, service 
and administration. The actual structure of the Wesumat Holding can be presented as 
follows: 
Wesurnat Holding GmbH 
Wesumat Fahrzeugwaschanlagen GmbH 
Foreign Subsidiaries 
Wesurnat Car Wash Marketing GmbH 
4.5 Performance of the company before the LMIBO 
Before the LMIBO in 1994, Wesurnat was already a market leader in carwash systems and 
showed impressive growth rates in turnover and operating profit. Here, the high quality of 
the company's products and the unremitting commitment to improving the cost- 
effectiveness of commercial car wash systems brought Wesumat success and continual 
growth. 
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The development of the Wesumat Fahrzeugwaschanlagen turnover and the per capita 
productivity from 1990 to 1994 was as follows- 
Year Turnover Change % Employees Tumover 
per employee 
309 
(in 000 DM) 























As can be seen in the figures outlined above, the company experienced considerable 
turnover growth rates in the years 1990-1992 between 21 and 52 percent. Increasing also 
simultaneously the number of employees over time the turnover per employee could be 
constantly enhanced reaching its peak in 1991 with DM 378.000 per employee. 
4.6 The LMBO 
Wesumat's LMBO team consisted of the following parties: 
9 3i 
Eurosynergies 
Mr. Wolfgang Decker, Managing partner Wesumat 
In 1994 the french shareholders of Wesurnat decided to sell their stake in Wesumat in order 
to reorganise their existing portfolio. Mr. Wolfgang Decker, managing director of 
Wesumat, considered increasing his 5 percent stake in the company through the French 
shareholders sale. Several equity providers completed the due diligence process to 
determine the value and performance potential of Wesurnat. Finally, Eurosynergies, a 
company who administers French investment funds and 3i were selected as ideal equity 
providers. Mr. Decker also participated in the buyout and increased his stake 
from 5 to 10 
percent. 
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The financing structure of the LMBO transaction was finally as follows- 
Purchase price DM 62.5m 
Equity: 
Common stock: DM 11.6m 
Capital reserve: DM 2.9m 
Mezzanine and Debt. 
Shareholder loan- DM IlAm 
Loan A: DM 3.1m 
Loan B: DM 7.3 m 
Mezzanine Loan: DM 13. Om 
Loan D: DM 8.1m 
Loan E- DM 2.9m 
Loan F: DM 2.2m 
Total: DM 62.5m 
4.7 Value creation after the LMBO 
The Wesumat LMIBO was based on the desire of the French owners to sell their stake in 
Wesumat in the process of a new investment and portfolio strategy. Mr. Decker had been 
with the company since its beginning in the 1960s and was managing partner of Wesumat. 
He was asked whether he was interested in increasing his current stake in the company in 
the framework of an LMBO transaction. 
Mr. Decker was convinced of the growth potential of the company and agreed to the 
LMBO. Financial investors were selected to participate in the transaction who agreed to 
respect management/owner's independence in the operational decision-making - 3i and the 
french venture capital firm Eurosynergies. The transaction was completed in 1994 and the 
growth potential was subsequently confirmed by Wesumat's increase in consolidated sales 
ftom DM 70m in 1990 to DM 170m in 1995. 
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4.8 Performance after the LMBO 
Wesumat's sales figures show the realisation of its growth potential since the LMBO in 
1994. In the two years subsequent to the buyout, turnover increased considerably, reaching 
growth rates of 8 percent and 15 percent respectively. In the first post-buyout year staff was 
reduced from 333 to 324 which, in combination with the increase in total turnover,, led to an 
increase in turnover per employee from DM 357,736 to DM 396,662. In the second post- 
buyout year turnover increased another 15 percent and the turnover per employee rose to 
DM 424,643. Operating profit and operating cash flow experienced a decline in the first 
year after the buyout due to the substantial investments the company had to make in order 
to expand. The positive results of the expansion strategy were apparent during the second 
year of the buyout. 
In summary the development of turnover and turnover per employee of Wesumat 
Fahrzeugwaschanlagen after the buyout was as follows: 
Year Turnover Change % Employees Turnover 
(in 000 DM) per employee 
1994 119.126 +1% 333 357 
1995 128.518 +8% 324 396 
1996 148.200 +15% 349 424 
(Source: Wesumat Fahrzeugwaschanlagen, 1997) 
4.9 Exit through Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
In the fall of 1997, the company announced its initial public offering at the Frankfurt stock 
exchange, where 60 percent of the company shares were to be offered to the public and the 
share capital was to be increased from 11.6m to 20m. According to the owners/managers, 
the proceeds from the TO would be used to promote the expansion strategy of the 
company which is, among other goals, focused on the fast developing nations 
in Asia and 
Eastern Europe. In the year of the TO in 1997 the company projects consolidated sales of 
DM 21 Om which would exceed its 1996 level by 8 percent. 
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Tarkett 
5.1 Company background 
Tarkett is one of the world's largest manufacturers and distributors of resilient and 
hardwood flooring, with an annual manufacturing volume of approximately 100 million 
square meters of flooring products. Situated in Frankenthal, Germany, Tarkett produces 
flooring products for sale to both residential and commercial markets in over 40 countries. 
In addition, Tarkett has a small industrial foils business in Europe, with a product range of 
vinyls for various applications such as labels blinds and furniture. 
Tarkett was established in 1886. In 1970, they acquired the resilient flooring operations of 
Protan & Fagertun AS in Norway and of General Aniline & Film Corporation in the United 
States as well as Harris Manufacturing Company, one of the oldest hardwood flooring 
manufacturers in the US. In 1987, Swedish Match almost doubled the size of Tarkett's 
business with its acquisition of a majority stake in Pegulan Werke AG, Germany's leading 
residential flooring manufacturer. In 1988, Stora, the Swedish forestry products and paper 
manufacturer, acquired the Swedish Match group of companies, which included substantial 
manufacturing assets as well as the Tarkett and Pegulan operations. 
5.2 Company owners before the buyout 
Before the buyout the company was owned to 100% by the Swedish corporation Stora. 
5.3 The group structure 
Tarkett has 13 manufacturing facilities located in Sweden, Germany, Ireland and the United 
States. The Group's European flooring operations have an extensive sales and distribution 
network with over 500 salespeople throughout the major European markets and in 
Australia. The US resilient and hardwood flooring operations had their own sales force that 
sold throughout North America through an aggregate of approximately 115 independent 
distributors. 
5.4 The products of the company 
Tarkett produced and sold a wide range of resilient and hardwood flooring products 
marketed under several brand-names, including Tarkett, Tarkett Pegulan and Febolit. The 
company believed that the group's future growth could be brought about through 
its 
continued ability to create and sustain brand recognition for its products, primarily through 
in-store marketing and advertising, as well as with targeted campaigns to particular target 
groups. 
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5.5 The flooring market 
The world-wide flooring market consists of several product groups: carpet, ceramic, tiles, 
resilient linoleum, laminates, hardwood and rubber. Based on market data, T ke ar tt 
estimated that carpet accounted for approximately 58 percent of the total flooring market by 
volume, wIffle ceramic and resilient flooring are estimated to account for 19 percent and 16 
percent, respectively. Hardwood flooring with 4 percent and other flooring accounted for 
the rest. While carpets comprised the largest proportion of the flooring market, Tarkett 
believed that sales of carpet by volume were flat or shrinking in most developed countries 
due to concerns about maintenance, allergic reactions and a short product lifespan. These 
considerations of Tarkett have resulted in renewed concentration on non-carpet flooring, 
particularly hardwood and ceramic tile. 
Despite the overall trend away from carpets towards ceramics and hardwood, large 
differences existed in the markets between regions in Europe. The Nordic countries had a 
higher than average proportion of resilient and hardwood flooring, while Central Europe 
countries had a higher proportion of carpet and Southern European countries favoured 
ceran-fics. Tarkett reorganised its marketing and distribution network in order to respond 
more effectively to the demands of each of these regions. 
5.6 Market position and competition 
Resilient flooring 
In 1992, Tarkett was the largest manufacturer of vinyl flooring for the residential and 
commercial markets in Europe. They estimate that the total European market for resilient 
residential flooring at that time was approximately 150 million square meters, with six 
competitors representing over 80 percent of the total market. The management of Tarkett 
assumed that Tarkett was the market leader by volume in this segment with an estimated 21 
percent market share. 
Tarkett was also considered to be the largest manufacturer of resilient commercial flooring 
for the Western European Market, which totalled approximately 100 million square meters 
in 1992. Although seven competitors accounted for almost 70 percent of the European 
market, with Tarkett in the leading market position, each national market was generally 
dominated by a strong domestic competitor. In the United States, the total market for 
resilient flooring was estimated in 1992 to have been 260 million square meters, 
approximately 73 percent of which represented residential demand. Tarkett and three other 
manufacturers accounted for nearly 90 percent of the market. 
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Hardwood flooring 
Tarkett was the largest manufacturer of hardwood flooring in Europe. Consumer purchases 
in Western Europe of hardwood flooring in 1992 were estimated at approximately 58 
million square meters, with the pre-finished flooring market representing approximately 41 
percent of this total. 
While the overall hardwood flooring market was more fragmented than the markets for 
resilient flooring, the division's major area of focus, prefabricated, cross-laminated 
products, was concentrated, with six competitors accounting for over 60 percent of the 
market. Tarkett and two other larger manufacturers each had nearly equal market shares of 
approximately 15 to 20 percent. The German., Scandinavian and Austrian markets were 
Tarkett's strongest markets, together comprising nearly 80 percent of the group's 1992 
sales. 
In the United States, the total market for hardwood flooring was estimated to be 34 million 
square meters in 1992. In general, the market was very fragmented, with small local 
producers of solid wood flooring accounting for a majority of the market. The prefabricated 
laminate segment in which Tarkett competed was relatively concentrated with five 
competitors accounting for 75 percent of the market. 
5.7 The LMBO 
In the early 1990s, Stora decided to concentrate on its core business and began divesting 
their non-core activities. Tarkett, with its flooring activities belonged to Stora's non-core 
business and in late 1992, began discussions that resulted in the agreement to sell Tarkett to 
the management of the company and to potential investors. In 1994, Tarkett first operated 
as a stand-alone operation, relying on Stora solely for credit and limited administrative 
support. The management at that stage was convinced that it had adequate personnel and 
systems in place to operate as an independent entity following the LNMO. 
Pursuant to the sale and purchase agreement dated February 1994, the company agreed to 
acquire from a subsidiary of Stora approximately 99 percent of the shares of Tarkett AG, 
which operated the Group's German facilities, and 100 percent of Tarkett International AB 
from Stora, which in turn owned approximately 100 percent of the shares of Tarkett AB, 
which operates the Group's Swedish, US and Irish facilities. The remainder of the 
outstanding share capital of Tarkett AG was owned by the public. 
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The Company intended to finance the acquisition as well as the repayment of third party 
borrowings of approximately DM 8m and expenses associated with the acquisition of the 
company estimated at DM 45m by an aggregate cash contribution of the shareholders,, a 
bank term credit facility, the sale of notes and the utilisation of cash in the group (see here 
point 5.7 Financing of the LMBO). 
The Sale and Purchase Agreement between Stora and the acquirers provided for various 
representations and warranties from Stora which were typical for such kind of transactions. 
For example Stora had agreed to indemnify the company for certain potential losses relating 
to the group's operations as conducted prior to the closing date like claims relating to 
hazardous substances, losses arising under environmental laws, certain pending litigation, or 
potential tax claims related to periods before January 1993. The aggregate liability for Stora 
for indemnities under the Sale and Purchase Agreement was limited to SEK 2.900m or DM 
636m which was a quite considerable amount for the selling company. 
5.8 Financing of the LMBO 
The funding of the purchase price including fees and repayment of existing loans was as 
follows- 
Purchase price: DEM 711 m 
Sources of funds (in million DM): Uses of funds (in million DM). 
Bank Credit Agreement 290 Purchase price 658 
Notes 238 Fees and expenses. 45 
Equity contribution of shareholders 160 Repayment of loans 8 
Utilisation of cash in the group 23 
Total 711 711 
5.9 The LMBO team 
Ordinary shares 
Management* 8.8 percent 
C" Capital Partners 43.6 percent 
Goldman Sachs 43.6 percent 
Hancock International Private Equity 4.0 percent 
Preference Shares 
" CWB Capital Partners 47.8 percent 
" Goldman Sachs 47.8 percent 
" Hancock International Private Equity 4.4 percent 
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The Management team consisted of the following members- 
" Lars Visen, President and Chief Executive of the Group 
" Ingvar Backhamre, Division Manager, Resilient Flooring, North America 
" Orvar Barthelson, Division Manager, Flooring - European Sales 
" G6ran Enocson,, Division Manager, Flooring - European Production 
Christel Hiller, Vice President and Finance & Administration 
David Wootton, Division Manager, Hardwood North America 
Mr. Lars Visen, chief executive manager of Tarkett since 1990, was responsible for the 
LMBO management team. Mr. Visen, who had studied mechanical engineering in 
Stockholm and Gbteborg, started his career in 1972 as a development engineer at Grdnges 
Metalwerken in Sweden where he systematically climbed the career ladder. Between 1982 
and 1990 he was the chief executive officer of several Swedish corporations, in the end of 
the Swedish company SAB Nife. In the Spring of 1990 Mr. Visen took the position of chief 
executive officer at Tarkett Pegulan. 
In order to build up their confidence in the company, Mr. Visen recognised early on that it 
was important to allow the investors to know the company's management team very well. 
To achieve this goal, Mr. Visen travelled extensively during the search for appropriate 
financing and attended company presentations to international institutional investors. He 
knew that the investors did not need comprehensive information on the inventories of the 
machines, - 
but rather to understand the motivation and vision of the management team. If 
the management team were able to inspire confidence in the investors, they would be 
prepared to participate in the company. 
Aa 
Auer completing the buyout in 1994, Mr. Visen envisioned already at that period in time 
Tarkett's initial public offering in the coming year. Tarkett's good performance subsequent 
to the buyout was one of the main reasons for the company's successful IPO. 
5.10 Performance of the company before the LMBO 
5.10.1 Financial year 1993 
Net sales for the nine months ending September 1993 amounted to DM 1.274bn marks or 
95 percent of the comparable sales volume in 1994 at DM 1.337bn. Operating profit 
amounted to DM 82.5m for 1993 which represented 60 percent of the operating profit of 
1994 which increased to DM 137.2m. Cash provided by operating activities was DM 85.4m 
which accounted for 75 percent of the 1994 operating cash-flow in the amount of DM 
II3.8m. 
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In detail the company performance before the buyout was as follows: 
in 000 DM 1993 1994 
Sales 1.274 1.337 
EBIT 82.5 137.2 
Operating cash-flow 85.4 113.8 
In recent years, the management of Tarkett has focused on improving profitability by 
concentrating on the group's core resilient and hardwood flooring business, where Tarkett 
has built strong market positions due to its widely recognised brand names, its product 
range, its extensive European sales and distribution network and its manufacturing 
economics of scale. Management has also focused attention on cost reduction throughout 
the group. 
Since the beginning of the 1990, the group has reduced headcount in continuing operations 
by approximately 15 percent as of December 31,1993 resulting in an improvement in 
income from operations despite reduced volumes and recessionary conditions. Although 
unit volumes in resilient and hardwood flooring declined by approximately 4 percent from 
1989 to 1992, Tarkett's gross margins have improved from 32.1 percent in 1989 to 34.3 
percent in 1992 and to 35.9 percent in 1993. 
5.11 Value creation after the buyout 
Tarkett's management's strategy was to continue reducing costs through 
a reduction in selling and administrative costs by improving the efficiency of the group's 
distribution network and consolidating its 15 European warehouses and service centres 
by a further improvement in manufacturing efficiencies by transferring production to the 
group's lowest cost facilities, increasing line speeds, reducing production set-up times 
and optimising raw materials usage. 
Furthermore, the following measures have been undertaken in order to improve the 
company performance: 
Slim, success-onented management structures 
Concentration on profitable core-areas 
Halt to an expansion policy on the costs of margins 
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Tarkett's management believed that the company's improved cost structure would position 
the group to capitalise on several positive factors in the flooring market including the 
recovery in North America and Europe, the continued development of the former East 
Germany as well as Eastern Europe and the increasing preference of European and US 
consumers for hard flooring, particularly hardwood flooring instead of carpets. The 
management also aimed at benefiting from the sale of a greater portion of higher margin 
products, including a new vinyl product aimed at the residential markets in the US and a 
non PVC-product in Europe which were launched in 1994. 
In summary, Mr. Lars Visen, Tarkett's general manager, believes that the LMBO 
transaction served as an act of liberation which incited increased motivation among 
management staff and the employees. After the buyout, the employees suddenly began to 
approach him with new ideas and concepts - an attitude which had long been missing at 
Tarkett. 
Mr. Visen stressed that he had been forced to sacrifice much of his time in the past for 
administrative dealings with the company owners instead of being actively involved with the 
operative business of the company. After the buyout he was finally in the position to give 
optimise the flow of communication in the company, which he saw as one of the essential 
tools of a successful company. 
5.12 Performance of the company after the LMBO 
5.12.1 Financial year 1995 
Net sales for 1995, the first year after the buyout, increased to DM 1.340bn from DM 
1.337bn for the financial year 1994, an increase of DM 3.5m or 0.2 percent. However, the 
company had not achieved its goals due to the restrictions placed on business development 
by the strong mark and the decreasing consumer market which allowed the group only a 
small rise in sales. 
Operating profit increased to DM 145.4m in 1995 from DM 89.4m in 1994, resulting in an 
increase in the operating margin from 6.6 percent to 10.8 percent in 1994. The operating 
result could have been improved mainly due to manufacturing cost reductions and changes 
in product mix to higher margin products. 
Cash provided by operating activities amounted to DM 128.2m in 1995 compared to DM 
113.8m in 1994. 
217 
5.12.2 Financial year 1996 
Net sales for 1996 increased to 1.348.6 million marks from 1.340,4 million marks in 1995, 
an increase of 8,2 million marks or 0.6 percent . 
The increase in sales was mainly due to 
exchange rate improvements - without consideration of this, profits sales volume would 
have been decreased by 3.2 percent amounting to DM 1.298bn. Operating profit decreased 
to DM 137.6m in 1996 from DM 145.4m in 1995. This decrease was based on the decline 
in sales in the first 6 months of the year when declining sales and remaining operating 
expenses diminished the results of the European production sites. Cash provided by 
operating activities amounted to DM 80.5m from DM 128.2m in 1995. The decline in 
operating cash-flow was mainly due to the decrease in operating profit as well as the higher 
working capital requirements and inventories brought about by the introduction of a new 
product line. 
In summary, the performance of the company after the buyout was as follows: 





Operating cash-flow 128.2 80.5 
5.13 Exit through an Initial Public Offering in 1995 and merger of Tarkett with Sommer- 
Alibert in 1997 
In June 1995, the investors of the leveraged management LMBO of Tarkett publicly offered 
shares of the company which was well received by the Frankfurt stock exchange. In May 
1997,, Tarkett AG and Sommer-Alibert S. A. (France) entered into an agreement to combine 
their world-wide flooring businesses to create one of the largest flooring companies in the 
sector. The deal involved Sommer-Alibert taking a sixty percent stake in Tarkett which in 
return would pay the DM 705m in cash for Sommer's floor covering business. At the same 
time, Sommer-Alibert would acquire 20.1 million shares in Tarkett through a public take- 
over offer of DM 32.75 per share. The purchase resulted in a significant cut in the 65 
percent stake of the two current shareholders, the investment funds Goldman Sachs and 
Doughty Hanson, who had became shareholders in the course of the leveraged management 
LMBO, and they were compensated with shares in the new company. According to the 
CEOs of both companies 'the combination of these two companies would create a global 
floor covering producer with a well-balanced portfolio of activities, both from a geographic 
and a product point of view and it will also generate potential for synergy and cost 
reductions'. 
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X. Summary of the interview impressions 
The LMBO environment is unlike that of traditional businesses. Interviews with LMBO 
financial investors and owners/managers reinforce the theories about the success of LNMOs 
and are compared with the empirical results of the research. Five owners/managers of 
LM[BO companies were interviewed and each interview was conducted concurrently with 
the accumulated data. 
The LMIBO companies in this sample all resulted from spin-offs of national and international 
corporations, one following composition proceedings of the parent company and one 
originating from a private source. The purchase price of the sample companies ranged from 
DM 2 to DM 711 m and the debt/equity ratios of the LMIBO companies ranged from 1: 3 to 
1: 5. 
Concerning the post buyout performance of the LMBO companies the general impression of 
the financial investors was that LMIBO executives manage more effectively after a LMBO 
than before; they promptly and decisively react to changes in the environment and pay 
attention to their advantageous business, manage cash-flow, recognise and resolve problems 
quickly and spend their energy constructively in managing the businesses. 
The interviews with owners/managers of LMBO companies revealed that several changes 
had been introduced after the buyout with respect to employees, compensation plans, 
product pricing and cost-cutting measures. One manager described the present environment 
as opposite to when he managed the firm as a division of a large group. He reported that 
after the buyout, managers/owners do what has to be done, whereas before the buyout no 
one took a risk and each manager took on a lot of paperwork to protect himself After the 
LMBO, managers/owners pay close attention to projecting and monitoring cash-flows. The 
comments by the LMBO participants interviewed on the development of the company after 
the buyout confirmed the results of the research. 
All of the managers/owners interviewed managed to increase sales volume after the buyout 
by promptly and decisively reacting to changes and opportunities in the market without 
being subject to the permission of the owner or group headquarters. The managers/owners 
interviewed referred to a slight decline in results the first year after the buyout due to the 
increased expenses for restructuring, employee lay-offs and social responsibilities. These 
measures were all implemented in the first year, as owners/managers attempted to consider 
all possible future liabilities and allocate resources for them in the first year after the buyout 
rather than in the years following the buyout. 
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All of the owners/mangers emphasised that they paid closer attention to projecting and 
monitoring cash-flows. Operating cash-flow increased considerably due to increased sales 
volume, better management of working capital and stable operating expenses. All of the 
executives in the survey tend to express their management goals in terms of cash-flow and 
not quarterly profits reports. 
There was a common perception among those interviewed about the management of an 
LN11BO company. Financial investors are regarded as active participants in the management 
who,, however, do not interfere in the day-to-day business decisions of the company. 
Owners/managers manage the company more effectively due to their freedom in decision- 
making and the flexibility they have to react to opportunities on the markets. In the 
interviews, all participants stated that company value increased after the buyout due to 
improved performance which was confirmed by the successful exits these companies had 
already completed. 
The exits of some of the sample LMBO companies confirmed the findings in part C of this 
study that going public as an exit alternative was less popular for German LMDBO 
companies than for their counterparts in the UK. More frequently a trade sale is the exit 
alternative of choice for German LMBO companies. The post-buyout purchase price of the 
LMBO companies gave their investors a considerable return on their initial equity due to the 
favourable debt/equity ration they had chosen to finance the transaction. 
Finally, due to the good post-buyout performance of the sample LMBO companies, they 
were able to repay the LMBO debt in compliance with the repayment schedule agreed upon 
initially. Interested tl-ýird parties were able to find additional growth and synergy potential in 
the LMBO companies and were therefore willing to pay a purchase price which allowed for 
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F. Findings of the study 
Part A 
Part A had introduced the subject of leveraged management buyouts, beginning with the 
historical development of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the US to the leveraged 
management buyouts in the UK and Continental Europe. 
Part B of the study presented the general, non-country specific concept of the leveraged 
management buyout transaction in order to establish a general understanding of the different 
steps and characteristics of this special take-over transaction. One important result of the 
LMEBO evaluation is that it is crucial for the success of the transaction to adopt the most 
appropriate structure from the beginning which can include various elements such as equity, 
mezzanine and debt financing. Once the purchase price is established and agreed among the 
respective parties, the appropriate distribution of equity, mezzanine and debt funding should 
enable the LMIBO company to build up a 'cushion' which will protect the company from 
failure in times of a declining business and market environment. The research and evidence 
of US economists (Roach 1989) on the right mixture of equity and debt financing revealed 
that the inherent risk exposure and the potential vulnerability of highly leveraged companies 
has to be considered when planning the buyout structure. Roach emphasises in this context 
that the real test for highly leveraged companies comes in times of recession or increasing 
interest rates when it remains to be seen if the projections in terms of debt and interest 
repayments were realistic to fulfil its debt servicing requirements in a declining business 
environment. Another important point of discussion in this part of the research concerned 
the exit alternatives available to the LMIBO-investors. Here, different options are available 
depending on the existing structures in each country: how well-established, organised and 
functioning the available financial markets are and what option is the most appropriate for 
each LMBO company. 
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In conclusion, it is important to realise that an LMBO transaction can not be considered as 
homogeneous across Europe, but rather one has to be aware that each European country, 
which has taken the idea from the UK, has had to adopt it to its own existing structures and 
interests. Although the concept of the LMBO can be regarded as a non-country specific 
product, the structure of the LMBO transaction itself is driven by micro- and 
macroeconomic factors and closely linked to the legal and tax environment of each country. 
Part C researched and evaluated the specific macro- and microeconomic factors in the UK 
and Germany which have influenced LMBO activity in both countries in the past and will 
influence it in the future. After the evaluation, a comparison of the respective macro- and 
microcconomic factors was made in order to explain and understand the different level of 
LNMO activity in both countries. 
Macroeconomic factors influential to the LMBO market, such as the deep recession in the 
UK at the beginning of LMBO activity in the early 1980s, increased buyout opportunities in 
that LMBOs were seen as a viable means to save companies from receivership. In Germany, 
buyout activity began in the late 1980s against a background of economic strength and 
growth which was further enhanced by the reunification euphoria following 1989. German 
Mittelstand company owners and also those of large corporations were reluctant to put their 
companies up for sale as this could be regarded as a personal failure. Therefore, LMBOs 
were quite unknown and rare as take-over alternative in Germany. 
In the 1990s, the LMBO market in the UK continued to expand, only sources of 
transactions fluctuated with the changing economic circumstances. When recession emerged 
again in the UK from 1990 to 1992, receivership became more important, whereas when 
economic recovery came to full circle towards the middle of the 1990s, divestment and 
family-owned companies became important buyout sources. 
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In Germany, from the 1990s on, divestment and family-owned companies have always been 
the most important buyout sources when a general restructuring process became necessary 
in German industry in the 1990s. 
LMEBOs have a relatively long history in the UK and have been recognised as a powerful 
restructuring tool and as an instrument of economic recovery. The volume of LM[BO 
transactions has increased steadily and comprised 404 transaction in 1994 at a value of 
f. 2.5bn. In 1996 the volume of LMIBO transactions declined slightly to 402 transactions at a 
value of pounds 3.6bn. Germany, with a distinctly younger LMBO market peaked at 74 
transactions in 1995 in term of number of transactions and in 1996 in terms of value with an 
estimated LMBO market value of pounds 1. Ibn. 
In addition to the number of years the LMBO market has been active, research has revealed 
that other micro- and macroeconomic factors served to encourage or retard the growth of 
the LMBO market. 
In the UK, macroeconomic factors like the establishment and growth of venture capital 
funds have encouraged LMIBO activity in recent years. The UK venture capital industry 
plays an important role in the European venture capital industry with 45 percent of the total 
venture capital volume in Europe administered by the UK. Pension funds at 41 percent and 
insurance companies at 15 percent were the main contributors to venture capital funds. In 
Germany, the role of equity investment and venture capital firms only gained importance in 
the late 1980s and banks with 59 percent and pension funds with 10 percent were the major 
contributors, together representing 69 percent of the total funds available. Due to the 
relatively late development of equity and venture capital in Germany, capital for LMBO 
transactions were predominantly provided by bank financing. This proved a large obstacle 
for many LMBO transactions and retarded the growth of LMIBO activity in Germany. In the 
1990s, the growing presence of financial investors and the establishment of investment 
funds of considerable size made ample sources of capital available and encouraged LMIBO 
activity. The existing size and value of the LMIBO market in 1994 can be attributed to these 
development of the financial market in Germany. 
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The attitude of banks towards LMEBO transactions has evolved over time, as has their 
impact on leveraged buyout activity. In Germany, the 'universal' banking system in place 
differs completely from the 'Trennbanksystem' prevailing in Anglo-American countries. The 
lack of expertise in new financial products has prevented banks from playing but a limited 
role in LMBO transactions. However, over time German banks have proceeded in 
establishing specialised divisions in order to provide the skins required to structure and 
monitor LMBO transactions. This gradual transition of banks into the new field of 
leveraged buyout transactions has encouraged LMBO activity in Germany in recent years. 
Exits routes are a major focus of LMBO investors, but the condition and status of the 
financial markets through which gains are realised are quite different in the UK and 
Germany. Whereas in the UK, flotation has always been an important exit channel, going 
publics counted as one of the least popular exit alternatives in Germany at only 7 percent of 
all exits in 1996. The strict entry criteria companies have to fulfil in order to get a full stock 
exchange listing on German stock exchanges have prevented many from taking this option. 
Microeconornic factors have also played an important role in the development of LMBO 
activity in the UK and Germany. This is especially true for the equity and liability structure 
which greatly influences the various LMBO take-over models available as well as the banks' 
influence on the buyout companies. UK companies tend to run relatively high equity ratios 
of approximately 49 percent due to the applied market or current cost accounting method 
which allows them to revaluate their assets at market value but at the same time prevents 
them from realising the step-up potential of assets often used in LMBO transactions. 
German companies, on the other hand, have relatively low equity ratios of approximately 18 
percent. The 'hidden reserves' in German companies, however, allow for LMBO models to 
be utilised, in which the step-up potential of their assets is used to increase depreciation 
volume, reduce taxable income and therefore increase net cash-flow. 
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The liability structure of UK and German companies differs greatly due to the fact that 
German companies rely heavily on bank debt (52 percent). UK companies, on the other 
hand, prefer external funding through securities (36 percent) which does not allow banks to 
exert such a pronounced influence on leveraged buyout companies. 
Banks also play a totally different role in the UK and Germany in terms of ownership, 
control and influence in the decision-making process of LMBO companies. In Germany, 
banks can exert an immense influence through their own voting fights, proxy votes and 
often a seat on the supervisory board, in addition to their traditional function as debt 
providers. In the UK, in contrast, companies depend much less on bank debt for the 
provision of external funds and prefer funding through securities instead. UK banks have 
therefore much less influence on the decision-making process. Due to the separation of 
investment banking and corporate lending, LJK banks never experience a conflict of their 
interests as lenders and owners of equity. 
Microeconomic factors common to the UK and Germany can be found in the areas of 
operation of LMBO target companies. In the UK as in Germany, leveraged management 
buyouts occurred more and more frequently in the distribution and service sectors, in 
mechanical engineering, business and other services and office machinery. This confirms the 
assumption there is a growing trend among LMBO financiers to finance service oriented 
sectors as well, which have few tangible assets but generate strong and stable cash-flow. In 
the past, LMBO financiers preferred to finance mature, asset rich manufacturing companies 
whose tangible assets could be used as security. 
Further common factors of the UK and Germany are the motives for owners in se ing t eir 
company. A return to core-activities, implying the divestment of non-core businesses from 
group holdings as the prime motive, while and succession problems ranked second in the 
UK at the date of the survey in 1989, as family-owned companies had not yet gained 
importance as an LMIBO source. 
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There are also similarities between the UK and Germany in vendors' motives for selling 
their companies to management. For both the time factor played a significant role, as the 
vendors surveyed considered the sale to the management as the least time consuming 
alternative. The purchase price motive, ranked second, indicated that management, as the 
potential LMBO investors offered the highest purchase price. 
In the survey, LMBO management teams in the UK and Germany were also asked about 
their motives in acquiring the company. Their answers reflected Jensen's 'agency cost' 
theory which outlined the agency related costs which emerge from the cohflict between 
managers and owners. These 'agency costs' were eliminated and performance improved by 
the change in ownership from managers to owners/managers. The UK and German LMBO 
managers surveyed gave the following as their prime motives in acquiring the company. the 
freedom to manage their own company, the belief in the success in the company and the 
opportunity to increase wealth. 
Although there are still some essential micro- and macroeconomic factors which distinguish 
the UK LMBO environment from that in Germany, the German market has been able to 
learn from the example set by the UK and increase the activity on the German LMBO 
market in recent years. The change in attitude of banks towards leveraged finance 
transactions has been significant, as have the expansion and establishment of equity and 
venture capital funds and the attitude among owners and managers with respect to LNMOs. 
Owners have become more willing to sell their companies and, more importantly, to sell to 
the management. A new generation of managers has started to emerge with a more 
entrepreneurial attitude. This could mark the end of the more risk adverse era of 
management, in which the status, the remuneration packages and the job security in their 
present position were paramount. 
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Part D-. Development of country- specific LMBO-models for the UK and Germany 
The legal and tax environments in the UK and Germany is very complex with various 
taxation rates and legal regulations, especially in the context of 'financial assistance' and 
'maintenance of share capital'. Therefore, from a legal and tax point of view, choosing the 
optimal LMEBO structure is vital to the success of the transaction. 
In the UK, the regulations about 'financial assistance' generally prohibit companies from 
giving financial assistance directly or indirectly to another party for the purpose of acquiring 
its own shares. Apart from a few exceptions stated in Section 153, - 1-4 of the Companies 
Act, only the 'whitewash' procedure for private companies set out in Sections 155 through 
158 makes it possible for the purchaser to use their target's assets in LMIBO financing. 
Therefore, before any LMIBO transaction is proposed, it is necessary to ensure that the 
proposal does not violate the Companies Act. 
The next crucial step is the choice of the right LMBO model in order to make use of all the 
legal and tax advantages available in a transaction. Here, one can choose between a share 
deal with or without transfer of assets or an asset deal. The LMBO models examined reveal 
that a share deal with or without transfer of assets offers the most advantages for the vendor 
and purchaser from a legal and tax point of view. If a share deal without the transfer of 
assets is employed as the take-over model, one must ensure that the deal complies with the 
regulations on 'financial assistance'. If a share deal is followed by the transfer of assets, 
there are no legal restrictions to using the target's assets as security for the LMBO loan and 
its cash-flow for the repayment of the LMBO loan, the two main functions of leveraged in a 
buyout transaction. From a tax point of view, the research suggests that the share deal 
offers tax advantages for the vendor and purchaser in the form of 'retirement' or 'group 
relief . 
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In Gen-nany, the regulations about the 'maintenance of share capital' established in the 
Joint-Stock Company Act and Limited Liability Company Act make it difficult to use the 
target's assets and cash-flow for the LMBO financing. In order to circumvent these strict 
regulations, special LMBO techniques have been developed which also provide considerable 
tax advantages for the vendor and the purchaser. 
As in the UK, one LMBO model comprises a share deal followed by an 'internal asset deal', 
also called the 'combination model'. This model combines the advantages for vendors, in 
the form of a share deal, and for purchasers, in the form of an asset deal. The only drawback 
of this model is the trade tax expenses which are not able to be compensated. 
In 1995, a new LMBO model was developed to avoid these trade expenses, made possible 
due to changes in German Reorganisation Law. The resulting 'conversion modell, allows the 
corporation to convert to a partnership without revealing their 'hidden reserves', which 
would increase their taxable income. Additionally, the step-up potential of the target's 
assets could be realised, resulting in increased depreciation volume, reduced taxable income 
and increased cash-flow volume. 
To sum up the LMBO models used in the LJK and Germany, the findings confirm the 
assumption that the appropriate take-over model enables all participants to overcome the 
legal and tax barriers in the UK and Germany in the context of LMBO transactions. 
Therefore, LMBOs have been confirmed to be a viable take-over alternative in the case of 
divestment, buyouts of family-owned companies, privatisation or other forms of business 
transaction. 
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Part E: The impact of the LMBO concept on the post-buyout performance of companies 
and the evaluation of post-buyout performance of German LMBO companies under difficult 
economic conditions 
In this part, the focus was on the theories and evidence of US, UK and German research 
concerning the increase in wealth and the improvement in performance of LMBO 
companies after the buyout. Among the hypotheses examined,, the tax hypothesis and 
'agency cost' hypothesis offered the most plausible explanations for the post-buyout 
development of LMIBO companies. In the tax hypothesis, operating profit increases as a 
result of the benefits inherent in the tax structure of an LM[BO transaction. Secondly, 
operating results improve through the reduction of agency costs which arose from the 
separation of ownership and control between owners and managers before the buyout. This 
conflict especially involved the amount of free cash-flow available, which technically should 
be paid out to shareholders, but instead were allocated otherwise by the management in 
order to increase their power and control. Research in the US and the UK found that the 
participation of management in the equity of the target increases their efforts to use 
available cash-flow to invest in positive net present value projects or shareholder dividends, 
instead of wasting it on the inefficiency of the organisation. Another factor in the 'agency 
cost' theory points out the role of debt in encouraging organisational efficiency. By issuing 
debt instead of stock, managers are bound to their pledge to pay out future cash-flow 
instead of spending it on negative net present value projects. 
The following empirical research then examined whether the improvement in performance 
of German LMBO companies due to the above factors can be sustained for German LMBO 
companies in the period of recession between 1990 and 1994. The findings revealed that the 
30 LMBO sample companies experienced a considerable increase in sales and operating 
cash-flow volume after the buyout. The LMIBO sample companies also outperformed their 
industry rivals in sales and operating cash-flow. Operational income, in contrast, declined in 
the first post-buyout year and increased only slightly in the second buyout year. 
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Despite the positive results of the LMBO sample companies, statistical evidence could not 
provide significant support for the general assumption that post-buyout performance of 
LMIBO companies is better than pre-buyout performance in times of economic recession. 
With the exception of sales performance which revealed a significant difference between the 
pre- and the post-buyout variables, the operating income and operating cash-flow before 
and after the buyout were not significantly different in order to reject the null hypothesis. 
Anecdotal evidence obtained through interviews with LMBO participants revealed that 
LMBO owners/managers manage their companies more effectively after the buyout than 
before. The interviews indicated that managers were able to react promptly and decisively 
to the changes and opportunities on the market and their motivation increased due to their 
equity in the LMBO company. LMBO managers/owners also gave evidence to the findings 
showing a decline in operating income in the first buyout year. Increased expenses for 
restructuring, employee lay-offs and social responsibilities all factored into the decline 
according to the anecdotal evidence. All LMBO managers/owners confirmed that close 
attention was paid to projecting and monitoring cash-flow after the buyout. Operating cash- 
flow increased considerably in the sample companies due to increased sales volumes, better 
management of working capital and stable operating expenses. All the managers/owners 
interviewed tended to view their goal in terms of cash-flow results and not quarterly 
reportable profits. They emphasised that the company value rose due to the improved 
operating performance, which is confirmed by the successful exits of several of the sample 
companies through trade sale or flotations. 
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Conclusion 
In the last decade, there has been a significant increase in the number and value of LMBO 
transactions in the UK, spreading over to Continental Europe. The underlying micro- and 
macroeconomic factors that promote LMIBO activity and the post-buyout performance of 
LMIBO companies have often been the subject of discussion between LMBO practitioners 
and academics. This topic has been discussed by researchers in the US, the UK and 
Germany, the results of which are presented in this paper. The research of this study was 
stimulated by the above debate and the lack of research on different aspects of LMBO 
activity in European markets and on post-buyout performance of LMBO companies outside 
the US and the UK. This study investigates the effects of the different micro- and 
macroeconomic conditions in the UK and Germany on the development of each LMBO 
market, presents existing evidence on the post-buyout performance of UK and German 
LMBO companies under favourable economic conditions and investigates post-buyout 
performance of German LMIBO companies under difficult economic conditions. A number 
of conclusions can be readily drawn from the research conducted and the evidence revealed. 
The results of the first part of this research examined the difference in micro- and 
macroeconomic factors influencing LMBO activity in the UK and Germany. The conclusion 
can be drawn that these differences had a strong impact on the development of LMBO 
activity in the UK and Germany. There are a number of relevant factors within an economy 
which, when combined, create a favourable or unfavourable climate for LMBOs. The 
external conditions that affect the availability of LMBO opportunities can be divided into 
the following categories: the willingness of owners to sell, the willingness of managers to 
buy, the ability to complete the transfer within each country's legal and tax requirements and 
the availability of appropriate sources of finance. The development of the LMBO market 
can be impaired or retarded by discrepancies in the above factors. The external conditions in 
the countries under examination., the UK and Germany, feature different pressures and 
regulations which have to be considered in an LMBO transaction. 
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The opportunities for an LMBO are determined by the economic conditions and the 
industrial structure of the respective country. Abundant merger and acquisition activitN, 
which leads to large national and international conglomerates can increase the potential for 
LMBOs,. as can the prevalence of many small- to medium-sized family-owned companies 
facing succession problems. 
Economic downturns in the UK and Germany have pressured national and international 
conglomerates to adjust their corporate structure and to return to their core-activitiesl. ý 
consequently to sell their non-core units or divisions in order to increase profitability. In the 
UK, this first took place during the recession in 1981, whereas in Germany industrial 
restructuring first occurred in the beginning of the 1990's. Globalisation,, increasing 
competition and the pressure of economic downturns also pushed small- to medium-sized 
company owners to consider selling their companies rather than struggle through recession. 
These company owners were always very reluctant to sell - especially in Germany - due to 
the fact that such a sale could be regarded as a failure. Moreover, company owners were 
hesitant to sell their life's work to an outside party. The LMBO concept enabled company 
owners in the UK and Germany to sell their company, but keep the small- to medium-sized 
structure and its independence. 
Management's ability to take over the company they work in depends on the structure of the 
company, the other bidding parties and the price. Research concerning the motive of owners 
to sell a company to management revealed that rather unemotional factors prevailed such as 
the efficiency of a sale to management and the purchase price offered. 
Furthermore, potential LMBO candidates - be it divestment of conglomerates or family- 
owned companies - cannot become an actual LMBO target unless the managers are willing 
to buy and are able to raise the necessary funds. The willingness of managers to participate 
in an LMBO is an indication of the entrepreneurial culture in the respective countries. In the 
past, German managers were always thought to have less of an entrepreneurial spirit than 
their UK counterparts due to high remuneration packages, a desire for job security and an 
aversion to risk. 
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The evidence presented here, however, suggests that this risk averse attitude among 
German managers seems to have been replaced with a strong desire to manage their own 
company, belief in a company they manage and the wish to create wealth. 
The availability of financial support for an LMBO transaction is subject to the sophistication 
of the financial markets in the respective country. Particularly relevant conditions here are 
the strength of the venture capital industry, the willingness of banks to implement new 
financing techniques and the number of exit channels available to realise the gains of 
investors and LMBO managers. The UK has a well developed venture capital industry, a 
strong banking industry experienced in LMBOs and an active,, well-developed stock market 
culture. These conditions have brought about a significant increase in LMBO activity over 
the years. 
The venture capital industry is developing strongly in Germany and many funds have been 
established in the 1990s. The banking sector has also recognised leveraged finance 
transactions as a new market niche and has established specialised departments in order to 
provide the expertise required in this field. Exit alternatives are of vital importance to 
venture capital firms to realise the return on their investments. In Germany, the 
development of an active stock market is still proceeding very slowly, but the 'Neue Markt', 
established in 1997, provides the necessary infrastructure for initial public offerings of small- 
to medium-sized companies by loosening their admission criteria. 
Several microeconomic factors in the LJK and Germany have an impact on the various take- 
over models available,, among them the equity and liability structure. Differences in 
valuation regulations in the countries under examination do not allow UK companies to 
conceal as many 'hidden reserves' in their balance sheets as German companies. As a result, 
there is less step-up potential for assets in the UK, which is therefore less significant for 
their take-over models than in Germany. 
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The liability structure of UK and German companies differs greatly. Bank financing plays a 
much bigger role in German companies than in UK companies, which prefer external 
financing through securities. Due to the reliance of German companies on bank financing, 
banks have much more influence on the development of the LMIBO market in Germany than 
in the UK. What's more, the governance model prevailing in German companies allows 
banks to have a strong impact on the decision-making process of companies. 
Upon examination of the business sectors in which LM[BOs occur, the research revealed 
that transactions frequently occurred in service sectors in the UK and Germany, followed by 
mechanical and instrumental engineering. This confirms the assumption that the focus of 
LMBO activity has changed from a tendency towards production companies with a 
substantial amount of tangible assets to service industry sectors with insufficient tangible 
assets to secure loans, but a significant cash-flow potential. 
Another common factor that affects the number of LMBO opportunities available in the 
countries under examination is the changing attitude of owners and managers towards 
LMBOs. In the UK, LMBOs have always been regarded as an efficient means to restructure 
a company and create wealth through the remarriage of ownership and control. In Germany, 
on the other hand, owners and managers at the beginning of LN1BO activity were very 
reluctant to accept LMBOs as a viable take-over form. 
According to Graper's recent research (1993), German owners are slowly changing their 
attitude towards LMEBOs and recognise this take-over model as an opportunity to sell a 
company at a competitive purchase price and in a very efficient manner. The managers, on 
the same token, have developed a more entrepreneurial attitude, abandoning their risk-free 
positions and remuneration packages for the freedom to manage their company more 
independently and the desire to create wealth. 
The legal and fiscal environment is another crucial factor for the development of an active 
LMIBO market. In the first step here, the research presented the relationship between the 
existing legal and taxation regulations in the UK and Germany and the structuring goals of 
an LMIBO- 
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It must be assumed that the complexity and strictness of the German legal environment - 
especially in terms of the 'maintenance of share capital' - was responsible for the reluctance 
towards LMBO transactions in the beginning. In the UK, in contrast,, the exceptions to the 
regulations for'financial assistance',, introduced by the conservative government of Margaret 
Thatcher, did not conflict with the existing regulations for the maintenance of share capital. 
In the second step, the research presented take-over models for UK and German LMIBO 
transactions in accordance with the prevailing legal and tax regulations in both countries. 
Due to the strictness and complexity of the German legal and tax environment, the take- 
over models are more complex and require extensive due diligence of the legal and tax 
issues before the transaction can be concluded. This may have been an obstacle for several 
LMIBO transactions at the beginning of LMIBO activity in Germany. 
Upon examination of post-buyout performance of LMBOs, the existing research suggests 
that there is a distinct improvement after a leveraged buyout. However, this evidence is 
insufficient to judge LMBOs in economic downturns due to the fact that most of the 
existing research was conducted against the background of a strong economic environment. 
The next step of this study was then to investigate whether LMBOs completed in times of 
recession would also have the same positive impact on post-buyout performance as those 
completed in economic upturns. The empirical research on LMBO companies in Germany 
which were targets of a buyout in times of economic downturns presented evidence on 
post-buyout operating results in 30 LMBO companies from 1991 to 1994. 
These 30 companies experienced an increase in sales, operating income (before 
depreciation) and operating cash-flow after the transaction. Sales performance was 7.5 
percent higher in the first year and 13.3 percent higher in the second year after the buyout 
than before the transaction. Statistically these results were highly significant at probability 
levels of 0.30 and 0.011 respectively. The sales growth of LMBO companies was 
significantly higher than the industry average at a probability level of 0.029. 
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Operating income, in contrast, declined in the first post-buyout year by 14.9 percent and 
increased in the second year after the buyout only by 1.9 percent. However, - these results 
were not statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis at probability levels of 0.581 
and 0.359 respectively. According to anecdotal evidence of LMBO participants, operating 
income declined in the first year due to the allocation of resources to restructuring measures 
related to the LMBO. This was further confirmed by the fact that operating cash-flow 
volume, as opposed to operating income, increased in the first year after the buyout 
indicating that measures not directly related to cash, such as provisions for restructuring and 
lay-offs were responsible for the decline in operating income. Compared to the industry 
average, the operating results of LMBO companies were worse than their industry 
counterparts. Statistically, however, this assumption could not be confirmed. 
Operating cash-flow increased in the first year after the buyout by 4.5 percent and in the 
second year by 33.5 percent. Statistically, however, the probability levels were insignificant 
at levels of 0.5 97 and 0.110 respectively. Compared to industry average, LMIBO companies 
exceeded the operating income growth-rate of their industry counterparts, but this could not 
be statistically sustained at the probability level of 0.316. 
Financial performance in the 30 sample companies after the LMIBO was superior to 
performance before the buyouts with the exception of operating income in the first year 
after the buyout. Income tax savings do not appear to have been the source of the increase 
in wealth, as the improvement in performance was measured with the variables sales and 
operating cash-flow, which exclude the effects of tax generated savings. According to the 
anecdotal evidence of LMBO participants of some of the sample companies, LMBO 
managers/owners seemed to manage the company more effectively after the buyout than 
before. Interviews also provided evidence that the reduction of debt was a dominant goal 
for the owner/managers and investor/owners after the buyout. Furthermore, they confirmed 
that close attention was paid to projecting and monitoring cash-flows rather than 
concentrating on reportable profits. 
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The results of the 30 sample companies and the anecdotal evidence of the interviews seem 
to support the 'agency cost' theory with regard to free cash-flow and to debt bonding. The 
entrepreneurial explanation seems to provide an adequate explanation for the increase in 
performance of the 30 sample companies after the buyout. Owners/managers can react 
promptly and decisively to opportunities in the market that benefit the company and 
increase its value. 
However, seen from a statistical point of view, the hypotheses that LMBO post-buyout 
performance exceeds pre-buyout performance under economically difficult circumstances 
could not be sustained for all assumptions. Only the development of sales could sustain the 
hypothesis that post-buyout performance exceeds pre-buyout performance and that of the 
respective industry. 
With respect to operating income and operating cash-flow the statistical results provided 
were insufficient to sustain the hypotheses that post-buyout performance exceeds pre- 
buyout performance and the industry average also in times of economic recession. 
Recent developments indicate that there is significant growth potential for the German 
LMBO market for the following reasons: the entry of national and international investors 
and venture capital firms, the growing public interest in well-known LMIBO transactions, 
the growing need for industrial restructuring and the increasing succession problems among 
German 'Mittelstand' companies. Furthermore, the establishment of favourable external 
conditions for LMIBOs in Germany based on the successful UK example will create an 




Speciric jargons and abreviations 
Acquisition 
Purchase of a company 
Agent 
Natural or legal entity who acts on behalf of a principal. 
Asset-backed transactions 
Transactions where the assets of a company are the only security for the financing. 
Asset deal 
Purchase of a company through transfer of single assets. 
Break-up value 
Value of the company in the case of liquidation 
Business Plan 
Plan which enables potential investors an estimation of the potential and the risks of the 
target company. 
Business Risk 
Risk existing in some business areas. 
Cash-flow lending 
Financing on the basis of budgeted cash flows. 
Corporate finance 
Financing of corporate transactions and equity relevant financial services. 
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Corporate restructuring 
Restructuring of a purchased target company 
Covenants 
Conditions given by banks at the issue of a credit. 
Disinvestment 
Disposal of certain company parts or subsidiaries. 
Exit 
Date, where the financiers dispose of their participation on the buy-out. 
Gearing 
Ratio between equity and debt. 
Going Concern value 
Value of a company under going concern aspects. 
Going Private 
Exclusion of the public concernig equity participation. 
Going Public 
Opening to the public concerning equity participations. 
Goodwill 
Immaterial value of the company. 
Hostile Take-over 
Take-over of a (listed) company against the consent of the present management. 
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Mdden reserves 
Difference between current cost and historical cost value of assets 
ICTA 
Income and corporation taxes act 
Junior Debt 
Unsecured, subordinated debt with equity character, whose repayment rely entirely on the 
cash flow power of the company. 
Junk bonds 
Highly speculative bonds with low rating 
Leveraged buy-out (LBO) 
Purchase of a company, subsidiary or division, primarily for cash, that is financed primarily 
by debt. The company's cash generating capacity is the source of debt service. The assets of 
the company are often pledged as collateral, providing back-up protection for the lenders. 
Typically, the thin layer of equity is held by the investment banking firm sponsoring the 
transaction, other third-party investors and a management group. 
Leveraged Management buyout (LMBO) 
Special form of leveraged buy-out in which the current management of the acquired 
corporation holds a significant equity stake in the company after the buy-out is completed. 
For better understanding and clarification this form of transaction will be referred to as 
LMBO in the study. 
Leveraged Management buyin (LMBI) 
A leveraged buy-out in which an outside management acquires a significant equity stake in 
the target company and where the transaction price is financed mainly be debt. 
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Mergers & Acquisitions 
Definition for company mergers and acquisition and services connected with it. 
Mezzanine 
Risk capital used at the purchase of a company which lays between equity and senior debt, 
taking the form of subordinated and unsecured debt. 
Present Value 
Value of the future returns of a company, discounted at a propriate interest rate. 
Senior Debt 
Ordinary, not subordinated debt. 
Share deal 
Purchase of a company through transfer of shares. 
Spin-off 
Disposal of a unit of a company. 
Target 
Company which is the object of a take-over. 
Trade sale 
Disposal of a company to another company. 
Venture capital 
Risk capital from certain institutions in order to finance certain projects. 
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Appendix B 
Leveraged Management Buyouts in Germany: 
Some descriptive background 
Most significant LMBOs in Germany from 1981 - 1989 
Company Sales Price Type Year 
(in Mil. DEM) 
n. a. LMBO 1985 
700 LxlBo 1990 
540 LMBO 1989 
n. a. LMBO 1985 
120 LNIBO 1987 
70 LMBO 1989 
n. a. LMBO 1987 
80 LNlBO 1990 
n. a. LNIBO 1988 
n. a. LMBO 1988 
1. Knorr Bremse 1.000 
2. Lancaster 900 
3. Lignotock GmbH 500 
4. Lowe Opta 260 
5. Ex-Cell-O 200 
6. Wallace & Tiernan 200 
7. Heidemann. Werke 150 
8. Kaiser Kabel 145 
9. Hein Gericke 110 
10. Leifeld Gruppe 100 
(Source: Karsunky, 1992 ) 
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Most significant LMBOs from 1990-1996 
Company Sales Price Type Year 
(in Mil . DEM) 
1. AEG n. a. 700 LMBO 1996 
1. Tarkett n. a. 650 LM[BO 1994 
2. Empe n. a. 235 LMIBO 1995 
3. Bran& Luebbe n. a. 210 LM[BO 1993 
4. BBG/Wilhelm Weber n. a. 175 LMBO 1996 
5. Hofmann Menue n. a. 125 LM[BO 1996 
6. Huss Holdings n. a. 100 LMBO 1996 
7. Deutsche Seereed. 1.000 n. a. LVIBO 1993 
Rostock 
8 Badische Stahlwerke 725 n. a. LM[130 1991 
9. Friedrich Deckel AG 636 n. a. LMBO 1991 
10. LVW AG 530 n. a. LMBO 1993 
11. Elpro AG 450 n. a. LMBO 1992 
12. Georg Lingenbrink 350 173 LMBO 1993 
13. Josef Riepl Bau AG 316 n. a. LM[BO 1991 
14. Aluminium Rheinf 278 n. a. LMIBO 1993 
15. Alurninium Giess. 200 170 LM1130 1991 
Villingen 
16. KaBbohrer n. a. 162 LMBO 1994 
Gelandefahrzeug 
17. Wesumat Fahrzeug- n. a. 71 LMBO 1994 
waschanlagen 
18. Infox n. a. 71 LM[BO 1995 
(Source. Amdata, Acquisitions Monthly, Initiative Europe 1997) 
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LMBOs in Germany from 1990-1994 by number and value 











(Source: Initiative Europe, European Buyout Review, 1997) 
LMBOs by value 
Total value/average 
Estimated value (GBP NEI. ) 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
Total value (GBP MI. ) 1.148 540 733 397 322 224 292 
Average value (GBP MI. ) 181,5 7,3 12,4 95-0 65o3 85,3 8,1 
(Source: Initiative Europe, European Buyout Review 1997) 
Value range of LMBOs 
% of total number 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1980-1990 
Less than GBP 5 MI. 361,8 35ý10 2916 523,4 50510 331.3 51317 
5- 10 MI. 135,2 151,0 183,5 19,10 20310 25; 10 
16ý7 
GBP 10 - 25 NEI. 23,7 25ýO 37510 143,3 10310 3373 13,13 
over GBP 25 MI. 263,3 255,0 143.8 141,3 200 83 183 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sample size 38 20 27 21 10 12 60 
(Source: Initiative Europe, European Buyout Review 1997) 
245 
LMBOs from 1981 - 1989 due to succession problems 
Target company 
1. Knorr Bremse 
2. Grünbeck GmbH 
3. Sachtler 
4. Brandt 
5. Hein Gericke 
6. Leifeld Gruppe 
7. Heidemann Werke 
8. Brause 
9. Ursula Neuhauser 
10. Königsberger 
Activity Year 
Automotive parts 1985 
Water treatment 1988 
Manufacture of tripod heads 1988 
Textiles 1988 
Motor bicycles and comp. 1988 
Machine tool manufact. 1988 
Automotive components 1988 
Stationery 1989 
Textiles 1989 
Manufacturer of cloth 1989 
(Source: Karsunky, 1992) 
LMBOs from 1990 - 1996 due to succession problems 
Target company 
1. AS Creation 
2. Bela Muehle 
3. Floraprint International 
4. Koelbel 
5. Kabel. Vision 
6. Goetz& Mueller 
7. Burton Gruppe 






Manufacture of wallpaper 1990 
Supply of animal feed 1990 
Printing of hortic. catalogues 1992 
Mail order supplier 1992 
Cable Television 1993 
Printing Services 1993 
Production of refractory mat. 1994 
Knitwear 1994 
Manufact. for autom. industr. 1995 
Marketing for travel industry 1995 
Sale measurement systems 1996 
PVC windows and shutters 1996 
(Source: Initiative Europe/Europe Buyout Review 1997) 
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5. Hiippe GmbH 
6. Thomson 
7. Textron 
8. Hoechst AG 
9. Ransburg Corp. 
10. Hoogovens 
Divestment Reason Year 
Dilektra GmbH New group strategy 1981 
Piper High losses of Piper 1982 
Pittler AG New group strategy 1984 
Loewe Opta GmbH Anti-trust law 1985 
Jaso Kiichemn6bel High losses of Jaso 1986 
Europart GmbH New group strategy 1987 
Ex-Cell-O New group strategy 1987 
Goldbach GmbH New group strategy 1988 
Statomat GmbH New group strategy 1989 
Kaiser Kable New group strategy 1989 
(Source, Karsunky, 1992) 
LMBOs from 1990 - 1996 due to divestments 
Mother company Divestment Reason Year 
1. John A. Benckiser Benckiser Water Treatment n. a. 1990 
2. Robannic Group Vemag Maschinenbau n. a. 1991 
3. Everest & Jennings Ortopedia n. a. 1991 
4. Bergeman Pfister n. a. 1991 
5. Maxwell Rushware n. a. 1992 
6. Tetra Laval Bran & Luebbe n. a. 1993 
7. FAG Kugelfischer Lukas Hydraulik n. a. 1993 
8. Stora Tarkett n. a. 1994 
9. Karl KaBbohrer KaBbohrer Gelandefahrzeug n. a. 1994 
10. Henkel Mattes & Weber n. a. 1994 
11. Schiele Industriew. Daimler Benz Aerospace n. a. 1995 
12. Colortronic GmbH K-Tron International Inc. n. a. 1995 
13. AEG AEG n. a. 1996 
14. Hofinann Menue Grand Met. p1c. n. a. 1996 
(Source: Initiative Europope, European Buyout Review 1997) 
247 
Bibliography 
Albach H., (1983), Die Bedeutung nüttelständischer Unternehmen in der Marktwirtschaft, 
Zfl3,. Heft 9, pp. 870-888, cited in Luippold, Management Buy-out, p. 27 
Almess K., (March 1997), Management Buy-outs and Firm-Level Performance, CN11BOR 
Altman E. I., Smith R. C., (Winter 1991), Highly leveraged restructurings, A valid role for 
Europe, The Journal of International Securities, pp. 347-357 
Amihud, (1985), Leveraged Management Buy-outs, Prepared for the Conference on 
Management Buyouts, New York 
Ballwieser W. Prof Dr., (1991), Symposiumsdiskussion zum 4. Management Buy-out 
Kongress in Frankfurt, p. 239 
Bannock G., (1990), The long term performance of Management Buy-outs. 3i, Occasional 
paper, London 
Bannock G., (1990), The economic impact of Management buy-outs, pp. 8-14 
Barry C., Muscarella C., Leavy J and Vetsuypens M., (1990), The role of venture capitalists 
in the creation of public companies: Evidence from the Going Public Process, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27, pp. 447-471 
Berger R., (1990), Corporate restructuring in Europa im Hinblick auf die EG 1992, In 
Siegwart H, Meilensteine im Management, Restrukturierung & Tumarounds, 
Basel/Frankfurt, pp. 37-57 
BDO, (August 1991), Financial Statements Worldwide, Second Edition, pp. 112-123, 
302-317 
248 
Blumers W., Beinert S., (1995), Grundregeln für die Optinuerung des Untemehmenskaufes 
nach dem neuen Umwandlungssteuerrecht, DB, Heft 21, p. 1043 
Blumers W., Marquardt M., (Dezember 1995), Untemehmenskdufe durch Anteilserwerb 
nach neuem Umwandlungssteuerrecht, DStR (Deutsches Steuerrecht), Heft 51-52,32. 
Jahrgang 23, p. 1872 
Braun Ch., (1989), Leveraged Buy-outs, Theoretische Grundlagen und empirischer 3- 
Länder Vergleich, München, GBI-Verlag, pp. 24-59 
Bruse, (199 1), Buchwertaufstockung, M&A Review, p. 120 
Bull 1., (1988), Management Performance in Leveraged Buy-outs, An empirical analysis, 
Journal of Business Venturing 3, pp. 263-279 
BVK (German Venture Capital Association e. V. ) Jahrbuch 1995, pp. 105-113 
BVK (German Venture Capital Association e. V. ) Jahrbuch 1997 
Chiplin B., Coyne J., Wright M., (July 1988), Management Buy-outs: The prospects in 
Continental Europe; A ten country study, 3i Occasional paper 
Coenenberg A. G., (1992), Jahresabschluf3 und JahresabschluBanalyse, 13. Edition, 
Landsberg am Lech, Verlag Moderne Industrie, p. 588 
CMBOR: Wright M., Wilson N., Robbie K., Ennew Ch., (March 1992), Occasional paper 
number 44 
CMBOR: Wright M., Robbie K., (Summer 1995), Management Buy-outs, Quaterly review 
from the Centre for Management Buy-out Research, pp. 3-6 
249 
CMBOR: Wright M., Thompson S., Robbie K., (March 1990), Corporate restructuring and 
the role of management and employee buy-outs, An overview of the issues and evidence in 
the UK and Europe, Occasional paper 21 
CMBOR- Wright M., Thompson S., Robbie K., (March 1992), Management equltY, 
ownersip, debt and performance, Some evidence from UK Management buy-outs, 
Occasional paper 32 
CMBOR: Wright M., Robbie K., (Winter 1995/1996), Quaterly review from the Centre for 
Management Buy-out Research, pp. 13-30 
CMBOR: Wright M., Robbie K., (June 1996), Management Buy-outs, 1986-1996, 
CMBOR, Towards the next millenium 
CMBOR: Wright M., Robbie K., Chiplin B.; (Spring 1997), Quaterly review of the Centre 
for Management Buy-out Research 
De Angelo H., De Angelo L., Rice E. M., (1984), Going private: Nlinority freezouts and 
stockholder wealth, Journal of Law and Economics 27, pp. 367-401 
De Angelo H., (1990), Accounting Review 
Köhler A. /Rotter N. j Demming C. /Schäfer H. (Hrsg. ), (1994), Britische Rechnungslegung, 
Chapter 4; Classification of firms and companies, Schaffer-Poeschel Verlag, Stuttgart, pp. 
37-45 
Deutsche Bundesbank, (November 1995), Monatsbericht, p. 43 
Die Bank, (1989), Banken bauen ihren Anteilsbesitz ab, pp. 519-522, cited in Kessel A., 
167 
250 
Dienst R. Ch., (1989), Neue Finanztechniken beim Unternehmenskauf in Deutschland. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH Inforinationsdienste und Matuschka Gruppe (Hrsg. ). 
Symposiumsdiskussion Management Buy-out" München am 09.06.1989, p. 23-33 
European Private Equity Survey, (1997) 
Fahrholz B. Dr., (1991), Management Buy-out Kongress in Frankfurt in 1991, pp. 50-64 
Feick H. G., Bender M. (Hrsg. ), (1994), Business Transactions in Germany 
Fest C., Wolbert H., (1989), Nüt Fremdkapital ein Unternehmen kaufen, FAZ 117/19893, 
Verlagsbeilage Unternehmensbeteiligungen - Management Buy-outs, B 15 
Financial Times, (May 1996), Management Buy-out Supplement 
Financial Times, (May 1997), Interest grows in Germany Is Neue Markt 
Fischer M., (1995), Verschmelzung von GmbH in der Handels- und Steuerbilanz, Der 
Betrieb, Heft 10,48. Jahrgang, p, 488 
Forst M., (1992), Management Buy-out und Buy-In als Form der Übernahme 
mittelständischer Unternehmen, Schriften zur Mittelstandsforschung, Institut für 
Nüttelstandsforschung, Nr. 48 NF, Bonn 
Fried V, - Hisrich R. and Polonchek 
A., (1993), Research Note: Venture capitalits investment 
criteria: A Replication, Journal of Small Business Finance, 3(1), pp. 37-42 
Fried V and FEsrich R., (1994), Towards a model of venture capital investment decision 
making, Financial Management, 23(3), pp. 28-37 
Frommann H., (1991), Internationale und nationale Entwicklung von MBO's. Beitrag zum 
4. Management Buy-out Kongress am 10. und 11.03.1991 in Frankfurt, pp. 262-268 
251 
Gräper M., (1993), Management Buy-out, Kieler Schriften zur Finanzwirtschaft, 
Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk Kiel KG, Band 14, Kiel 
Groeben v. d. F., (1988), Management Buy-out, Neue Schubkraft ffir Unternehmen, ZflK, 
Heft 7, pp. 266-268, cited in Luippold, Management Buy-out, p. 30 
Groeben v. d. F, (1988), Voraussetzungen für einen erfolgreichen Management Buy-out 
Dokumentation zum MBO-Kongress, Neuss, pp. 34-41 
Hardman J. P.,, Thornton G., (1986/1987), The tax implication of Management Buy-outs, 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Hrsg. ), Accountants Tax 
Digest Nr. 53 
Harvey M, Lusch R., (1995), Expanding the nature and scope of due diligence, Journal of 
Business Venturing, pp. 5-21 
Hensel W., 
- 
Merz S., (1992), Die steuerliche Optirnierung - ein geldwertes Kapitel, in-. 
Liitjen, Management Buy-out; pp. 169-193 
flite G., Vetsuypens M., (1989), Management Buy-outs of divisions and shareholder 
wealth, Journal of Finance 44, pp. 953-970 
Higson C., (1995), Business Finance, Second Edition, Butterworths 
Hoffmann/Ramke, (1992), Managment buy-out in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2. 
Auflage, Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, pp. 70-96 
Hölters (Hrsg. ), (1992), Handbuch des Unternehmens- und Beteiligungskaufs, 4. Auflage, 
Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag 
252 
Holzapfel H. J., Pöllath R., (1994), Recht und Praxis des Untemehmenskaufs, Rechtliche 
und steuerliche Aspekte, 7. neubearbeitete Auflage, Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbR 
K61n, p. 160 
Initiative EuropeAPrivate Equity Monitor, (September 1996) 
Initiative Europe, (1995), Europe Buyout Review 
Initiative Europe, (1996), Europe Buyout Review 
Initiative Europe, (1997), Europe Buyout Review 
International Trade Comission, (1983), The weighted cost of capital of US companies 
Jensen M. C., Meckling W., (1976), Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp. 305-360 
Jensen M. C., (1986), Agency Costs and Free Cash Flow - Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 76, pp. 323-329 
Jensen M. C., (1988), Takeovers: Their causes and consequences, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, pp. 21-48 
Jensen M. C., (1994), The eclipse of the public corporation, Harvard Business Review 
Kaplan S., (1989), The Effects of Management Buy-outs on operating performance and 
value, Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 217-254 
Kaplan S., Stein J., (1993), The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 
1990's, Quaterly Joumal of Economics, 108, pp. 313-357 
253 
Karsunky R., (1992), Entwicklung eines funktionenorientierten Leveraged Management 
Buy-out Modells" und Beurteilung seiner Strukturierungs- und Finanzierungsaltemativen in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Grof3britannien und Frankreich, Frankfurt am Main, 
Verlag Peter Lang GmbH, pp. 33-36, p. 100, pp. 286-288, pp. 193-194 
Kessel A, (1995), Der Leveraged Buy-out in den USA und der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 166-170 
Kieschnik R. L., (1987), Management Buy-outs of Public Corporations, An empirical 
analysis, Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin 
Knight WJL, (1992), The Acquisition of Private Companies, Sixth Edition, London, 
Longman Group Ltd. 
Koenen S., Gohr M., (1993), Asset-Deal, Share-Deal oder Kombinationsmodell - 
Anwendungsvoraussetzungen und ertragsteuerliche Effekte der Übernahme von 
Kapitalgesellschaften, Der Betrieb, Heft 51/52,46. Jahrgang, p. 2548 
Kohlberg J. A., (1989), Buy-outs in den USA. Symposiumsdokumentation Management 
Buy-out in München vom 09.06.1989. FAZ GmbH Informationsdienste und Matuschka 
Gruppe, pp. 1-10 
Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts & Co. (with Deloitte Haskins & Sells), (1989), Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 64-70 
Lake S. J., (1995), An examination of the German Management Buy-out Market, Factors 
influencing and likely future potential, Dissertation, University of Nottingham (School of 
Management and Finance) 
Lehn K, Poulsen A., (1989), Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private 
transactions, Journal of Finance 44, pp. 771-788 
254 
Leimbach A., (1991), Unternehmensübernahmen im Wege des Management Buy-outs in der 
Bundesrepublik. Besonderheiten, Chancen, Risiken, Kontaktstudium in Zusammenarbeit mit 
dem USW Universitätsssenünar der Wirtschaft, pp. 454-455 
Leopold G., (1989), Der Markt entwickelt sich positiv, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
vom 23.05.1989, B 12 
Lerbinger P., (1986), Untemehmensakquisition durch LBO. Die Bank Nr. 3, pp. 113-142 
Lichtenberg F., Siegel D., (1990), The effects of leveraged buy-outs on productivity and 
related aspects of firm behaviour, Journal of Financial Economics 27, pp. 165-194 
Lorenz T., (1989), Venture Capital today, Brentice Woodhead, Hamel Hemp stead/England, 
Luippold T., (1992), Management Buy-outs, Evaluation ihrer Einsatzm6glichkeiten in 
Deutschland, 2. Auflage, Haupt Verlag, pp. 169-176 
Lutter M., 
- Wahlers H. W., 
(1989), Der Buyout: Amerikanische Fälle und die Regeln des 
deutschen Rechts, Die Aktiengesellschaft, p. 13 
Lowenstein L., (1986), Management Buy-outs, Columbia Law Review 730, pp. 730-784 
Marais L., Schipper K., Smith A., (1986), Management Buy-out Proposals and Corporate 
Claimholders: Explicit Recontracting and Differential Wealth Effects. University of 
Chicago, Graduate School of Business, Working paper 
Marais L., Schipper K., Smith A., (1989), Wealth Effects of going privates on senior 
securities, Journal of Financial Econonfics, pp. 165-194 
&A Review (1996) 
255 
MacNfillan I. C., Zemann L. and Subbanarasima P. N. S., (1987), Criteria distinguishing 
successful from unsuccessful ventures in the venture screening process, Journal of Business 
Venturing, 3, pp. 123-137 
Nlichel A., Shaked 1., (1986), Takeover madmess: Corporate America Fights back, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. (New York) 
Moschner M., (1989), Management Buy-out HI, Verbreitung und Bedeutung, ÖBA Nr, 1, 
pp. 72-78 
Muscarella C., Vetsuypens M., (1990), Efficiency and organizational structure. A study of 
reverse LBO's. Journal of Finance 45, pp. 1389-1413 
Muzyka D., Birkley S. and Leleux B., (1995), Trade-offs in the investment decisions of 
European venture capitalists, Journal of Business Venturing. 
Nemec E., (1991), Management Buy-outs als innovative Form der Firmeniibernahme,, 
Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitiit Wien, p. 157 
Norton E. and Tennenbaum B., (1992), Factors affecting the structure of venture capital 
deals, Journal of Small Business Management, 30(3), pp. 20-29 
O'Brien V., (1995), Buy-outs. A guide for the management team. London. Euromoney 
books and Orion Publishing, p. 7-17 
OECD Economic Surveys, (1994), Germany 1994, p. 73 
OECD Economic Surveys, (1995), Germany 1995, pp. 1-70, pp. 92-96 
OECD Economic Surveys, (1996), United Kingdom 1996, pp. 1-42, p. 150 
OECD Economic Surveys, (1996), Germany 1996, p. 72 
256 
Oho W, Behrens S. Dr, Schneider J., (1995), Strategics to optimise the German tax 
position for the acquisition of a german. company under the new German law governing the 
reorganization of companies (Pffinder, Vollard, Weber & Axter) 
Palepu K., (1990), Consequences of Leveraged Buy-outs, Journal of Financial Econonks, 
pp. 247-262 
Patricof A., (1988), Leveraged buy-out Erfahrungen in den USA. Dokumentation zum 
Management Buy-out Kongress in Neuss am 01. und 02. Marz 1988, pp. 17-33 
Peters K. /Werner H. S., (1978), Banken als herrschende Unternehmen? Uberlegungen zu 
den Herrschaftsmöglichkeiten von Kreditinstituten in faktischen Unternehmensverbindungen 
im Nichtbankensektor. Die Aktiengesellschaft, 23, pp. 297-309, cited in Kessel A., Der 
Leveraged Buy-out, p. 168 
Phan, Hill, (1995), Organizational restructuring and economic performance in leveraged 
buy-outs, An ex post study, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38, pp. 704-739 
Picot G., (1995), Kauf und Restrukturierung von 
Wirtschaftsrecht, Verlag C. H. Beck, p. 72 
Richards A., (1996), European Venture Capital Journal 
Unternehmen, Handbuch zum 
Roach S. S., (1989), Living with corporate debt, Journal of Applied Corporate Financel pp. 
19-29 
Sagasser, Bula, (1995), Umwandlungen, 6. Umwandlungsmodell als Nüttel der Gestaltung 
eines Unternehmenskaufes 
Sahlmann WA, (1990), The structure and governance of venture capital organizations, 
joumal of Financial Economics, 27, pp. 473-521 
257 
Schmid H., (1994), Leveraged Management Buy-out, Begriff, Gestaltungen, optimale 
Kapitalstruktur und ökonomische Bewertung, Peter Lang Verlag, p. 73 
Seifert J. F., (1991), Erfahrungen eines MBO-Unternehmers nÜt einem zwelmaligen 
Management Buy-out, Dokumentation zum 4. Management Buy-out Kongress, Tund 8. 
Marz 1991, Frankfurt 
Seth A., Easterwood J., (1993), Strategic redirection in large management buy-outs: The 
evidence from post buy-out restructuring activity, Strategic Management Journal, pp. 251- 
274 
Shleifer A, Summers L., (1988), Breach of trust in hostile takeovers. In: Alan Auerbach, 
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
Shleifer A.. Vishny R., (1992), Journal of Finance 
Singh H., (1990), Management Buy-outs and shareholder value, Strategic management 
joumal, Summer special issue, pp. 111-129 
Smith A., (iggo), Corporate ownership structure and performance: The case of 
Management buy-outs, Journal of Financial Economics 27 
Statistisches Bundesamt, (1994), Fachserie 14, Reihe 8, Umsatzsteuer 1992, Stuttgart 
Rödder T., (1995), Konsequenzen des geplanten § 50 c Abs. 11 EStG für das 
Kombinations- und Umwandlungsmodell, DB, Heft 12, p. 599 
Rödder T., Hötzel 0., (1994), Perspektiven für die steueroptimale Forms des 
Unternehmenskaufs, Das Umwandlungsmodell nach dem Regierungsentwurf eines neuen 
Umwandlungsgesetzes, p. 286 
258 
D ; -; Rudder T., Schaumburg, (1995), Umwandlung, Umwandlungssteuergesetz 1995, 
Vermögensübergang auf eine Personengesellschaft oder auf eine natürliche Person, p. 520 
Schipper K., Smith A., (1986), Corporate Income Tax Effects on Management Buy-outs, 
Working paper, University of Chicago 
Schwenkedel S., (1991), Management Buy-out - Ein neues Geschäftsfeld für Banken, 
Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden 
Tanner K., Graper M., Wright M., (1992), Germany and Austria, Eastern Germany 
provides the focus, Acquisitions monthly buy-out supplement, p. 105 
Vest P., (1994), Der Vekauf von Konzernunternehmen durch Management Buy-out, Gabler 
Edition Wissenschaft, Deutscher Universitätsverlag 
Warwick, (1989), The performance of Management buy-outs in the longer term, Warwick 
business school, Touche Ross,, London 
Wine H., Beswick S., (1992), Buying and Selling Private Companies, 4. Edition, London, 
Botterworths 
Wöhe, (1992), Einführung in die Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre, 16. Auflage, 
München, Vahlens Handbücher der Wirtschaft, pp. 690-711 
Wright M., Coyne J., (1985), Management Buy-out, Croom Helm, Beckenham, p. 43-44 
Wright M., Chiplin, Robbie K., (1989), Germany in ist early stages, Acquisitions monthly, 
Buy-out supplement, p. 71 
Wright M., Thompson S. et al, (1989), Management Buy-outs, debt and efficiency, Some 
evidence from the UK 
259 
Wright M., Normand J., Robbie K., (1990), Management Buy-outs, Second Edition, 
Cambridge, Woodhead-Faulkner Ltd.,, p. 74 
Wright M., Thompson S 
., Robbie K., (1990), Management Buy-out from the Pubfic Sector- 
Ownership form and incentive issues, Fiscal studies 
Wright M., Thompson S., Robbie K., (March 1990), Corporate restructuring and the role of 
management and employee buy-outs, An overview of the issues and evidence in the LJK and 
Europe, CN1BOR Occasional paper 21 
Wright M., Thompson S., Robbie K., (1991), Management buy-outs: Past, Present, Future, 
p. 2 
Wright M., Robbie K. et al, (Winter 1991), Managerial equity performance and 
management buy-outs. The European Dimension, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
pp. 47-58 
Wright M., Thompson S., Robbie K., (1992), Venture Capital and Management Led 
Leveraged Buy-outs: A European Perspective, Journal of Business Venturing 7, pp. 47-5 1, 
55 
Wright M., Wilson N., Robbie K., Ennew Ch., (March 1992) CMBOR, Occasional paper 
44 
Wright M., Thompson S., Robbie K., (March 1992), Management equity, ownersip, debt 
and performance, Some evidence from UK Management buy-outs, CMBOR Occasional 
paper 32 
Wright M., Robbie K., (October 1992), Management equity ownership. Debt and 
performance, Some evidence from UK Management Buy-outs. 
Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, pp. 413-430 
260 
Wright M., Robbie K., Thompson S. and Stakey K., (1994), Longlevity and the life cycle of 
MBOs, Strategic Management Journal,, 15, pp. 215-227 
Wright M., Thompson S., Robbie K., Wong P., (June 1995), Management buy-outs in the 
short and long term, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, pp. 461-482 
Wright M., Robbie K., (March 1995), Big deals at last, Acquisitions monthly, March 
Wright M., Robbie K., (Summer 1995), Management Buy-outs, Quaterly review from the 
Centre for Management Buy-out Research, Summer 1995, pp. 3-6 
Wright M., Robbie K., (Winter 1995/1996), Quaterly review from the Centre for 
Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR), pp. 13-30 
Wright M. Robbie K., (March 1996), Family break-up increase in Germany, Acquisitions 
monthly 
Wright M., Robbie K., (March 1996), Acquisitions Monthly, p. 54 
Wright M., Robbie K., (June 1996), Management Buy-outs, 1986-1996, CMBOR, Towards 
the next millenium 
Wright M., Robbie K., (1996), Venture Capitalists and Unquoted Equity Investment 
Appraisal, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 26(l) 
Wright M., Robbie K., (Spring 1997), Chiplin B.; Quaterly review of the CN11BOR 
Wright M., Dial J., Hoskisson R., (1997), A multi-theoretic perspective on leveraged buy- 
outs; Texas A&M University, Nlimeo. 
Wright M., Robbie K., (1997), Venture Capital, International Library of Management, 
Dartmouth Publishing 
261 
Wright M., Wilson, Robbie, (1997), The Longer Effect of Management Led Buy-outs, in P 
Reynolds etal: Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, pp. 555-569, Babson College 
Yago G., (1991), Junk bonds, How high yield securities restructured corporate America. 
New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. I 10 
262 
